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Abstract: 
Potential sUAS BVLOS operational scenarios/use cases and DAA approaches were collected through a 
number of industry wide data calls.  Every 333 Exemption holder was solicited for this same information.  
Summary information from more than 5,000 exemption holders is documented, and the information 
received had varied level of detail but has given relevant experiential information to generalize use cases.  
A plan was developed and testing completed to assess RLOS, a potential key limiting factors for safe 
BVLOS ops.  Details of the equipment used, flight test area, test payload, and fixtures for testing at different 
altitudes is presented and the resulting comparison of a simplified mathematical model, an online modeling 
tool, and flight data are provided.  An Operational Framework that defines the environment, conditions, 
constraints, and limitations under which the recommended requirements will enable sUAS operations 
BVLOS is presented.  The framework includes strategies that can build upon FAA and industry actions that 
should result in an increase in BVLOS flights in the near term. 
 Evaluating approaches to sUAS DAA was accomplished through five subtasks: literature review 
of pilot and ground observer see and avoid performance, survey of DAA criteria and recommended baseline 
performance, survey of existing/developing DAA technologies and performance, assessment of risks of 
selected DAA approaches, and flight testing.  Pilot and ground observer see and avoid performance were 
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DAA systems were assessed by focusing on the Safety Risk Management (SRM) pillar of the SMS (Safety 
Management System) process.  This effort (1) identified hazards related to the operation of sUAS in 
BVLOS, (2) offered a preliminary risk assessment considering existing controls, and (3) recommended 
additional controls and mitigations to further reduce risk to the lowest practical level.  Finally, flight tests 
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The UND and NMSU team was tasked by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with research related 
to Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) for small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS).  A small UAS 
weighs less than 55 pounds.  BVLOS is similar to Extended Visual Line of Sight (EVLOS) and other 
operations where the sUAS is not in the immediate proximity of the operator.  The operating scenario does 
not necessarily include the situation where the sUAS may be out of sight due to a natural or man-made 
occlusion, unless there is a technology solution for that scenario.  So, in general, BVLOS is an operating 
environment where the sUAS is out of sight due to distance and the limitation of the human visual system.  
This report captures a number of elements explored by the team. 
 
Potential sUAS use cases were gathered to assess potential BVLOS applications that may use DAA 
approaches.  Data calls were made through a number of approaches including a Request for Information 
(RFI) in the Federal Business Opportunity (Fed Biz Ops) web site maintained by the Federal Government.  
To supplement the information from Fed Biz Ops, data calls were made to the Technical Analysis and 
Applications Center (TAAC) (operated by New Mexico State University) List Serve as well as published 
on an AUVSI website.  Responses from this process as well as Fed Biz Ops were minimal, with the total 
receipt being approximately 40.  A few use cases were reported and were mostly for mapping, land/area 
monitoring, and straight line inspections.  Use cases reported operating altitudes between 50 and 700 feet 
AGL with the most typical operating altitudes were between 50 and 100 feet AGL.  Use case airspeeds 
ranged between 6 and 33 knots, with an average speed of around 12 knots.  No use cases reported actual 
in-flight climb or descent rates. 
 
A number of Detect and Avoid approaches were highlighted and discussed by seven separate entities – 
ATC; Dynetics, Inc.; Gryphon Sensors, LLC; Honeywell; New Mexico State University; IMSAR; 
Echodyne; and R-Cubed.  Their information is sorted into Ground-Based as well as Airborne/Mixed Detect 
And Avoid (DAA) systems.  Further details on the various DAA systems and contacts have been provided 
to the FAA in a separate Point-Of-Contact Database. 
 
To supplement these data, the 333 Exemption Holders on the FAA website were all reviewed to elicit 
summary sUAS information.  That summary information from more than 5,000 exemption holders is 
contained in this report.  To understand the data that were acquired from the 333 Exemptions, defined uses 
were created to sort each docket by business use, of which there were eleven general uses.  Each of these 
use cases were further divided into subcategories to allow additional definition.  The 333 exemptions 
granted over time for these eleven categories are plotted as a function of time showing the breakdown by 
use. 
 
The types and different platforms requested in the 333 exemptions are also detailed.  The total number of 
use cases collected (where a use case consists of an individual request for a specific UAS or a request to 
use all UAS on the FAA-approved list) is 36,826.  A total of 5,553 dockets were processed.  Most 
applications were for 4-copters (total of 6,586), followed by similar number of requests for fixed-wing 
(818), 6-copter (726), and 8-copter (879).  There were 153 different 4-copter platforms requested.  The 
sUAS data were also analyzed by manufacturer.  Each known model was classified by type and 
manufacturer (there are almost 200 different manufacturers in the listing). 
 
A “333 Use Case/DAA Data Call” was sent to more than 4,400 333 exemption holders for information 
regarding their operations as well as DAA approaches.  Information received as a result of this data call has 
varied in its level of detail but has provided relevant experiential information to generalize use cases.  
Descriptive categories are provided for each response.  Input to the RFI was received that contained 
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proprietary information.  These data are not included in this report, but are archived along with all the raw 
material received in the various information requests. 
 
An assessment of Radio Line of Sight (RLOS) coverage was completed with the goal of assessing the radio 
line-of-sight (RLOS) connection for small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) through testing.  This 
connection element is key to ensuring safe operations, specifically if flying BVLOS.  A description of the 
approach and testing is provided.  Various modeling approaches are discussed and an RLOS range that may 
be achieved in applications of sUAS was developed.  Propagation was modeled using the well-respected 
Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model (Longley and Rice 1968), which was developed by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce in 1968.  The test plan addressed data collection in a test setting to validate the 
developed model.  A number of different approaches can be used to assess the coverage.  A simplified 
mathematical model based on a version of the Longley-Rice model and an online-based Longley-Rice 
model were compared to actual field measurements to assess validity of the simplified input tools. 
 
Static and flight test operations were completed on the unpopulated and NMSU-controlled Chihuahuan 
Desert Ranchland Research Center (CDRRC).  Testing was performed between two 3DR radios (3DR v2 
telemetry SiK radio with the stock antennas), operating at 915 MHz with 100 mW transmitters (20 dBm).  
One unit was placed at 1 m above ground level at various locations on the ranch.  This unit was attached 
directly to a laptop computer running MavLink control software.  This allowed the laptop to record the 
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of both the control unit (laptop) and the remote unit.  The second 
radio was either connected to a fixed pole for the initial testing or to a small UAS.  The resulting data did 
provide a clear demarcation line where the communication link degraded at distance.  For UAS flights, a 
Pixhawk flight control unit was used and mounted as a payload below a quad-copter (remote unit) that was 
operated at 2400 Mhz at a nominal height of 100 ft AGL.  A sampling of test points were also collected at 
200, 300, and 400 ft. AGL.   
 
Field results were plotted and compared to both an on-line calculator [one that incorporates the Longley-
Rice (L-R) model, terrain databases, and user entries for the radio characteristics to produce detailed 
coverage maps], and a simplified Longley-Rice model developed by E. Johnson.  Based on field data, an 
estimated field observable RLOS coverage map was drawn for a visual comparison between the models 
and field observations. 
 
Based on the limited sample and analysis time permitted, the results of the field test indicate that in the 
scenario flown, the simplified model and the on-line calculator models provide too coarse of estimations of 
RLOS coverage.  As the simplified model assumes a uniform terrain type (plains, hilly, mountainous, etc.), 
it cannot adequately account for a radio coverage area that spans multiple terrain types.  This field testing 
has demonstrated that real-world RLOS conditions differ from the analytical models—while the 
mathematical models may attempt to replicate ideal conditions, site specific influences can impact actual 
link distances.  A number of specific conclusions were drawn from this testing and are included in the 
report.  Additional testing in different environments or geographies and with different radio systems or 
frequencies may add to the knowledge base.  This additional testing may be warranted.  With the 
uncertainties shown, it is logical to choose a conservative approach in selecting a safe-and-reliable RLOS 
operational distance. 
 
An Operational Framework that defines the environment and conditions under which the recommended 
requirements will enable sUAS operations BVLOS is presented.  Considerations for BVLOS operations 
involve a number of interrelated elements that are needed for safe flight.  These elements result in potential 
constraints on the systems and operations.  The three elements of significant interest are 1) the conditions 
or locations in which one flies must be conducive to safe flight operations; 2) the operator must operate in 




A series of assumptions and limitations are provided that can facilitate BVLOS operations.  These are also 
supplemented by considering a number of additional considerations, relevant scenarios, the Science And 
Research Panel (SARP) “Well Clear” definition for sUAS, the FAA BNSF Pathfinder Effort, and other 
aircraft considerations.  A number of international activities that provide relevant inputs are also provided.  
The framework may not be prescriptive nor does it include an exhaustive set of actions; the framework 
includes strategies that can build upon FAA and industry actions that should result in an increase in BVLOS 
flights in the near term.  The primary strategies and recommendations to help facilitate sUAS BVLOS 
operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) are: 
1) Require a minimal set of limitations for BVLOS operations 
a. Operating time: daytime 
b. Meteorological Conditions: Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) 
c. Altitude: ~500 feet AGL 
d. Overflight: no densely populated areas 
e. Airport proximity limitations: greater than or equal to 5 miles 
f. Critical operating limitations: greater than or equal to 3 miles of critical infrastructure 
g. Operational control: RLOS will determine distance; no daisy chaining of control stations 
h. Vehicle visibility: optimize color, lighting, and design for conspicuity 
2) Develop a consensus-and research-based design strategy 
3) Utilize common phases of flight to facilitate recommendations and potential regulatory input to the 
FAA 
4) Develop a taxonomy and use cases that result in a manageable set of recommendations for 
regulatory and recommendation purposes 
5) ASTM could lead the development of design and other data for BVLOS operations based upon 
current and proposed research 
6) A DAA system, either airborne or ground-based, must be operational with the system 
7) sUAS BVLOS operations in the NAS can take place without extensive and very expensive 
infrastructure 
8) International operations and requirements should be considered in formulating the BVLOS 
requirements for the USA 
9) Develop a more robust RLOS model for BVLOS 
10) Utilize SMS to assess risk as BVLOS evolves 
11) Utilizing candidate DAA and other enabling BVLOS technologies, develop, verify and validate 
test methodologies for these current systems and apply this to future systems 
12) Anticipate that the near future will demand autonomous BVLOS without a human pilot 
 
Evaluating approaches to sUAS DAA was accomplished through five subtasks: 
1. Literature review of pilot and ground observer see and avoid performance. 
2. Survey of DAA criteria and recommended baseline performance. 
3. Survey of existing/developing DAA technologies and performance. 
4. Assessment of risks of selected DAA approaches. 
5. Flight testing. 
 
Given the existing literature, it is concluded that for relatively small manned aircraft, an optimistic average 
detection distance for manned-aircraft pilots is on the order of 0.8 miles during the daytime, with this 
distance increasing at night through the use of accessory lighting.  (It is noted that this is based upon the 
literature examined herein, and does not include findings from Pathfinder Focus Area II.)  The actual 
manned-aircraft pilot intruder detection distance in a given scenario depends upon many factors, including 
sky condition, cockpit obstructions, and interaction geometries. 
 
Development of DAA criteria—the emphasis here being well clear—was accomplished through working 
with the SARP, which developed the distance-based definition of 2000 ft horizontally and 250 ft vertically 
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for sUAS, and through simulations of sUAS encounters with manned aircraft that were performed within 
this effort.  These simulations indicated that: 
 Some advantages are realized when the horizontal distance for well clear is expanded to 4000 ft.  
When this is done, avoidance of NMAC (Near MidAir Collision) is enabled given that sensors are 
able to provide information regarding needed maneuvers by, minimally, the well-clear threshold. 
 Field Of View (FOV) has a significant impact on maintaining well clear.  A 180° FOV is 
recommended, although a full 360° FOV may be required to handle manned-overtaking-
unmanned scenarios. 
 The UAS autoflight system must be considered as part of the total DAA package.  Any autopilot 
expecting human-in-the-loop control must be capable of aircraft trajectory changes within as few 
control inputs as possible, as being able to respond rapidly significantly enhances the ability to 
maintain well clear. 
 Update rates of sensors should be considered when evaluating sensing distance required to enable 
maintenance of well clear. 
 Using a 1 Hz sensor update rate, a 2000 ft well clear distance could be maintained when the 
simulated sensor range was 1.75 nm.  For a 4000 ft well clear distance, the required sensor 
detection range is 2.6 nm for a fixed wing UA (Unmanned Aircraft) and 3.5 nm for a multi-rotor 
UA. 
 Challenges associated with maneuvering vertically to maintain well clear include ballooning past 
500 ft AGL (Above Ground Level) when operating the UA manually, the threat of crashing into 
the ground if applying a rapid descent while in manual control, and the inability to remain 
vertically well clear with a simulated multi-copter while under waypoint control owing to the 
slowness of the maneuver. 
 
Information regarding sUAS DAA approaches was collected through a literature review, requests for 
information, and direct interactions.  DAA system architectures were defined according to three primary 
characteristics: sensor location (on/off board), degree of autonomy, and sensor type (active/passive).  Given 
these, existing standards (e.g., environmental standards), and developing criteria (e.g., well clear), metrics 
and metrics values were developed for DAA systems, with the metrics divided according to whether the 
sensor is on or off board owing to the importance of SWaP (Size, Weight, and Power) for on board systems.  
These metrics were then used to develop qualitative scores for different DAA approaches.  This process 
produces the following results: 
 Only 11 DAA-intensive companies were identified.  This underscores the relative youth of this 
field. 
 The majority of DAA-intensive companies are pursuing on-board solutions. 
 The only off-board solution being pursued by companies identified as DAA-intensive is radar-
based.  It appears as if other approaches are in earlier stages of development. 
 On board solutions being explored by DAA-intensive companies include active radar, passive 
EO/IR, and passive acoustic.  Of these, radar and EO/IR are the most popular approaches. 
 Off board radar-based systems have advantages regarding sensor performance (e.g., range), with 
the primary barrier being acquisition cost. 
 On board radar-based systems have utilization advantages (e.g., cost, installation), with the primary 
challenges being detection range and FOV within SWaP limitations. 
 On board EO/IR-based systems provide excellent update rates and may provide utilization 
advantages (e.g., cost).  However, FOV and SWaP appear to be challenges. 
 On board passive acoustic approaches appear to enable a complete FOV, with comparable range 
performance at an apparently lower SWaP requirement. 
 Data for some metrics (e.g., probability of detection, false alarm rate, operational environment 
limitations) were severely limited.  Additional data are needed to solidify results. 
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 It is expected that some data are limited owing to a lack of flight testing.  Flight testing would 
enable both characterization of approaches and establishment of standards that will enable future 
system development. 
 
Risks were assessed by focusing on the Safety Risk Management (SRM) pillar of the SMS (Safety 
Management System) process.  This effort (1) identified hazards related to the operation of sUAS in 
BVLOS, (2) offered a preliminary risk assessment considering existing controls, and (3) recommended 
additional controls and mitigations to further reduce risk to the lowest practical level.  Within both ground 
and airborne based DAA systems, hazards generally coalesced into four components (1) Level of 
Autonomy, (2) Hardware, (3) Software, and (4) Sensor.  Risks for nearly 250 hazards were identified within 
this architecture of system states, classified, and offered some degree or method of mitigation.  Of the four 
primary DAA components identified, hazards related to sensor systems were the most numerous at 102, 
followed in decreasing order by those related to software, hardware, and level of autonomy.  Following 
implementation of recommended mitigations and controls, residual risks: 
 For autonomy were expected to reduce to 2 high risks, 13 medium risks, and 10 low risks. 
 For hardware were expected to be reduced to 1 high risk, 1 medium risk, and 59 low risks. 
 For software were expected to be reduced to 1 high risk, 5 medium risks, and 49 low risks. 
 For sensor were expected to be reduced to 20 high risks, 34 medium risks, and 78 low risks.   
Common mitigations that were identified include practical performance evaluation or equivalent, more 
stringent medical standards than those established under 14 CFR §107.17 for crewmembers operating sUAS 
BVLOS, system redundancy, and health monitoring of flight critical processes.  The challenges associated 
with Software Of Unknown Pedigree (SOUP) surfaced repeatedly across the software component, with 
frequent reference to standards such as DO-178 (application of DO-178C as an existing control generally 
resulted in residual risks having the lowest likelihood but commonly high severity owing to the presence 
of single point events/failures).  It is noted that the go-to-ground/land mitigation provides an overarching 
mitigation for alleviating unacceptable residual risk, but can be challenging to implement. 
 
Limited flight testing was performed in conjunction with another research project.  These tests enabled 







The New Mexico State University (NMSU) and University of North Dakota (UND) Alliance for System 
Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE) teams were tasked with researching Detect And 
Avoid (DAA) technology in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) that could enable Beyond the Visual Line 
of Sight (BVLOS) operation of small UAS weighing under 55 lbs (sUAS) within limited portions of the 
National Air Space (NAS) while achieving a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft operating in a 
similar manner.  The NMSU and UND ASSURE teams were tasked with considering the following research 
questions: 
a) What are the requirements for an airborne or ground-based Detect and Avoid system compatible 
with sUAS (55 pounds and less) operating in limited portions of the NAS in order for the sUAS 
pilot to comply with 14 CFR 91.113 in a manner that does not increase the risk to other aircraft, or 
persons on the ground, beyond that currently present in the NAS for similar manned aircraft 
operations?  
b) What are the requirements for a software algorithm(s), if any, to implement these requirements? 
c) What are the most feasible airborne or ground-based sensors that are capable of meeting these 
requirements and are compatible with sUAS size, weight, and power (SWaP), and level-of 
certification constraints? 
 
These questions underlie a research program, with key outputs being development of DAA requirements, 
standards, and, eventually, a rule set that enable BVLOS operations with sUAS.  This report provides the 
output of the first step (first project) within this overall program.  The tasks, and thus output reported herein, 
are divided into two primary tasks: Operational Framework and Comparison of Approaches. 
 
2 Operational Framework 
2.1 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Use Cases and Detect and Avoid Approaches 
2.1.1 Introduction 
2.1.1.1 Background 
The purpose was to reach out and survey the industry’s current uses of small UAS and systems to support 
limited BVLOS to help inform FAA rules, regulations and guidelines.  These current users are the most 
likely source of personnel who will want to fly BVLOS in the future. 
 
The operational framework was to be informed by an analysis of actual and proposed use cases for aviation 
operations (both manned and unmanned) that are conducted primarily from the surface to 500 feet above 
ground level (AGL).  An additional set of use cases that span from the surface to 1,000 feet AGL also were 
to be considered.  The functional and performance requirements of these use cases inform both the 
functional requirements for the UAS and the potential threat posed from other users of the operational 
environment. 
 
2.1.1.2 Assumptions and Limitations 
For this effort, the research assumed the following operating limitations: 
a) Day, visual meteorological conditions (VMC) operations only. 
b) UAS operations will initially be limited to Class G and Class E airspace. 
c) UAS operations will be conducted from the surface to 500 feet AGL, with additional evaluation of 
the potential for operations up to 1,000 feet AGL. 
d) UAS operations will be conducted over other than densely populated areas, unless UAS complies 
with potential criteria or standard that demonstrates safe flights over populated areas. 
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e) UAS will not be operated close to airports or heliports.  ‘Close’ is initially defined as greater than 
3 miles of an airport unless permission is granted from ATC or airport authority.  A distance of 
greater than 5 miles will be examined if needed to support an appropriate level of safety.  
f) UAS operations will be restricted to within radio line of sight (RLOS) of a single, fixed ground-
based transmitter. 
g) Some safety-based design and/or configuration requirements may be specified (aircraft painted in 
a highly-visible paint scheme to facilitate identification by other aircraft, strobe lights, etc.). 
h) Small UAS (sUAS) are potentially designed to an Industry Consensus Standard and issued an FAA 
Airworthiness Certificate or other FAA approval. 
 
2.1.1.3 Investigative Team 
The NMSU Team was led by Henry Cathey.  Members of the team included Stephen Hottman, PhD; 
Zachariah LaRue; Alexander VanHoudt; as well as several students who supported the processing of 
Section 333 data. 
 
2.1.1.4 Report Content 
The report contains the results from various data calls, all for the same information purpose. They were: 
 Initial data call 
o TAAC (Technical Analysis and Applications Center), AUVSI (Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International) 
 Fed Biz Ops RFI 
 Section 333 Exemption Database Compilation 
 Subsequent 333 data call 
 
2.1.2 Initial Data Call and Outcome 
A request for information (RFI) on commercial sUAS use with a focus on Detect and Avoid (DAA) 
procedure and technology was dispersed.  The FAA posted the RFI on Fed Biz Ops, and the RFI 
announcement was distributed to ASSURE External Advisory Board (EAB) and then posted on the 
ASSURE web site on February 12, 2016.  Additional information also was sent through TAAC List Serve 
on February 16, 2016.  Fourteen responses were collected from this data call.  One response discussed 
information for a platform greater than 55 lbs.  One response discussed information on sensor technology 
independent of any sUAS platform.  Two responses discussed operations outside of the U.S.  Ten responses 
discussed sUAS operation for various purposes within the U.S.  These 10 responses listed broad use case 
information, and little information on DAA technology.  DAA procedural and technology description was 
discussed to varying degrees ranging from being present (though without any further description), to “return 
home” functionality with regard to specific DAA technology.  Detection procedure was discussed on a see-
and-avoid level tasked to the PIC and the visual observers.  Additional details on the results are provided 





Table 1. Results of initial data call.  The Xs indicate that the respondent provided data for this category.  The dash 
indicates the respondent did not provide data for this category.  
Respondent sUAS Use Case Detect and Avoid 
Modern Technology Systems, Inc. X - 
Insitu X (Performance Data) - 
NMSU/PSL X X (T&E Data) 
Alexander Technical Coordinators - (No Systems) - (No Systems) 
IMSAR - X 
Dynetics Inc. - X 
Gryphon Sensors - X 
ADS - N/A 
Danish Ministry of Environment and Food N/A N/A 
Kurzprofil N/A N/A 
VideoBank - (Tool Only) N/A 
USDA X - 
 
 
From the initial RFI, 10 UAS use cases were received.  Six were received from NMSU/PSL, while one was 
received from Modern Technology Systems, one from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), and two from Insitu.  Six of these cases were examples of fixed-wing aircraft, while two were 
helicopters and two were quadcopters (4-copters).  Eight sUAS were represented, with weight ranges from 
1.5 lbs to 40 lbs. One non-sUAS was represented, with a weight of 79 lbs. 
 
Typical uses for the systems were mapping, land/area monitoring, and straight-line inspection.  Typical 
flight patterns varied for the different uses.  Mapping and monitoring cases tended to use a “serpentine” 
flight pattern (i.e., a progressive back-and-forth pattern, much like mowing a lawn), while straight-line 
inspections used a linear flight path along whatever was being inspected. 
 
Use cases reported operating altitudes between 50 and 700 feet AGL.  The most typical operating altitudes 
were between 50 and 100 feet AGL. 
 
Use-case airspeeds ranged between 6 and 33 knots, with an average speed of around 12 knots. 
 
No use case reported actual in-flight climb or descent rates.  However, Insitu reported climb rate figures 
(varying with payload, etc.) for the sUAS included in their report. 
 
No use case included detailed DAA information.  Insitu information notes “Insitu AV do not detect.”  One 
sUAS (SenseFly eBee) used by NMSU PSL has in manufacturer’s information lists “mid-air collision 
avoidance” as a feature, but does not go into detail.  No other UAS reported has DAA information readily 
available.  (Use cases do not include any information, and readily available manufacturer’s information has 
no information). 
 
Detect and Avoid technology was discussed by seven separate entities – ATC; Dynetics, Inc.; Gryphon 
Sensors, LLC; Honeywell; New Mexico State University; IMSAR; Echodyne; and R-Cubed.  Their 
information is sorted into Ground-Based as well as Airborne/Mixed Detect and Avoid systems.  Ground-
Based DAA systems included submissions by ATC, which used a VUSIL computer program that senses 
surrounding air traffic and displays it to the pilot ground control station.  A “Detect and Avoid” tool in the 
program indicates conflicts and possible avoidance maneuvers on a separate display.  Flight testing has 




Dynetics, Inc. reported use of a GroundAware Radar, which is technology that can track sUAS, people 
beyond 2 km, and vehicles to >3.5 km within 120° FOV.  This display also can be integrated with optical 
and thermal camera data.  Alert zones indicated in the display notify the user of threats based on location, 
heading, and classification, and automatically slew the camera in that direction.  When multiple ground-
based sensor units are deployed, it gives the user a 360° view. 
 
Gryphon Sensors, LLC reported the use of single-radar detection ranges of DJI Phantom sized targets from 
6-8.5 km, and small, manned targets from 15-20 km. 
 
Honeywell reported the use of multiple sensors and sensor types, which integrated data into DAA 
algorithms.  SAAP (the technology indicated) has the capability of integrating and using threat declaration 
and resolution logic algorithms.  SAAP reportedly can operate with different combinations of cooperative 
and non-cooperative sensors and tracks threats detected for the user. 
 
New Mexico State University reported test data on the Raytheon Sentinel Radar with hot air balloons, 
gliders, and UAS.  Airborne/Mixed DAA Systems included: a submission from IMSAR, which discussed 
a miniaturized radar system with reduced weight and power requirements.  This system was described as 
unique technology to obtain a wide FOV. 
 
Echodyne reported on their MESA technology - a miniaturized radar that electronically steers the radar 
beam without phase shifters.  Details on this system, however, were not yet made public. 
 
R-Cubed reported the use of integrated radar for larger UAS (greater than 55 lbs); however, its functionality 
and display included cooperative/non-cooperative tracking, collision avoidance, weather, ground mapping, 
synthetic aperture radar, and a moving target indicator. 
 
NMSU reported test data on EO, IR, Radar, and acoustic DAA technologies (greater than 55 lbs tested). 
 
2.1.3 Analysis and Outcome of 333 Dockets Data 
Based upon the limited response to the “initial” data call, a team was tasked with deriving relevant 
information from the publicly posted 333 exemptions granted by the FAA.  Over 5,400 individual 
applications were investigated.  A significant number of the exemptions granted included only general 
information on specific use cases, and included no DAA procedural or technological information beyond 
what is given within the allowances provided by a 333 exemption.  A database of applicants, general uses, 
specific uses, sUAS platforms approved per applicant, and point of contact information per applicant was 
developed. 
 
To understand the data that were acquired from the 333 Exemptions, defined uses were created to sort each 
docket by business use.  Eleven general uses were identified, specified as follows:  
 Aerial Data Collection 
 Aerial Photography/Videography 
 Aerial Surveying/Mapping 
 Agriculture 
 Emergency Services 









2.1.3.1 Use Case Definitions 
Where possible, these general uses were broken down further into more specific sub-categories of their 
respective general uses.  This allowed for the collection of a greater amount of information.  The definition 
of each general use is provided below along with the listing of their respective sub-categories.  The detailed 
definitions of each of the sub-categories appears in Appendix A. 
 
Aerial Data Collection: Use cases that are either described simply as “Aerial Data Collection” (or having 
a very similar description), or can most accurately be described as a use involving the collection of data by 
means of sensors or cameras on-board of the sUAS.  Separate from the definitions of “Aerial 
Surveying/Mapping,” “Agriculture,” “Inspection,” and “Research,” the description given of the use case is 
not necessarily specific as to what data are collected, and what purposes the data will be used for. 
- Aerial Data Collection – Construction/Mining 
- Aerial Data Collection – Environmental 
- Aerial Data Collection – General 
- Aerial Data Collection – Insurance 
 
Aerial Photography/Videography: Use cases that are either described simply as “Aerial 
Photography/Videography” (or having a very similar description), or can most accurately be described as 
a use involving the collection of pictures and videos for no other obvious or implied reason than to have 
the pictures or videos taken in the applications listed below. 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – Closed-set filming 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – Construction 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – General 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – News-Gathering 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – Outdoor Activities 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – Real Estate 
- Aerial Photography/Videography – Wedding 
 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping: Use cases that are either described simply as “Aerial Surveying/Mapping” 
(or having a very similar description), or can most accurately be described as a mapping or surveying 
operation for various purposes. 
- Aerial Surveying/Mapping – Agriculture/Mining 
- Aerial Surveying/Mapping – Construction 
- Aerial Surveying/Mapping – Engineering 
- Aerial Surveying/Mapping – General 
 
Agriculture: Use cases that are either described simply as “Agriculture” (or having a very similar 
description), or can most accurately be described as a use involving the collection of data for agricultural 
purposes. 
- Agriculture – Crop Monitoring 
- Agriculture – General 
- Agriculture – Precision Agriculture 
 
Emergency Services: Use cases which are either described simply as “Emergency Services” (or having a 
very similar description), or describe a use case that can be described as aiding police officers, firefighters, 
medical services, etc., or in the investigation of areas that are too dangerous to put a human being in for 
investigative purposes. 
- Emergency Services – Crisis Response 
- Emergency Services – General 
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- Emergency Services – Investigate Hazardous Regions 
 
Flight Training/Education: Use cases which are either described simply as “Flight Training,” “Education” 
(or having a very similar description), or describe a use case involving the training employees, students, or 
other users in the operation of sUAS technology, and/or procedures.  Use cases involved in educating 
individuals on sUAS principles, or in demonstrating concepts in mathematics and sciences which can 
demonstrated by sUAS technology. 
- Flight Training/Education – Education 
- Flight Training/Education – General 
- Flight Training/Education – sUAS Training 
 
Inspection: Use cases that are either described simply as “Inspection” (or having a very similar 
description), or that describe a use case involving the inspection of different kinds of structures or areas for 
safety, upkeep, maintaining of, etc. 
- Inspection – Communications Structures 
- Inspection – Construction 
- Inspection – General 
- Inspection – Insurance 
- Inspection – Oil/Pipeline 
- Inspection – Power plants 
- Inspection – Real Estate 
- Inspection – Structure  
- Inspection – Wind power  
 
Marketing: Use cases that are either described simply as “Marketing” (or having a very similar 
description), or describe the capture of aerial images and videos for the express purpose of using these 
images and videos for the marketing of a business, product, or service. 
- Marketing – Aerial Images 
- Marketing – General 
 
Multiple Applications: Use cases which are either described simply as “Multiple Applications” (or having 
a very similar description), or have been cleared for more than one general use case. 
 
Research: Use cases which are either described simply as “Research” (or having a very similar description), 
or describe a use involving imaging and data collection distinctly for scientific research purposes. 
- Research – Academics 
- Research – Development 
- Research – General 
- Research – Market 
- Research – Operations 
- Research – Product Testing 
- Research – Transportation 
 
Search/Rescue: Use cases that are either described simply as “Search / Rescue,” or describe a scenario 
where a sUAS platform would be used to aid in various search and rescue operations. 
 
Surveillance, Monitoring, etc.: Use cases that are either described simply as “Surveillance,” “Monitoring” 
or having a description that can be categorized in a similar fashion. 
- Monitoring – Environmental 
- Monitoring – General 
- Monitoring – Legal 
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- Monitoring – Safety 
- Monitoring – Security 
 
From the data collected, Aerial Photography/Videography had the most use cases by 333-exemption 
holders, with 13,262 use cases granted between September 2014 and June 29, 2016.  The other most 
common general use cases included Inspection (7596), Aerial Surveying/Mapping (4116), Flight 
Training/Education (2399), and Search/Rescue (1917). 
 
2.1.3.2 Section 333 Analysis and Outcome 
2.1.3.2.1 Date Trends 
The granted 333 exemptions were analyzed by date of posting, and then broken down into their respective 
general uses to reflect the trends of general use requests from September 2014 to June 2016.  This 
information is represented in the cumulative distribution functions in Figs. 1 and 2.  These data were split 















2.1.3.2.2 UAS Categories 
The total number of use cases collected (where a use case consists of an individual request for a specific 
UAS or a request to use all UAS on the FAA-approved list) is 36,826.  A total of 5,553 dockets were 
processed. 
 
The data were analyzed to discover how many use cases requested different categories of UAS, which are 
depicted in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Types of UAS requested.  









All on Pre-approved list 1899 
Unknown/Proprietary/ etc. 273 
 
 
“Unknown” UAS is a catch-all category for UAS that have little data easily available for identification–
these UAS could be proprietary, or, for example, have poor manufacturer’s listed specifications. 
 
The known UAS systems that were identified in exemption requests were analyzed to discover how many 
models were present of each broad type (e.g., fixed-wing, helicopter, etc.) (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Types of UAS.  








Unknown models 146 
Total UAS systems: 489 
 
The “unknown” models in Table 3 roughly correspond to the “unknown” type listed in Table 2. 
 
2.1.3.2.3 Broad Usage Requests 
During the data analysis process, the data were split into three categories: “Grand Totals,” “One General 
Use Totals,” and “Multiple General Use Totals.”  A docket labeled as “One General Use Totals” was 
defined as a 333 exemption that was granted for only one of defined general use cases, a docket labeled as 
“Multiple General Use Totals” was defined as a 333 exemption that was granted for two or more general 
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use cases, and the data used in the “Grand Totals” table added the information from the “One General Use 
Totals” and the “Multiple General Use Totals” together.  The distinction between “One General Use” and 
“Multiple General Uses” was drawn to highlight the trend of 333 applicants requesting exemption for 
several unrelated general use cases, and to draw attention to the trend in the data that showed exemption 
holders that only applied for clearance for one general use and typically requested clearance for use from a 
smaller number of general use categories (namely Aerial Data Collection, Aerial 
Photography/Videography, Aerial Surveying/Mapping, and Inspection). 
 
The data were analyzed for both general and more specific use cases.  Each 333 Exemption required a usage 
in the application.  These requestor-specific usages were sorted into broad categories of usage for the 
database, then further into narrower categories for more in-depth analysis.  These data are sorted into the 














AERIAL DATA COLLECTION 1865 437 1428 
Aerial Data Collection - Construction / Mining 62 26 36 
Aerial Data Collection - Environmental 199 20 179 
Aerial Data Collection - General 1518 367 1151 
Aerial Data Collection - Insurance 86 24 62 
        
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY/VIDEOGRAPHY 13262 3081 10181 
Aerial Photography/Videography - Closed-set 
Filming 
1630 329 1301 
Aerial Photography/Videography - Construction 951 199 752 
Aerial Photography/Videography - General 6128 1648 4480 
Aerial Photography/Videography - News-Gathering 683 47 636 
Aerial Photography/Videography - Outdoor 
Activities 
279 41 238 
Aerial Photography/Videography - Real Estate 3336 773 2563 
Aerial Photography/Videography - Weddings 255 44 211 




AERIAL SURVEYING/MAPPING 4116 285 3831 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping - Agriculture/Mining 931 44 887 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping - Construction 116 14 102 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping - Environmental 88 11 77 





    
AGRICULTURE 1437 84 1353 
Agriculture - Crop Monitoring 197 15 182 
Agriculture - General 752 29 723 
Agriculture - Precision Agriculture 488 40 448 
        
EMERGENCY SERVICES 720 52 668 
Emergency Services - Crisis Response 254 37 217 
Emergency Services - General 443 4 437 
Emergency Services - Investigate Hazardous Regions 23 11 14 
        
FLIGHT TRAINING/EDUCATION 2399 29 2370 
Flight Training/Education - Education 404 2 402 
Flight Training/Education - General 36 9 27 
Flight Training/Education - sUAS Flight Training 1959 18 1941 




Table 4 continued. 
INSPECTION 7596 675 6921 
Inspection - Communications Structure 282 22 260 
Inspection - Construction 679 52 627 
Inspection - General 3863 253 3610 
Inspection - Insurance 153 23 130 
Inspection - Oil/Pipeline 417 36 381 
Inspection - Power Plants 575 98 477 
Inspection - Real Estate 401 47 354 
Inspection - Structure 951 109 842 
Inspection - Wind Power 275 35 240 
        
MARKETING 496 18 478 
Marketing - Aerial Imaging 5 5 0 
Marketing - General 491 13 478 
        
RESEARCH 1327 149 1178 
Research - Academics 90 11 79 
Research - Development 271 12 259 
Research - General 743 68 675 
Research - Market 12 0 12 
Research - Operations 120 41 79 
Research - Product Testing 17 6 11 
Research - Transportation 74 11 63 
      
 
  
SEARCH/RESCUE 1917 19 1898 
Search/Rescue - General 1917 19 1898 
        
SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING, ETC. 1691 69 1622 
Monitoring - Environmental 702 2 700 
Monitoring - General 459 2 457 
Monitoring - Legal 30 1 29 
Monitoring - Safety 160 53 107 















Figure 5. 333 exemptions granted for multiple types of uses: Sep. 2014 – Jun. 2016.   
 
 
2.1.3.2.4 Use by UAS Type 
The uses of each exemption were analyzed further by first separating the broad types of UAS (e.g., fixed-
wing, helicopter, etc.), then by the usage request categories.  That is, researchers checked how many 
requests in each use case category there were for each broad type of UAS.  The following data are presented 
in Table 5. 
 
The sUAS data were analyzed by manufacturer.  Each known model was classified by type and 
manufacturer.  There were a large number of manufacturers.  The table that summarizes this information is 
included in Appendix B.  It makes explicit how many of the categorized platforms are manufactured by any 
particular company, as well as how many categorized platforms of each type of UAS (i.e., fixed-wing, 




Table 5. Use by UAS type.  
 Fixed-wing Helicopter 2-copter 4-copter 5-copter 6-copter 8-copter 12-copter FAA List UNCL 
Aerial Data 
Collection 




42 6 1 1766 0 176 213 7 467 57 
Aerial Surveying / 
Mapping 
101 1 0 132 0 17 21 0 62 9 
Agriculture 42 0 0 19 1 9 4 0 5 5 
Delivery 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emergency 
Services 
5 0 0 39 0 10 3 0 3 0 
Flight Training / 
Education 
23 0 0 32 0 3 6 1 5 3 
Inspection 13 2 4 241 0 37 39 0 61 13 
Marketing 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 0 7 1 
Multiple 
Applications 
499 8 9 3913 3 428 521 1 1193 159 
Research 17 1 1 88 0 15 14 0 17 9 
Search / Rescue 3 0 0 14 0 1 1 0 4 2 
Surveillance, 
Monitoring, etc. 




2.1.4 Section 333 Use Case/DAA Data Call 
Approximately 4,500 333 exemption-holders were contacted by email with a similar message to that sent 
out in the FEDBIZOPS data call.  The responses appear in Appendix C.  The responses are re-structured 
but otherwise unedited responses from the exemption holders.  Some of the responses included information 
in all the categories requested (very detailed responses) while others included information but not in all 
categories requested (less detailed responses).  The descriptive categories provided for each response 







Climb / Descent Rates 
Flight Patterns 
 
Below is a short listing summary of the types of responses received. (Full responses are presented in 
Appendix C.) 
 
2.1.4.1 Very Detailed Responses 
A & R Video.  POC: Andrew Sommer, asommer@arvideo.com  
Monthly construction photography on primarily linear construction projects such as road 
widening, drainage improvements, water and sewer line installations.  
 
Empire Unmanned.  POC: Joseph Stewart, joseph.swart@adavso.com  
Application: Agriculture 
Application: Mining 
Application: Aerial Surveying 
Application: Classification and Species Identification 
Application: Sawmill Inventory 
Application: Fire Fighting 
Application: Real Estate 
 
Boulder Emergency Services, POC: Steve Lanaghen, stevelanaghen@boulderrescue.org  
Search and Rescue 
 
Kansas State University.  POC: Travis Balthazor, travisb@ksu.edu  
Varied use cases 
 
2.1.4.2 Less Detailed Responses 
Delta Southern UAS.  POC: Preston White, preston@deltasouthernuas.com  
UAS in agriculture to determine plant health, in law enforcement to get a usable image for planning 
purposes, for disaster relief and search and rescue by providing EMS with an up to date image of 
the affected area 
 
Mike Knudsen Photography.  POC: Mike Knudsen, mike@mikeknudsenphotography.com  
Primarily for real estate work 
 
SurvTech Solutions.  POC: Jordan Kowenski, jkowenski@survtechsolutions.com  
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Surveying, Photogrammetry, Mapping 
 
Rapid Aerial LLC.  POC: Matt Roderick, matt@rapid-aerial.com  
Rural utility line and substation inspections  
Photogrammetric Surveys  
 
DuPage County, Illinois.  POC: Lucy Chang, lucy.chang@dupageco.org  
Currently, the UAS is primarily used to inspect County flood control facilities and capture 
photographs and video footage from high elevations for use in County publications, presentations, 
and technical reports.  Plan to expand the use of the UAS to include the monitoring of wetlands in 
locations that are difficult to access on foot, and monitor water quality at storm sewer outfalls. 
 
SelectTech GeoSpatial.  POC: Frank J. Beafore, fbeafore@sgamf.com  
Varied with development of UAS as a driver 
 
Forza RPV.  POC: Gil, gil@forzarpv.com  
sUAS powerline inspection program 
 
Atlanta Drone Operations.  POC: Pete Wambolt, pete@atldrone.com  
Variety of different operations.  Most of our uses are for aerial photography/videography.  Also 
have done work with 3D mapping and have worked on a few shoots for up and coming TV 
shows. 
 
JimmyC LTD.  POC: Jimmy Clark, jimmyclark@usa.com  
Insurance building damage assessment post catastrophic event such as earthquake, hurricane, 
tornado, explosion and flood. 
 
Trans-Global Production.  POC: Bob Bailey, bbailey@cableone.net  
Video of an auto dealership showing aerial view of dealership buildings and inventory 
Video of golf course property showing buildings, water hazards and fairways/greens 
Video of a tennis tournament in progress 
Aerial shots of the Christmas parade 
Video at our local football stadium, of the high school graduations 
 
Several responses that included complete data to the RFI were received.  The responses were first separated 
into two primary categories–fixed-wing UAS and multicopter UAS.  Once separated, key quantitative data 
points were analyzed for differences.  These data points were average flight duration (in minutes), average 
flight altitude (in feet above ground level), and average airspeeds (in miles per hour). The data are presented 
in Tables 6-7. 
 
 
Table 6. Multicopter characteristics.  
 Flight Duration 
(minutes) 
Flight Altitude (Feet 
AGL)  
Speed (MPH) 
Mean 20.34 154.31 17.97 
Standard Deviation 11.29 77.09 11.57 





Table 7. Fixed-wing characteristics.  
  Flight Duration 
(minutes) 
Flight Altitude (Feet 
AGL)  
Speed (MPH) 
Mean 41.43 342.33 39.98 
Standard Deviation 17.79 112.00 13.68 
Median 50 360 46.98 
 
 
While there is not enough data to accept these numbers as representative, there is a clear divide in the usages 
of multicopter and fixed-wing UAS.  Average flight duration, flight altitude, and speed of fixed-wing UAS 
are all nearly double that of the respective categories for multicopter UAS. 
 
Qualitative data about flight patterns used was also summarized.  Four general patterns were categorized – 
elongated “s”-patterns, cross/grid patterns, linear flight, and hovering/circling a target/object. The data are 
provided in Tables 8-9. 
 
 
Table 8. Flight patterns.  
 Multicopters Fixed-Wing 
S-Pattern 4 3 
Cross/Grid 7 2 
Linear 4 1 
Hover/Circle 8 0 
 
 
The received data show a clear pattern evident in the Section 333 requests: There are far more multicopters 




Table 9. Flight pattern descriptions.  
Platform Location Takeoff Time Flight Duration 
Tarot 650 Quad Florida Usually Mid to Late Afternoon 
Typically 1 - 6 flights in a day lasting 4 - 12 minutes 
each, with the longest lasting up to 20 minutes 
Tarot 690 Hexa Florida Usually Mid to Late Afternoon 
Typically 1 - 6 flights in a day lasting 4 - 12 minutes 
each, with the longest lasting up to 20 minutes 
    
Sensefly eBee Ag 
Washington 
State and Idaho Dependent on client's needs 15 - 30 minutes 
 DJI Phantom 2 
Washington 
State and Idaho Dependent on client's needs 15 - 30 minutes 
    
DJI Phantom 2 
Boulder 
County, CO 
Most flights around noon, though some start as 
early as 09:00, and some start as late as 17:00 1 - 29 min with an average of 14 min 
 DJI Phantom 3 
Boulder 
County, CO 
Most flights around noon, though some start as 
early as 09:00, and some start as late as 17:00 1 - 29 min with an average of 14 min 
 DJI S1000 
Boulder 
County, CO 
Most flights around noon, though some start as 
early as 09:00, and some start as late as 17:00 1 - 29 min with an average of 14 min 
    
DJI S1000+ Central Kansas Typically close to solar noon 22 - 28 min 
3D Robotics Aero 
(built by Kansas 
State) Central Kansas Typically close to solar noon 40 - 55 min 
3DR X8+ Salina, KS During daylight hours 18 - 25 min 
DJI S1000+ Salina, KS During daylight hours 18 - 25 min 
DJI Inspire Salina, KS During daylight hours 18 - 25 min 
 PrecisionHawk 
Lancaster MKIII Salina, KS During daylight hours 40 - 55 min 
3D Robotics Aero 
(built by Kansas 
State) Salina, KS During daylight hours 40 - 55 min 
3D Robotics Aero 
(built by Kansas 
State) Central Kansas Typically close to solar noon 40 - 55 min 
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DJI Inspire Central Kansas Typically close to solar noon 18 - 22 min 
    
Sensefly eBee; DJI 
S900 
Mississippi 
Delta During Daylight Hours 
Usually roughly 10 min, but can last up to 40 min 
depending on the wind 
    




complexes Typically between 9am and 7pm > 20 min 
    
Non-specified 
Quad-Copter Southeast US During Daylight Hours 15 - 100 min 
Non-specified Fixed 
Wing Southeast US During Daylight Hours 15 - 100 min 
    
DJI Phantom 3 Pro 
Southwest 
Idaho Typically between 10am and 12pm local 10 - 20 min 
 DJI Inspire 1 Pro 
Southwest 
Idaho Typically between 10am and 12pm local 10 - 20 min 
    
DJI Phantom 3 
Dupage 
County, IL Varies 4 flights at a time of up to 15 min 
    
 
Springfield, 
OH   
    
Not specified Not specified Not Specified Not specified 
    
DJI Phantom 3 
Professional 
In and around 
Atlanta, GA 
Most flights take place between 10am and 4pm, 
though some will happen later for artistic reasons Around 15 min with 5 - 10 flights in total 
DJI Inspire 
In and around 
Atlanta, GA 
Most flights take place between 10am and 4pm, 
though some will happen later for artistic reasons Around 15 min with 5 - 10 flights in total 
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 DJI Phantom 3 
Anywhere in 
the United 
States Daytime business hours 15 - 60 min 
DJI Phantom 2; 
Anywhere in 
the United 
States Daytime business hours 15 - 60 min 
    









2.1.5 Fed Biz Opps Data Call 
The Fed Biz Ops data call was released by the FAA. 
 
The overall response to the Fed Biz Ops was not robust.  Some of the responders also included proposed 
enhancements to the current technology for use by BVLOS operators in the future.  The summary list of 
responses included the following: 
 
Stinger Ghaffarain Technologies (SGT) 
SGT provided a proposed ground-based detect and avoid (GBDAA) technology.  SGT also 
proposed a concept of operations (not an actual use case), for use in Class G airspace 
SoHaR Incorporated 
Provided a proposed self-sensing error process for flight platforms.   
Gryphon Sensors 
Provided information on theoretical GBDAA technology, the costs and benefits of that technology, 
and some details on the TRL9 - a GBDAA sensor which can detect a DJI Phantom-sized obstacle 
from 6 - 8.5 km away, and small manned aircraft from 15-20 km away. 
Harris Corporation 
Provided general information on its DAA systems.  
Thales Defense & Security 
Described a ground-based, passive detection system – essentially a cloud of multiple ground-based 
sensors that are able to detect in 3D the locations of multiple aircraft, then feed that information 
into larger aircraft TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) systems and/or ATC systems. 
AirMap 
Described software designed to aid drone operators and manned aircraft in being aware of the 
other’s presence in airspace. 
Empire Unmanned 
Described several general uses of sUAS. 
SRC Inc. 
Described a ground-based DAA system. 
Accelerated Development & Support (ADS) 
Proposed to do the research this program is intended to do – collect use cases, evaluate DAA 
technologies (both onboard and ground-based), etc. 
 
The more detailed responses for the above are provided below. 
 
Stinger Ghaffarain Technologies (SGT) provides a proposed ground-based detect and avoid (GBDAA) 
technology.  They propose a use for this technology in rural areas with no sources of electromagnetic 
interference with the operating frequencies.  There may be other obstacles present in these cases when they 
do not interfere with the GBDAA systems, however.  One or more ground-based radar units could be paired 
with one or more Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) ground receivers (and supporting 
equipment, such as antennae, power sources, etc.),  The data from the sensors display a visual depiction of 
the airspace state, with varying levels of integration of the sensed data.  They do not quantify how much 
time is sufficient for completing an avoidance maneuver, and assume that this will be supplied or 
determined externally.  Examples of maneuvers include: Abort and return to base, Divert and loiter 
(descend/ascend to a safe altitude and loiter at that location until otherwise commanded), Divert and land 
(suspend current flight plan, followed by a descent at the maximum descent rate from wherever located), 
Land immediately, Terminate into an uncontrolled drop. 
 
SGT also proposed a concept of operations (not an actual use case) for use in Class G airspace.  In addition 
to detection technology and avoidance maneuvers, SGT proposes crew and procedures involving: 
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Supporting logic for decision-making, which can be automatic, procedural, or experience-based; Possibly 
one or more visual observers (VOs), to provide supplementary surveillance in the radar cone of silence; A 
suite of conflict resolution and avoidance procedures/maneuvers, issued under the direction of a single 
safety authority charged with safety-related decision making and establishment of contingency procedures 
to address emergencies arising from a compromise of the GBDAA system; Supporting crew members, with 
the appropriate procedures, suitably trained and equipped to operate the system. 
 
SoHaR Incorporated provided a proposed self-sensing error process for flight platforms.  The self-sensing 
process attempts to determine the discrepancy between a location that a pilot (or pre-planned flight plan) is 
trying to place the platform, and the actual location of the platform itself.  This proposed technology can 
do this whether the error is caused by hardware, software, or the environment.  The proposed system detects 
any error between the intended status of the platform by the PIC and the actual status of the platform itself, 
and directs the platform to its intended location.  No avoidant methods are discussed.  The intended process 
is to bring the output from the platform into agreement with the command from the PIC.  This is 
accomplished by feeding back a representation of the output and subtracting it from the command.  The 
difference between the two is the error signal that is used by the process to bring the output into closer 
agreement with the command.  Deterioration, such as friction of an output element, will cause an increase 
in its value.  Monitoring of the error signal can provide information about: overall health, type of anomaly 
(can distinguish between friction, backlash, or electronic causes), and prognostics. 
 
Gryphon Sensors provided information on theoretical GBDAA technology, the costs and benefits of that 
technology, and some details on the TRL9—a GBDAA sensor which can detect a DJI Phantom-sized 
obstacle from 6-8.5 km away, and small manned aircraft from 15-20 km away.  It is capable of detecting 
hundreds of targets simultaneously and presents the information to the PIC in a Common Ethernet interface 
with customizable output.  No avoidant methods are discussed, however the information on the benefits 
and drawbacks of GBDAA technology, such as a smaller range for low-flying aircraft, an ability to track 
multiple platforms at a time (thus reducing cost), a reduced operating weight for the platform, and its 
inappropriateness for long endurance flights are provided. 
 
Harris Corporation provided general information on its DAA systems.  They synthesize real-time, FAA 
derived ADS-B data (en-route and terminal secondary surveillance radars, airport surface detection 
equipment-X band, Wide Area Multilateration, and flight plan data) to feed their Symphony line of 
platforms.  With the given information provided for their Symphony line, their RangeVue system easily 
incorporates additional surveillance sources, including third-party inputs; it conducts centralized DAA 
processing based on available input sources and trajectory predictions, and issues alerts, warning, and 
maneuver guidance to the PIC. 
 
The response from Thales Defense & Security described a ground-based, passive detection system – 
essentially a cloud of multiple ground-based sensors that are able to detect in 3D the locations of multiple 
aircraft, then feed that information into larger aircraft TCAS systems and/or ATC systems. 
 
The response from AirMap described software designed to aid drone operators and manned aircraft in being 
aware of the other’s presence in airspace.  The software appears to alert UAS users of near-proximity 
manned aircraft through the use of flight tracking via Four-dimensional flight tacking, calculated from a 
UAS user or FAA-filed flight plan (no active tracking). 
 
The response from Empire Unmanned described several general uses of sUAS.  Five cases utilize a fixed-
wing aircraft.  These cases use the SenseFly eBee Ag. The first case was to collect images of fields for 
farmers to improve their practices.  The second case was to help mining operations calculate volumes of 
gravel piles, map terrain, and survey.  The third case was to survey engineering installations.  The fourth 
case is to collect spectrally-filtered images to identify aquatic plants.  The fifth case was to collect images 
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to aid a sawmill in calculating log stockpiles.  These use cases all used a combination of elongated 
serpentine and cross-pattern flight patterns. 
 
Two additional cases each used the DJI Phantom 2.  The first case was used for post-fire damage assessment 
of a forest fire.  The second case was for video collection of real estate for commercial promotion.  The 
response notes in particular this case was primarily reserved for large, secluded estates due to the rule of 
500’ separation from non-participants.  Neither of these cases used a particular flight pattern – both were 
flown as necessary. 
 
The response from SRC Inc. described a ground-based DAA system.  The system looks at multiple “shells” 
of airspace (operational volume, where the UAS can be; Declarational volume, encompassing the 
operational volume and the edges of where the operator should be advised of another aircraft’s presence; 
and site surveillance volume, which encompasses the two smaller levels and is far larger than either).  Using 
a variety of sensors, the system detects and classifies the UAS and other aircraft, alerting the UAS operator 
as necessary and recommending a course of action to ensure all aircraft maintain safety. 
 
The response from Accelerated Development & Support (ADS) proposed to do the research this program 
is intended to do – collect use cases, evaluate DAA technologies (both onboard and ground-based), etc. 
 
2.1.6 Summary 
The NMSU ASSURE team has gathered a database of general use cases from a Fed Biz Ops RFI, as well 
as an investigation of 333 exemption requests.  Personalized requests for more detailed information have 
been written, and have been sent to 333 exemption holders. 
 
2.1.6.1 sUAS RLOS Limitation Assessment 
Within the individual example use cases provided in the individual 333 exemptions that were investigated, 
very few instances are given where a sUAS platform’s capabilities outside of the guidelines given for a 333 
exemption are discussed.  Ranges that are listed in the database are typically limitations given by the 
manufacturer.  In the manufacturers’ given specifications of their platforms, it is not always apparent what 
the limiting factor is in the platforms’ range (e.g. power limitations or communications limitations).  
However, in the instances where the effective distance in which the controller and sensors can communicate 
was given, a range of to 500 m to 50 km was provided.  Most of these cases can be placed into one of two 
categories: (1) those where the platform’s controller can only effectively communicate up to 1 km; and (2) 
those where the platform’s controller is listed as being capable of effective communication up to 5 km 
(usually with an explanation that this maintains FCC compliance).  In certain uses, manufacturers mention 
that the range can be extended through the use of relays. 
 
2.1.6.2 sUAS RLOS Boundary Recommendation 
These range limitations vary widely (ranging from 59 m to 265 km dependent on the platform).  It is not 
apparent from most of the descriptions listed in the 333 exemption applications when or how often the 
sUAS platforms are being used to their full range (or close to it), just as it is not immediately apparent what 
measures are being used to extend a platform’s range to the farthest distances from the operator.  As with 
the RLOS Limitation Assessment, most individual applications for 333 exemptions list ranges that fall into 
one of two categories: (1) those where the platform’s controller can only effectively communicate up to 1 
km; and (2) those where the platform’s controller is listed as being capable of effective communication up 
to 5 km. 
 
2.1.6.3 sUAS Use Case Data Collection/Analysis 
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164 unique, specific use cases were identified out of the applications for 333 exemptions investigated.  
These specific and unique use cases were grouped into 16 general use case categories.  These categories 
included the following: 
 

















2.2 Radio Line Of Sight (RLOS) 
2.2.1 Test Plan 
2.2.1.1 Introduction 
A radio line-of-sight (RLOS) range that may be achieved in applications of small unmanned aircraft systems 
(sUAS) was developed.  Propagation is modeled using the well-respected Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain 
Model (Longley and Rice 1968), which was developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1968.  The 
test plan will address data collection in a test setting to validate the developed model. 
 
This test plan will evaluate and analyze the variances between the Longley-Rice model with terrain, 
Longley-Rice model without terr1ain, and field truth measurements in a real-world setting.  A simplified 
model without terrain would be more easily incorporated into an operator’s safety guideline as safe 
operational distances could be incorporated into aeronautical charts and tables rather than requiring field 
access to a complex computer model.  The intent of this test plan is to determine if this concept of simplified, 
table-based flight safety criteria, would be a valid option in the development of safety regulations and 
guidance for sUAS operations. 
 
A number of factors affect the modeled RLOS range, including the following: 
 Terrain 
 Weather 
 Frequency in use 
 Antenna gains at the ground station and the aircraft 
 Transmitter power 
 Receiver sensitivity 
 
RLOS operation of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) seems practical over distances of a few miles 
in mountainous terrain, and up to greater than 50 miles over flat terrain.  The greatest ranges are achieved 
when using a high-gain antenna at the ground control station, but this may require actively steering the 
antenna to track the UAS in flight. 
 
Popular radio frequencies for the control link include the 433 and 900 MHz as well as 2.4 GHz bands, 
where both licensed and unlicensed operations are possible.  Achieving the benefits offered by a high-gain 
directional antenna, however, will usually require the operator to be licensed by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and to use a frequency outside the unlicensed Industrial, Scientific, 
and Medical (ISM) bands. 
 
2.2.1.2 Model Assumption 
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The test plan will address aspects of the model in a real-world setting. 
 
2.2.1.2.1 Line of Sight Radio Propagation 
Line-of-sight radio propagation can be modeled in four regimes, of increasing range: 
 Free space, where the range is so short that only the direct path from the transmitter to the receiver 
is important. 
 Two-ray, which extends beyond the free space regime to the geometric horizon.  In this large range, 
the received signal is modeled as a direct ray plus a ray reflected from the terrain. 
 Diffraction, which models radio energy that is diffracted by the terrain for some distance over the 
horizon. 
 Scattering, which extends beyond the diffraction range. 
 
The RLOS range limit for sUAS applications typically will fall in the two-ray or the diffraction regime, 
depending on the characteristics of the radios and the terrain. 
 
2.2.1.2.1.1 Geometric Line of Sight 
The first step in bounding the RLOS range for sUAS is to determine the horizon distance.  This is the range 




Figure 6. Horizon distance over irregular terrain.   
 
 
Here, he1 is the elevation of the antenna at the Ground Control Station (GCS), he2 is the altitude of the UAS, 
and dL1 and dL2 are the distances from each to the highest point of the intervening terrain.  The geometric 
LOS (Line of Sight) range is dL = dL1 + dL2.  From the figure, it is clear that if the UAS flies beyond this 
range (at altitude he2) it will lose the direct radio path and enter the diffraction regime. 
 
Mathematically, we can express the geometric line-of-sight range dL in terms of the antenna heights, the 
effective Earth radius1 a, and a terrain roughness factor ∆h, as in the Longley-Rice model (Table 10). 
 
 
                                                     
1 To accommodate the refractive index gradient near the Earth’s surface, a value of 4/3 the Earth’s actual radius is 
commonly used: a = 8497 km. 
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Table 10. Terrain roughness factor as in the Longley-
Rice model.  
Type of Terrain ∆h in m 
Watery or very smooth plains 0 - 5 
Smooth plains 5 - 20 
Slightly rolling plains 20 - 40 
Rolling plains 40 - 80 
Hills 80 - 150 
Mountains 150 - 300 
Rugged mountains 300 - 700 
Extremely rugged mountains > 700 
 
 
The horizon distances over a smooth surface are then 
 
   (1) 
 
from which the horizon distances over irregular terrain are computed: 
 
  . (2) 
 
Antenna heights in these formulas are in meters, and distances are in kilometers.  Figure 7 shows several 









2.2.1.2.1.2 Radio Line of Sight 
Actual RLOS range may be greater (or less) than the geometric line-of-sight (horizon) distance, depending 
on where the radio signal becomes too weak.  Pertinent radio characteristics include 
 Antenna gains at the GCS and UAS 
 Transmitter power 
 Receiver sensitivity 
 Frequency in use 
 
A number of online calculators are available that incorporate the Longley-Rice model, terrain databases, 
and user entries for the radio characteristics to produce detailed coverage maps.  One such online calculator 
is offered by the Canadian Communications Research Centre (CRC) at http://lrcov.crc.ca/main/.  An 




Figure 8. Example RLOS coverage map (GCS at Las Cruces Airport).  The red contour 
surrounding the gray regions shows the RLOS range limits for one possible suite of radio 
equipment.   
 
 
While this level of detail may be useful locally, a general formulation of RLOS range in terms of ∆h, UAS 




2.2.1.2.2 Application to sUAS 
The Longley-Rice report (1968) includes methods for estimating signal loss over radio paths using either 
detailed knowledge of the terrain (as in Fig. 8) or more generically using a terrain roughness factor ∆h.  If 
the latter approach is combined with the characteristics of example radio equipment, generic estimates of 
RLOS ranges over various types of terrain can be produced. 
 
2.2.1.2.2.1 Typical sUAS Radio Specifications 
Common operating frequencies for sUAS are the 433 and 900 MHz bands, as well as 2.4 GHz, with 900 
MHz especially common.  The Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands at 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz 
offer the possibility of unlicensed operation: 
 The ScanEagle sUAS (Wilke 2007) is reported to have an effective RLOS range of 50-100 km (30-
60 miles) at 2000 feet altitude, when using a 900 MHz control link and a 1.8 m dish antenna (Fig. 
9). 
 An example 900 MHz industrial radio (Freewave Technologies 2014) offers a power output up to 
1 W (30 dBm, the FCC limit), a receive sensitivity of -108 dBm, and a link range of up to 60 miles. 
 900 MHz antennas for the GCS are available with a range of antenna gains.  For example, a GNS 
Wireless HG918G-NF dish has 18 dBi gain (16.5° vertical/horizontal beam width), while Laird 
OD9 series antennas offer omnidirectional gains of 5, 6, 8, and 11 dBi. 
 




Figure 9. Example dish antenna about 2 m above ground.   
 
 
2.2.1.2.2.2 Weather Effects 
Weather affects LOS radio links in two ways: 
 
31 
 Moisture in the atmosphere (snow, rain, or fog) and on vegetation can absorb radio frequency 
energy, especially around 2.4 GHz.  Lower frequencies experience less loss. 
 Wind does not affect the radio signal directly but can move or twist antennas.  This can move the 
beam of a highly directional (high-gain) antenna, resulting in a fluctuating received signal level.  
Another effect in arid areas is a build-up of static electricity on antennas due to wind-blown dust 
and sand.  In extreme cases, this can damage a sensitive radio receiver. 
 
The designers of LOS radio links usually compensate for weather effects by building in a “fade margin” 
(i.e., raising the needed signal strength at the receiver by, for example, 15 dB). 
 
2.2.1.2.2.3 Expected RLOS Ranges with 900 MHz Radios 
Using these examples, sUAS radio specifications and a fade margin are used to compute the allowed loss 
of signal strength over a RLOS path.  From this, the Longley-Rice model can be used to find the RLOS 
range limit.  Radio ranges can be evaluated using both a high-gain and an omnidirectional (omni) antenna.  
A 6 dBi omnidirectional antenna was chosen to yield 36 dBm EIRP (Equivalent Isotropically Radiated 
Power), the maximum allowed by the FCC for unlicensed operation in the 900 MHz band.  The link budgets 
are shown in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 11. Link budgets for high-gain and omni-directional antennas.  
 High-Gain Omni   
Transmit power 30 dBm 30 dBm 
Transmit antenna gain 18 dBi 6 dBi 
Receiver antenna gain -2 dBi -2 dBi 
Receiver sensitivity -108 dBm -108 dBm 
Fade margin 15 dB 15 dB 
Allowed path loss 139 dB 127 dB 
 
 
RLOS range limits for high-gain and omnidirectional GCS antennas at a height of 2 m are shown in Figs. 
10 and 11, respectively, as a function of sUAS operating altitude (numerical results plotted in the following 
graphs are included in the Section 2.2.1.2.5).  sUAS operating altitudes in all of the figures that follow are 






Figure 10. RLOS range for 900 MHz system, high-gain dish antenna 




Figure 11. RLOS range for 900 MHz system, 6 dBi omni antenna 2 m 
above ground.   
 
 
The RLOS range depends strongly on the terrain.  If RLOS range is plotted versus terrain roughness at the 
two altitudes of interest (500 and 1000 feet above ground/nominal terrain – reference he2 in Fig. 6), the 






Figure 12. 900 MHz RLOS range vs terrain, high-gain dish 




Figure 13. 900 MHz RLOS range vs terrain, 6 dBi omni 
antenna 2 m above ground.   
 
 
Next, two alternatives to the baseline GCS setup are evaluated.  First, an operator seeking extended range 
might mount a dish antenna on a 5 m tower.  The resulting range is compared to the 2 m case in Fig. 14, for 






Figure 14. 900 MHz RLOS range, high-gain dish antenna at 5 m vs 2 
m.   
 
 
A second alternative is a handheld controller with a 3 dBi whip antenna at 1 m above the ground, which is 




Figure 15. 900 MHz RLOS range, 6 dBi omni antenna 2 m above 





2.2.1.2.2.4 Expected RLOS Ranges with 2.4 GHz Radios 
If the same radio specifications and fade margin as above are used, but with 2.4 GHz radios, the RLOS 





Figure 16. RLOS range for 2.4 GHz system, high-gain dish antenna, 2 






Figure 17. RLOS range for 2.4 GHz system, 6 dBi omni antenna, 2 m 
above ground.   
 
 
In Fig. 17, the 2.4 GHz RLOS range using a 6 dBi omni antenna is limited in most cases by free-space 
losses, not by the terrain or UAS altitude.  The free-space range limit is 22.3 km or 13.8 miles. 
 
2.2.1.2.3 Discussion 
When a directional antenna (18 dBi) is used, 2.4 GHz offers greater RLOS range except in the most rugged 
terrain, as shown in Fig. 18.  Furthermore, directional antennas are smaller at higher frequencies, and are 
therefore subject to less wind loading.  Thus, higher frequencies are expected to be popular in benign terrain, 
especially for operators using licensed bands where directional antennas may be used without a requirement 






Figure 18. RLOS range for 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz systems, 18 dBi 
GCS antenna, 2 m above ground.   
 
 
The use of directional antennas, however, may be operationally challenging, especially at high gains, due 
to the need to point the antenna precisely at the aircraft, and to track it as it flies.  This may not be too 
difficult when a sUAS is used for inspection of linear infrastructure, but for applications involving flight 
over wide areas, operators may prefer the simplicity of an omni antenna. 
 
2.2.1.2.4 RLOS Model Conclusions 
RLOS operation of sUAS seems practical over distances of a few miles in mountainous terrain, and up to 
more than 50 miles over flat terrain.  The greatest ranges are achieved when using a high-gain antenna at 
the ground control station, but this may require actively steering the antenna to track the sUAS in flight. 
 
2.2.1.2.5 Numerical Results 
The numerical results plotted in Figs. 10 through 18 for the model are in Tables 12-17.  Altitudes shown 
are in feet above ground/nominal terrain (reference he2 in Fig. 6). 
 
Table 12. 18 dBi dish antenna, 2 m above ground for 900 MHz systems.  




Low Hills Mountains 
Altitude (ft) ∆h = 5 m 30 m 80 m 300 m 
100 15.1 13.8 11.2 4.9 
200 19.5 17.1 13.5 5.8 
500 27.9 24.2 18.9 8.3 
1000 38.3 33.0 26.6 12.3 





Table 13. 6 dBi omni antenna, 2 m above ground for 900 MHz systems.  
Altitude (ft) ∆h = 5 m 30 m 80 m 300 m 
100 8.1 6.8 5.1 1.9 
200 11.8 9.2 6.5 2.3 
500 19.1 14.8 10.2 3.6 
1000 28.8 22.4 16.5 6.1 
2000 36.6 35.0 26.6 11.4 
 
 
Table 14. 18 dBi dish antenna, 5 m above ground for 900 Mhz systems.  
Altitude (ft) ∆h = 5 m 30 m 80 m 300 m 
100 37.4 32.4 24.8 5.3 
200 41.9 36.1 28.2 6.6 
500 51.0 44.3 35.7 9.9 
1000 62.1 54.6 45.3 15.2 
2000 78.0 69.9 60.0 24.7 
 
 
Table 15. 3 dBi whip antenna, 1 m above ground for 900 Mhz systems.  
Altitude (ft) ∆h = 5 m 30 m 80 m 300 m 
100 4.2 3.2 2.7 2.1 
200 5.9 4.6 3.5 2.7 
500 10.9 7.9 5.6 4.4 
1000 18.6 13.7 9.1 7.4 
2000 26.1 23.3 17.1 13.7 
 
 
Table 16. 18 dBi dish antenna, 2 m above ground for 2.4 GHz systems.  
Altitude (ft) ∆h = 5 m 30 m 80 m 300 m 
100 27.3 21.1 12.2 1.1 
200 31.7 24.9 15.3 1.6 
500 41.1 33.3 22.5 3.0 
1000 52.1 43.6 31.9 6.0 
2000 55.3 55.3 46.3 13.0 
 
 
Table 17. 6 dBi omni antenna, 2 m above ground for 2.4 GHz systems.  Gray shading indicates 
range limited by free-space attenuation, not terrain or aircraft altitude.  
Altitude (ft) ∆h = 5 m 30 m 80 m 300 m 
100 13.8 13.8 6.1 0.3 
200 13.8 13.8 8.5 0.4 
500 13.8 13.8 13.8 1.0 
1000 13.8 13.8 13.8 2.3 





2.2.1.3 Chihuahuan Desert Rangeland Research Center 
The planned test location for the RLOS model validation (and other sUAS testing) is north of Las Cruces, 
New Mexico, on the Chihauhuan Desert Ranchland Research Center (CDRRC) (Figs. 19-20).  New Mexico 
State University operates the CDRRC in order to protect and ensure availability of its resources for teaching, 
research, and extension endeavors that benefit the citizens of New Mexico as originally declared in 
Congressional Act S4910, 1927. 
 
The CDRRC conducts educational, demonstrative, and experimental development with livestock, grazing 
methods, and range forage, including investigation of the sustainability and management of natural 
resources and environmental ecosystems. 
 
The CDRRC is part of NMSU, which is located in Las Cruces, New Mexico.  It is a major source of arid 
lands research in the Department of Animal and Range Sciences, which is part of the College of 
Agricultural, Consumer, and Environmental Sciences.  Established in 1927 to conduct “educational, 
demonstrative, and experimental development with livestock, grazing methods, and range forage,” the 
CDRRC is administered by the NMSU Board of Regents. 
 
The Center is located in Doña Ana County, New Mexico, at the southern end of the Jornada Plain.  Now 
divided by Interstate 25, the Center encompasses almost 100 square miles, with one-fourth of the land west 
of the interstate. 
 
Land on the Center varies widely, with elevations from 4,000 ft on the Rio Grande flood plain on the west 
side to 5,840 ft at the top of Summerford Mountain in the Doña Ana Mountains on the east side.  The nearly 
level plains of the north and central parts of the Center are on the Jornada del Muerto basin, with several 
small playa areas where water collects after rainfall.  Soils range from sandy loams to clays overlying 
caliche hardpan. 
Several vegetation types occur on the center.  Creosote bush dominates the upper slopes of the mountains 
and the hills along the river.  At lower elevations, the creosote bush type grades into the mesquite type that 
grows on sandier soils, and into the tarbush type on heavier soils.  The plains area, once dominated by black 
grama, today has been invaded by mesquite.  These mesquite stands are interspersed with snakeweed and 
many species of grasses and forbs. 
 
Wildlife populations on the Center are rich and varied.  Among the larger mammals are mule deer, 
pronghorn antelope, gemsbok, bobcat, coyote, badger, and fox.  Mountain lions have been sighted.  There 
are also many rabbit and rodent species.  Several bird species migrate throughout the area, but a large 
number also live and nest on the rangeland.  Species such as roadrunners, hawks, and occasionally golden 
eagles are seen on the Center.  Numerous lizard and snake species also inhabit these lands. 
 
Teachers, researchers, and students from across the NMSU campus benefit from the center.  The 
Department of Animal and Range Sciences oversees the facility with help from a steering committee of 
scientists from the College of Agriculture, Consumer, and Environmental Sciences and the College of Arts 
and Sciences.  Through the Biology Department, the center is part of the Jornada Basin Long-Term 
Ecological Research project—a National Science Foundation Ecology Network.  Current research efforts 
include: 
 Evaluating continuous and seasonal grazing strategies at different intensities to determine effects 
on livestock performance as well as plant cover and composition. 




 Determining the influence of range conditions on wildlife populations. 
 Autecology of plant species. 
 Assessing competition and other interactions between common plant species. 
 Ascertaining the role of small herbivores in a desert environment. 
 
In addition to research conducted by the Department of Animal and Range Sciences, faculty and graduate 
students from other NMSU departments are conducting research at the Center.  Currently, much of the 
research is in conjunction with the Long-Term Ecological Research program, which is part of a nationwide 
program funded by the National Science Foundation. 
 
The CDRRC is used for teaching, demonstration, and research projects with livestock, grazing methods, 
and range forage, including investigations into the sustainability and management of natural resources and 
environmental ecosystems. 
 
Research at the CDRRC includes archaeology, beef cattle management and genetics, desertification, 
entomology, geology, grazing management hydrology, plant diversity, rangeland resource management, 
rangeland restoration, soils, watershed management, and wildlife. 
 
Also unique to the CDRRC is former industry-based research facility related to national security.  A 
significant asset for the national security work is represented by a tower that the Raytheon Corporation 
installed and maintained on the CDRRC.  That 100 ft tower is now owned by NMSU and is available for 
research.  The NMSU Physical Sciences Laboratory (PSL) has significant experience in conducting UAS 
operations at the Jornado Experimental Range that is adjacent to the CDRRC. 
 
The CDRRC was selected as a site for the RLOS research based on a number of factors.  The airspace of 
the CDRRC falls within the NMSU Flight Test Center (Test Site), and the current FAA Certificate of 
Authorization (COA) also covers this airspace.  NMSU/PSL has significant UAS operating experience with 
a variety of UAS platforms in nearby airspace for low-altitude operations and over this area for higher UAS 
operations.  The terrain within the CDRRC varies from the Summerford Mountain to extended desert plains 
with no obstacles.  The population on the ground consists of a single residence at the Ranch headquarters 
approximately one mile from the tower, and cattle and wildlife are the only other inhabitants.  So, the 
population density is low.  This area also is remote with no paved roads, a few county roads adjacent to 
significant power transmission lines, and unimproved two-track roads.  There is only small acreage at the 
northern perimeter where the public has access; otherwise, access is controlled.  Both RLOS and BVLOS 















2.2.1.3.1 Tower Site Attributes 
The Tower Site (previously mentioned) is located approximately one mile from the ranch headquarters.  
The tower is important for the RLOS data collection.  The tower is in a fixed position so that any 
measurements will be consistent and repeatable.  A tethered UAS was considered but winds aloft still would 
impact the precise location during data collection.  A sUAS transmitter will be located at the top of the 
tower in various orientations as part of the test setup.  From the tower location, simulating a UAS operating 
at 100 ft AGL, access will be available to a variety of GPS fixed locations that also are impacted by some 
of the geography in the area.  Power also is available at the site, and as was previously discussed, there are 
minimal people on the ground.  In addition, most local general aviation flights follow Interstate 10 to the 
west of the CDRRC. 
 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Tower Site Location 
The tower is situated on the northern slope of Summerford Mountain in the Doña Ana Mountains.  Figures 
21-22 show the proximity of the tower to Summerford Mountain.  Figure 23 depicts a close-up of the top 
of the tower.  Figure 24 shows the tower facing southwest.  Figure 25 shows the tower facing east.  Figure 
26 depicts the solar array and the energy distribution building.  Figures 27-29 depict the view facing 










Figure 22. 100 ft tower showing proximity to 










Figure 24. 100 ft research tower—view is 






Figure 25. 100 ft research tower—view is 




















Figure 29. View looking north/northwest from tower area, flat desert plains.   
 
 
2.2.1.4 RLOS Validation and Verification: Expected Test Measurements 
The communications package (and/or the entire airborne platform) from a sUAS will be mounted on the 
top of the tower.  A nonconductive support will maintain a transmitter/sUAS approximately three feet from 
the tower.  Signal strength will be measured between the Ground Control System (GCS) and the sUAS 
AUT.  Free space path loss (FSPL) and Fade Margin calculations at specific test points will be made as a 
control function.  A GCS for the UAS will be operated from various directions at multiple distances to 
compare field measurement to the Longley Rice propagation model with and without terrain mapping.  The 
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battery pack for the communication system on the tower will be in two different states during 
measurements, fully charged and 50% charged.  A comparison of calculated RLOS and measured coverage 
will be performed to validate the effectiveness of the Longley-Rice models against field measurements 
when applied to sUAS platforms. 
 
2.2.1.4.1 Phase One: Static Tower Test 
The Phase One test will involve the use of the Tower at the CDRRC north of Las Cruces, New Mexico.  A 
sUAS (and/or transmitter) will be mounted at the top of the tower.  The GCS for the UAS will be operated 
at a variety of directions and distances (including plains to the north and mountains to the southeast) from 
the tower.  Using the Longley-Rice propagation model, a calculation will be made for the predicted 
performance of both a directional (1 watt, 6 dBi gain) and omni antenna (100 mW, 2 dBi gain) operating at 
900 MHz.  The specific parameters for the propagation model for a representative directional antenna are 
shown in Fig. 30, and the resulting predicted coverage is shown in Fig. 31.  For an omni antenna, the 
representative parameters are included in Fig. 32, and the resulting predicted coverage is shown in Fig. 33.  
The altitude for both the antennas is fixed at 100 ft AGL, which is the height of the tower.  The model will 
be modified with the specific antenna and transceiver used in the test prior to the actual field test.  The 
figures shown below are the Longley-Rice propagation model with terrain mapping.  Actual testing will 
include overlaying the Longley-Rice model without terrain mapping so that a comparison of the two models 
versus field measurement can be performed. 
 
2.2.1.4.1.1 Test Apparatus 
A 3-D Robotics Iris sUAS (or similar model) will be utilized (and/or the transmitter alone) as the test 
platform.  The sUAS will be configured so it can be placed in one of four test conditions (facing north, 
south, east, and west) at the top of the tower.  The control station will be activated at multiple test points 
(including plains to the north and mountains to the southeast) to determine the actual coverage versus 
predicted. 
 
2.2.1.4.1.2 Data Points 
The field measurement for each data point will consist of the signal strength level and a nominal sUAS 
control function indication assuming the entire airframe is mounted on the tower vs. just a sUAS transmitter.  
The control function (TBD) will demonstrate actual control and response to a specific flight function such 
as camera control or control surface change (aileron, flaps, etc.).  The control function is a pass/fail type 
measurement.  Since the CDRRC exists in a low humidity environment (range of 8 to 77% relative 
humidity), when possible, measurements will be conducted for both humidity extremes.  Weather 




























A Test Report will be produced with all the results from Phase One.  Environmental conditions also will be 
included in this report as well as lessons learned that could affect Phase Two activity. 
 
2.2.1.4.2 Phase Two: Dynamic Flight Test 
Phase One provides for the opportunity for the collection of a variety of data points that could be used to 
test the RLOS models.  However, these tests are constrained by the overall height of the tower.  In order to 
gather higher altitude test data, Phase Two will include actual UAS flights at three different altitudes with 
the data collection being taken at various directions (including plains to the north and mountains to the 
southeast) remote from the tower.  Data obtained from the Phase One testing will be used to develop a 
safety margin for Phase Two testing.  Phase Two testing will more closely emulate real flight conditions 
and various airframe orientations.  Battery condition will be charged fully prior to each flight and monitored 
during flight.  Again, utilizing the Longley-Rice propagation model (with terrain), representative 
calculations were made for the directional and omni antennas at 400, 500 and 1000 ft AGL.  The parameters 
for the directional antenna for the higher altitudes are the same as those shown in Fig. 30 except for the 
variance in altitude.  The predicted coverage for the 400 ft altitude is reflected in Fig. 34.  The predicted 
coverage for the 500 ft altitude is shown in Fig. 35; and 1000 ft in Fig. 36.  The parameters for the omni 
antenna for the 400 ft altitude are shown in Fig. 37, 500 ft in Fig. 38, and the predicted coverage for the 
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1000 ft altitude is reflected in Fig. 39.  Figure 40 shows an overlay of the 100 ft (Phase One) predicted 
coverage versus the 400 ft (Phase Two) predicted coverage for the omni. 
 
2.2.1.4.2.1 Test Apparatus 
A 3-D Robotics Iris sUAS (or similar model) but the same as the Phase One test will be utilized as the test 
platform.  The sUAS will be located near the tower platform in order to minimize any variation of RLOS 
coverage pattern and distances from Phase One testing. 
 
2.2.1.4.2.2 Data Points 
The field measurement for each data point (including plains to the north and mountains to the southeast) 
will consist of the signal strength level at the GCS and sUAS control function.  The control function (TBD) 
will demonstrate actual control and response to a specific flight function such as camera control or control 
surface change (aileron, flaps, etc.).  The control function is a pass/fail type measurement.  Weather 












































Test reporting for the Phase Two activities will result in a unique test report.  The data included in this 
report will summarize all the information from the Phase Two activities.  Any recommendations for follow-
on testing will be included as lessons learned.  The RLOS model also will be restated with any 
recommended changes to the parameters and also will be communicated as a final recommendation to the 
FAA. 
 
2.2.1.5 BVLOS Technology Tests 
A variety of airborne and ground-based technologies for detecting, sensing, and avoiding other aircraft will 
be tested starting in the near future for the safe operation of sUAS BVLOS.  These technologies will be 
identified by a recent Request for Information distributed by NMSU as part of the FAA UAS COE BVLOS 
funded research.  These technology tests will take place primarily on the 100 square miles of the CDRRC.  
As the specific technology is selected for testing, a unique test plan will be developed to guide the test and 
evaluation activities, or will be incorporated into this test plan. 
 
2.2.2 Test Results 
2.2.2.1 Introduction and Background 
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The New Mexico State University (NMSU) and University of North Dakota (UND) Alliance for System 
Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE) teams were tasked with researching Detect and 
Avoid (DAA) technology in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) that could enable Beyond the Visual Line 
of Sight (BVLOS) operation of small UAS weighing under 55 lbs (sUAS) within limited portions of the 
National Air Space (NAS) while achieving a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft operating in a 
similar manner. 
 
One element of this research was to assess the radio line-of-sight (RLOS) connection for small unmanned 
aircraft systems (sUAS).  This connection element is key to ensuring safe operations, specifically if flying 
BVLOS.  A description of a proposed approach and potential testing was provided in a previously submitted 
test plan (Cathey 2016).  In that report various modeling approaches were discussed and the potential RLOS 
range that may be achieved using a sUAS was developed.  The signal propagation was modeled using the 
well-respected Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model (Longley and Rice 1968), which was developed by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1968.  The test plan addressed the data collection in a test setting to 
validate the developed model. 
 
The test plan was designed to evaluate and analyze the variances between the Longley-Rice model with 
terrain, Longley-Rice model without terrain, and field truth measurements in a real-world setting.  A 
simplified model without terrain would be more easily incorporated into an operator’s safety guideline as 
safe operational distances could be incorporated into aeronautical charts and tables rather than requiring 
field access to a complex computer model.  The intent of this testing was to determine if this concept of 
simplified, table-based flight safety criteria, would be a valid option in the development of safety 
regulations and guidance for sUAS operations. 
 
As previously noted, a number of factors affect the modeled RLOS range, including the following: 
• Terrain 
• Weather 
• Frequency in use 
• Antenna gains at the ground station and the aircraft 
• Transmitter power 
• Receiver sensitivity 
 
This test report’s purpose is to present a set of measured field data and compare to the simplified Longley-
Rice Irregular Terrain Model, and to an available online calculator.  The comparison to real world data 
provides an assessment of the models to help make better informed decisions on allowable BVLOS flight 
operations.  This information can be used to help inform the researchers and the FAA on how to proceed in 
its research efforts related to BVLOS operations and to inform FAA rules, regulations and guidelines. 
 
This effort was carried out in collaboration with the Army Research Laboratory which provided personnel 
and equipment under the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) 16-23 between the 
U.S. Army Research Laboratory and New Mexico State University Physical Sciences Laboratory. 
 
2.2.2.2 Test Purpose, Equipment, and Description 
Field testing at the NMSU ranch was performed during the month of January 2017 to determine ground 
truth for the maximum reliable distance for a typical small UAS transceiver.  The goal was to determine if 
the E. Johnson version of the Longley-Rice (L-R) model described in Cathey (2016) with no terrain 





Testing was performed between two 3DR radios (3DR v2 telemetry SiK radio with the stock antennas), 
operating at 915 MHz with 100 mW transmitters (20 dBm).  The 3DR V2 radio specifications are: 
• 100 mW output power 
• -121 dBm receive sensitivity 
• Based on HopeRF’s HM-TRP module 
• RP-SMA connector 
• 2-way full-duplex communication through adaptive TDM 
• UART interface 
• Transparent serial link 
• MAVLink protocol framing 
• Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
 
One unit was placed at 1 m above ground level at various locations on the ranch.  The unit was attached 
directly to a laptop computer running MavLink control software.  This allowed the laptop to record the 
RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) of both the control unit (laptop) and the remote unit.  RSSI can 
be converted to Signal Strength in dBM using the formula: 
 
  Signal Strength (dBm) = RSSI/1.9 – 127. (3) 
 
The noise floor at 915 MHz, latitude and longitude were also recorded.  From these data, distance between 
antennas was calculated as was the fade margin, assuming a -121 dBm receiver sensitivity. 
 
The second unit radio with antenna was either connected to a fixed pole for the initial testing or to a small 
UAS.  The initial static testing was performed with the remote unit mounted to a 20 ft tower/pole.  In the 
case of the UAS, a Pixhawk flight control unit was used and mounted as a payload below a quad-copter 
(remote unit) which was control operated at 2400 MHz at a nominal height of 100 ft. AGL.  A sampling of 
test points were also collected with the remote unit at 200, 300, and 400 ft AGL.  These data sets are 
included in this report but have not yet been compared to model estimates. 
 
Field results were plotted and then compared to both an on-line calculator (incorporates the Longley-Rice 
(L-R) model, terrain databases, and user entries for the radio characteristics to produce detailed coverage 
maps (http://lrcov.crc.ca/main/) and a simplified Longley-Rice model developed by E. Johnson.  Based on 
field data, an estimated field observable RLOS coverage map was drawn for a visual comparison between 
the models and field observations. 
 
2.2.2.3 Flight Test Area 
Static and flight test operations were centered at latitude 32.51716, longitude -106.83065, on the 
Chihuahuan Desert Ranchland Research Center (CDRRC).  The terrain consists of high desert scrub to the 
north and igneous mountains to the south.  This area is on gated access controlled property owned by 
NMSU.  Details and pictures of the CDRRC were noted in the test plan (Cathey 2016).  The CDRRC was 
selected as a site for the RLOS research based on a number of factors.  The airspace of the CDRRC falls 
within the NMSU Flight Test Site, and the current FAA Certificate of Authorization (COA) also covers this 
airspace.  NMSU/PSL has significant UAS operating experience with a variety of UAS platforms in nearby 
airspace for low-altitude operations and over this area for higher UAS operations. 
 
The terrain within the CDRRC varies from the Summerford Mountain to extended desert plains with no 
obstacles.  The population on the ground has a single residence at the Ranch headquarters approximately 
one mile from the tower, and cattle and wildlife are the only other inhabitants.  So, the population density 
is low.  This area also is remote with no paved roads, a few county roads adjacent to significant power 
transmission lines, and unimproved two-track roads.  There is only small acreage at the northern perimeter 
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where the public has access; otherwise, access is controlled.  NMSU has a controlled access area equivalent 
to about 100 square miles.  Both RLOS and BVLOS studies and experiments are ideal at the CDRRC. 
 
A 100 ft tower is located at the operations center, but was not used in this particular test series.  It was 
originally envisioned that the fixed tower would be used by setting one of the transmitters on top of the 
tower and turned on to broadcast.  There were logistical issues related to provisioning the test tower for the 
BVLOS tests.  A plan to address tower issues should result in a more robust future test site.  The number 
of trips required up and down the tower, time considerations, and safety considerations led the team to an 
alternative approach to use the small UAS as the transport for the transmitter.  The tower location did still 





















Figure 44. View from the tower to the southeast.   
 
 
2.2.2.4 Test Payload and Fixtures 
Tests 1 and 2, at an AGL of 20 ft, had the remote unit mounted to a pole mast.  For the subsequent tests, 
the test platform for the remote unit was a payload slung under a quad-copter for the field test data points 
at 100, 200, 300, and 400 ft AGL.  As noted before, the remote unit consisted of the Pixhawk flight control 
unit, a 3DR V2 915 MHz radio @ 100 mW, and a battery pack.  Figures 45-47 show the fixed mast pole 


















Figure 47. Quad-copter with payload ascending to 100 ft AGL.   
 
 
2.2.2.5 Test Data for 20 ft AGL 
Initial data points were collected with the remote transmitter mounted on a 20 ft pole mast.  The test 
equipment was the same as noted above and the same as was used for the 100 ft test with the exception that 
the remote was mounted on a mast rather than a payload attached to a quad-copter.  On-line coverage 
estimates where generated at this altitude only.  These initial tests were done to confirm all of the equipment 
was working and the approach was sound.  The various tests were conducted on different days and each 
test was designated with a different test number (TEST1 = T1, TEST2 = T2, etc.)  Below is a summary of 
the field data in Tables 18 and 19. 
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Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.51955 -106.83308 11:30:00 AM N/A TRUE 350 64 63 -93.32 -93.84 27.68 30 -111.21
2 32.52014 -106.82489 11:38:00 AM N/A TRUE 634 47 49 -102.26 -101.21 18.74 29 -111.74
3 32.52218 -106.82170 11:45:00 AM N/A TRUE 1008 40 44 -105.95 -103.84 15.05 31 -110.68
4 32.52663 -106.81322 11:53:00 AM N/A TRUE 1944 37 43 -107.53 -104.37 13.47 31 -110.68
5 32.53125 -106.80515 11:58:00 AM N/A FALSE 2858 35 35 -108.58 -108.58 12.42 31 -110.68
6 32.53407 -106.80910 12:00:00 PM N/A TRUE 2760 45 49 -103.32 -101.21 17.68 30 -111.21
7 32.53988 -106.81696 12:09:00 PM N/A TRUE 2834 68 70 -91.21 -90.16 29.79 41 -105.42
8 32.54507 -106.82473 12:13:00 PM N/A FALSE 3153 35 38 -108.58 -107.00 12.42 34 -109.11
9 32.54528 -106.83556 12:19:00 PM N/A TRUE 3161 52 53 -99.63 -99.11 21.37 31 -110.68
10 32.54554 -106.84531 12:21:00 PM N/A TRUE 3442 45 45 -103.32 -103.32 17.68 32 -110.16
11 32.54598 -106.86228 12:26:00 PM N/A TRUE 4366 41 47 -105.42 -102.26 15.58 34 -109.11
12 32.54992 -106.86304 12:30:00 PM N/A TRUE 4742 34 34 -109.11 -109.11 11.89 31 -110.68
13 32.55561 -106.86421 12:40:00 PM N/A TRUE 5308 0 36 -127.00 -108.05 -6.00 31 -110.68
14 32.54085 -106.86111 12:52:00 PM N/A TRUE 3885 0 35 -127.00 -108.58 -6.00 32 -110.16
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/12/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)











Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.51399 -106.83706 7:33:00 AM N/A TRUE 697 46 49 -102.79 -101.21 18.21 31 -110.68
2 32.51158 -106.83715 7:39:00 AM N/A FALSE 870 0 36 -127.00 -108.05 -6.00 35 -108.58
3 32.51005 -106.83727 7:44:00 AM N/A FALSE 1005 0 43 -127.00 -104.37 -6.00 29 -111.74
4 32.50903 -106.83742 7:50:00 AM N/A FALSE 1105 40 42 -105.95 -104.89 15.05 31 -110.68
5 32.50931 -106.83860 8:07:00 AM N/A FALSE 1148 0 31 -127.00 -110.68 -6.00 30 -111.21
6 32.50848 -106.84084 8:16:00 AM N/A FALSE 1358 0 41 -127.00 -105.42 -6.00 32 -110.16
7 32.50363 -106.83965 8:23:00 AM N/A FALSE 1725 0 25 -127.00 -113.84 -6.00 26 -113.32
8 32.50162 -106.84080 8:29:00 AM N/A FALSE 1973 0 29 -127.00 -111.74 -6.00 30 -111.21
9 32.50463 -106.84349 8:37:00 AM N/A FALSE 1841 0 20 -127.00 -116.47 -6.00 30 -111.21
10 32.50421 -106.84696 8:40:00 AM N/A FALSE 2101 0 24 -127.00 -114.37 -6.00 26 -113.32
11 32.51667 -106.84145 10:24:00 AM N/A TRUE 1014 43 45 -104.37 -103.32 16.63 30 -111.21
12 32.51891 -106.84570 10:29:00 AM N/A TRUE 1424 40 43 -105.95 -104.37 15.05 32 -110.16
13 32.52132 -106.85032 10:34:00 AM N/A FALSE 1901 36 37 -108.05 -107.53 12.95 32 -110.16
14 32.51981 -106.85374 10:42:00 AM N/A TRUE 2185 49 49 -101.21 -101.21 19.79 30 -111.21
15 32.51955 -106.85317 10:46:00 AM N/A FALSE 2128 0 35 -127.00 -108.58 -6.00 35 -108.58
16 32.52032 -106.82702 11:10:00 AM N/A TRUE 489 72 74 -89.11 -88.05 31.89 30 -111.21
17 32.52222 -106.82163 11:15:00 AM N/A FALSE 1016 43 45 -104.37 -103.32 16.63 32 -110.16
18 32.52526 -106.81587 11:21:00 AM N/A TRUE 1653 46 46 -102.79 -102.79 18.21 30 -111.21
19 32.52711 -106.81223 11:24:00 AM N/A TRUE 2051 38 40 -107.00 -105.95 14.00 28 -112.26
20 32.5309 -106.80502 11:30:00 AM N/A TRUE 2848 36 38 -108.05 -107.00 12.95 24 -114.368
21 32.52928 -106.8021 11:35:00 AM N/A FALSE 2997 0 33 -127.00 -109.63 -6.00 28 -112.263
22 32.5276 -106.80106 11:43:00 AM FALSE 3007 0 27 -127.00 -112.79 -6.00 29 -111.737
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/13/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)




The data above were compared to an on-line calculator using user entries for the radio characteristics to 
produce detailed coverage maps (http://lrcov.crc.ca/main/).  The calculation pages are shown in Fig. 48.  










Figure 49. On-Line L-R coverage map for 20 ft AGL.   
 
 
Figure 50 illustrates test 1 and 2 data points.  With what will also be seen with the 100 ft AGL tests, the 
signal strengths below -108 dBm are too low for reliable connection even though the advertised sensitivity 




Figure 50. Test 1 and 2 data points with distances for 20 ft AGL.  Green indicates test points that had communications 
and valid data linkage between the remote and the controller such that data could reliably be passed between the units.  
Red data points indicate that the linkage was unreliable or connection could not be made between the units.   
 
 
2.2.2.6 Model Parameters for 100 ft AGL 
Input parameters to the On-Line Longley-Rice (900 MHz, 100 mW transmitters), 100 ft AGL are provided 
in Fig. 51.  It should be noted that: 
• No Receiver Sensitivity Input parameter available in this application, 
• Dielectric constant is Normal Ground (15), 






Figure 51. On-Line L-R coverage input parameters for 100 ft AGL.   
 
 
The resulting coverage map based on the On-line Longley-Rice Tool showing Boundary/Road Crossing 
Measurement Positions at maximum range estimates for 100 ft AGL remote antenna is shown below in Fig. 






Figure 52. Estimated RLOS coverage from on-line calculator for 100 ft AGL.   
 
 
Table 20. Calculated data points for RLOS coverage from on-line calculator 
for 100 ft AGL.  
Location Latitude Longitude Distance (miles) 
Tower 32 31 1.65 -106 49 50.59  
Point 1 32 31 51.2 -106 46 28.4 3.41 
Point 2 32 33 50.5 -106 48 15.9  
Point 3 32 34 0.4 -106 50 55.4 3.44 
Point 4 32 32 46.4 -106 52 55.3  
Point 5 32 30 0.7 -106 51 39.3 2.11 
 
 
The coverage from E. Johnson’s Longley-Rice Model (900 MHz, 100 mW transmitters) showing maximum 
ranges with -121 dBm and -108 dBm receiver sensitivity using terrain roughness types of smooth plains 






Figure 53. Coverage estimates from simplified E. Johnson L-R model for 100 ft AGL.  Table 21 provides color 
designations.   
 
 
Table 21. Calculated coverage estimates from simplified E. Johnson L-R model for 100 ft AGL.  Model results were 
obtained using a 0 dB fade margin.  
Parameter Estimate 1 Estimate 2 Estimate 3 Estimate 4 
Frequency (MHz) 900 900 900 900 
Tx height (m) 1 1 1 1 
Rx height (ft) 100 100 100 100 
Tx Power (dBm) 20 20 30 30 
Tx Ant Gain (dBi) 2 2 2 2 
Rx Ant Gain (dBi) -2 -2 -2 -2 
Sensitivity (dBm) -121 -108 -121 -108 
Fade Margin (dB) 0 0 0 0 
Allowed Path Loss (dB) 141 128 151 138 
For the SiK Radio 
Power = 100 mW (20 dBm), sensitivity = -121 dBm 
Over gently rolling plains (Δh = 30 m) 
 
 
2.2.2.7 Test Data for 100 ft AGL 
Testing at 100 ft AGL occurred on January 20th and 26th, 2017.  The remote antenna was mounted as a 
payload below a quad-copter and flown at 100 ft AGL at latitude 32.51716, longitude -106.83065 (antenna 
tower).  The measurements were collected using a laptop computer connected to a 915 MHz 3DR radio, 
running MavLink flight control software.  The test points are at the position of the laptop (Cntrl Position).  
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A “0” RSSI indicates that no connect was made between the remote and control units.  As noted before 
with the tests at 20 ft AGL, these tests at 100 ft AGL, the signal strengths below -108 dBm are too low for 
reliable connection even though the advertised sensitivity of the units is -121 dBm.  Tables 22 and 23 
present the data recorded in tests. 
 
Figure 54 is an image that depicts the test point locations and their relationship to the RLOS coverage maps 
for the On-Line L-R model, the E. Johnson L-R model, and an estimate of the actual coverage based on 
observed field data.  As with the previous image presenting the data on the surface map, green data points 
indicates test points that had communications and valid data linkage between the remote and the controller 
such that data could reliably be passed between the units.  The red data points indicate that the linkage was 
unreliable or connection could not be made between the units. 
 
The Johnson L-R coverage displayed is the 3.8 mile estimate (6.1 km), which would be associated with -108 
dBm receiver sensitivity (-121 dBm less 13 dB fade margin).  By comparison the On-line Longley-Rice 
Tool coverage displayed is an approximate 3.4 mile estimate (5.5 km).  One can see that this distance is 
less and coverage area is not as great as with the Johnson L-R coverage.  The measured data pulls in the 
coverage distance even further with a coverage display of 3.1 miles (5.0 km).  This is significant since the 
real world measurements produce a reliable coverage area less than either the Johnson L-R or the On-line 
Longley-Rice Tool. 
 
It should be noted that neither the Johnson L-R nor the On-line Longley-Rice Tool model reliably predicts 
the RLOS area to the southwest of the tower.  The coverage to the north of the antenna site is mostly LOS 
due to the flat or rolling surface terrain.  The area southwest of the tower is mountainous.  Also note that 
the signal strengths below -108 dBm are too low, in this case, for reliable connection even though the 
advertised sensitivity of the units is -121 dBm.  Using a fade margin of approximately 15 dB when 
computing the link budget more closely aligns with field observations. 
 
For operational purposes, the operator must consider the entire area of operation to ensure that the inputs 
one uses in the model match the actual geographic terrain.  The range area used for these tests demonstrated 
how the varied geographies (rolling hills and mountains) impacted the resultant model estimates of RLOS.  
Models that incorporate actual terrain data will perform better in this scenario since there are dual terrain 
types, in this case, and the more generalized E. Johnson model only incorporates one.  Further model 
considerations should include a factor for vegetative ground cover effects on radio signal propagation 
through both absorption and scattering at low incident transmission angles.  The specific area in which 
these tests were conducted was covered in creosote bush (Larrea tridentate) which appeared to attenuate 
signal strengths more than expected from phase shift and multi-path effects, when a significant distance of 











Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.54601 -106.86209 9:10:00 AM N/A TRUE 4356 51 40 -100.16 -105.95 20.84 37 -107.53
2 32.55302 -106.86359 9:15:00 AM N/A TRUE 5043 45 39 -103.32 -106.47 17.68 31 -110.68
3 32.55843 -106.86465 9:26:00 AM N/A TRUE 5587 0 26 -127.00 -113.32 -6.00 25 -113.84
4 32.52263 -106.79784 10:16:00 AM N/A TRUE 3136 0 40 -127.00 -105.95 -6.00 32 -110.16
5 32.53155 -106.80545 10:44:00 AM N/A TRUE 2854 53 48 -99.11 -101.74 21.89 37 -107.53
6 32.53068 -106.80281 10:58:00 AM N/A TRUE 3012 45 44 -103.32 -103.84 17.68 31 -110.68
7 32.53067 -106.79681 11:00:00 AM N/A TRUE 3510 45 40 -103.32 -105.95 17.68 29 -111.74
8 32.53121 -106.78152 11:07:00 AM N/A TRUE 4864 32 35 -110.16 -108.58 10.84 27 -112.79
9 32.53122 -106.78047 11:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 4958 0 34 -127.00 -109.11 -6.00 28 -112.26
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/20/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)











Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.51320 -106.83720 8:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 756 0 21 -127.00 -115.95 -6.00 15 -119.11
2 32.50797 -106.84278 8:35:00 AM N/A FALSE 1529 0 -127.00 -6.00 40 -105.95
3 32.52961 -106.80231 9:25:00 AM N/A TRUE 2996 57 52 -97.00 -99.63 24.00 41 -105.42
4 32.51810 -106.79499 9:34:00 AM N/A FALSE 3345 0 -127.00 -6.00
5 32.53077 -106.79427 9:54:00 AM N/A TRUE 3732 54 50 -98.58 -100.68 22.42 36 -108.05
6 32.53123 -106.77997 10:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 5003 47 45 -102.26 -103.32 18.74 33 -109.63
7 32.53134 -106.77658 10:20:00 AM N/A TRUE 5309 0 36 -127.00 -108.05 -6.00 30 -111.21
8 32.50458 -106.84346 11:30:00 AM N/A TRUE 1844 0 37 -127.00 -107.53 -6.00 33 -109.63
9 32.50347 -106.85069 11:42:00 AM N/A FALSE 2418 0 32 -127.00 -110.16 -6.00 33 -109.63
10 32.50309 -106.85329 11:55:00 AM N/A FALSE 2637 0 -127.00 -6.00
11 32.50155 -106.84079 12:14:00 PM N/A FALSE 1979 0 -127.00 -6.00
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/20/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)





Figure 54. Test 3 and 4 data points and model coverage area for 100 ft AGL.  Green indicates test points that had 
communications and valid data linkage between the remote and the controller such that data could reliable be passed 
between the units.  Red data points indicate that the linkage was unreliable or connection could not be made between 
the units.   
 
 
2.2.2.8 Test Data for 200, 300, and 400 ft AGL 
To provide some additional data points, a limited amount of data were collected at 200, 300, and 400 ft 
AGL (Tables 24-26).  This was done with the remote payload mounted on a quad-copter.  No analysis has 
yet been performed for this data, but it is included for reference.  Although not specifically noted here due 
to the limited amount of data points, the significance of these tests are their possible usage to determine the 
base level of RLOS.  Radio connection at specific test points was established at the 400 ft AGL level, then 
the payload descended to the 300 ft and 200 ft test points.  During the descent, it was possible to determine 
the altitude where signal was lost.  This significantly improves the resolution of the base level of the RLOS 
diffraction zone where this occurs beyond visual line of sight.  Setup and equipment were the same as used 











Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.51320 -106.83720 8:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 756 59 58 -95.95 -96.47 25.05 31 -110.68
2 32.50797 -106.84278 8:35:00 AM N/A FALSE 1529 0 40 -127.00 -105.95 -6.00 35 -108.58
3 32.52961 -106.80231 9:25:00 AM N/A TRUE 2996 58 56 -96.47 -97.53 24.53 40 -105.95
4 32.51810 -106.79499 9:34:00 AM N/A TRUE 3345 0 -127.00 -6.00
5 32.53077 -106.79427 9:54:00 AM N/A TRUE 3732 53 45 -99.11 -103.32 21.89 40 -105.95
6 32.53123 -106.77997 10:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 5003 46 45 -102.79 -103.32 18.21 40 -105.95
7 32.53134 -106.77658 10:20:00 AM N/A TRUE 5309 0 38 -127.00 -107.00 -6.00 33 -109.63
8 32.50458 -106.84346 11:30:00 AM N/A TRUE 1844 52 47 -99.63 -102.26 21.37 35 -108.58
9 32.50347 -106.85069 11:42:00 AM N/A FALSE 2418 0 32 -127.00 -110.16 -6.00 35 -108.58
10 32.50309 -106.85331 11:55:00 AM N/A FALSE 2639 0 -127.00 -6.00
11 32.50155 -106.84079 12:14:00 PM N/A FALSE 1979 0 -127.00 -6.00
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/20/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)











Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.51320 -106.83720 8:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 756 63 52 -93.84 -99.63 27.16 37 -107.53
2 32.50797 -106.84278 8:35:00 AM N/A TRUE 1529 42 43 -104.89 -104.37 16.11 31 -110.68
3 32.52961 -106.80231 9:25:00 AM N/A TRUE 2996 59 58 -95.95 -96.47 25.05 40 -105.95
4 32.51810 -106.79499 9:34:00 AM N/A TRUE 3345 0 -127.00 -6.00
5 32.53077 -106.79427 9:54:00 AM N/A TRUE 3732 44 42 -103.84 -104.89 17.16 35 -108.58
6 32.53123 -106.77997 10:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 5003 43 46 -104.37 -102.79 16.63 35 -108.58
7 32.53134 -106.77658 10:20:00 AM N/A TRUE 5309 42 41 -104.89 -105.42 16.11 32 -110.16
8 32.50458 -106.84346 11:30:00 AM N/A TRUE 1844 53 50 -99.11 -100.68 21.89 36 -108.05
9 32.50347 -106.85069 11:42:00 AM N/A TRUE 2418 54 50 -98.58 -100.68 22.42 42 -104.89
10 32.50309 -106.85331 11:55:00 AM N/A TRUE 2639 0 -127.00 -6.00
11 32.50155 -106.84079 12:14:00 PM N/A FALSE 1979 0 -127.00 -6.00
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/20/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)











Test Time Op Check DLOS Distance Fade Margin
Point LAT LON Local Pass/Fail T F meters Remote Controller Remote Controller Remote (dB) RSSI dBm
1 32.51320 -106.83720 8:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 756 60 60 -95.42 -95.42 25.58 32 -110.16
2 32.50797 -106.84278 8:35:00 AM N/A TRUE 1529 38 40 -107.00 -105.95 14.00 32 -110.16
3 32.52961 -106.80231 9:25:00 AM N/A TRUE 2996 57 56 -97.00 -97.53 24.00 40 -105.95
4 32.51810 -106.79499 9:34:00 AM N/A TRUE 3345 0 42 -127.00 -104.89 -6.00 35 -108.58
5 32.53077 -106.79427 9:54:00 AM N/A TRUE 3732 53 47 -99.11 -102.26 21.89 31 -110.68
6 32.53123 -106.77997 10:09:00 AM N/A TRUE 5003 44 44 -103.84 -103.84 17.16 35 -108.58
7 32.53134 -106.77658 10:20:00 AM N/A TRUE 5309 43 42 -104.37 -104.89 16.63 31 -110.68
8 32.50458 -106.84346 11:30:00 AM N/A TRUE 1844 54 54 -98.58 -98.58 22.42 39 -106.47
9 32.50347 -106.85069 11:42:00 AM N/A TRUE 2418 45 48 -103.32 -101.74 17.68 29 -111.74
10 32.50309 -106.85331 11:55:00 AM N/A TRUE 2639 0 -127.00 -6.00
11 32.50155 -106.84079 12:14:00 PM N/A FALSE 1979 0 -127.00 -6.00
Cntrl Position RSSI Signal Stength (dBm) Noise Floor
Date 1/20/20017
Rem Pos 32.51716 -106.83065
Recv Sens -121
Clouds
Temp(F) Humid (%) Solar Wind (mph) Pres (inHg)





This field testing has demonstrated that real world RLOS conditions differ from the analytical models.  
While the mathematical models may attempt to replicate ideal conditions, there are site specific influences 
that can impact the actual link distances.  The study that was conducted and the data that were collected 
that are documented here are by no means extensive enough to provide the exact specific limitations of the 
RLOS link distances, but they do provide enough information to help inform a user for potential safe 
operation.  The following conclusions are drawn from this testing: 
• The manufacturer supplied radio specifications under ideal conditions may overestimate the 
possible RLOS link distance in real world conditions. 
• Generalized Longley-Rice models (in this case the Johnson L-R) without actual terrain elevation 
data require the operator to incorporate more than a single model estimated RLOS if area of 
operation spans multiple terrain types. 
• The On-line Longley-Rice Tool overestimated coverage area based on the assumed input 
parameters.  Fine tuning of the input parameters may improve this, but an average user may not be 
able to improve the inputs without testing. 
• The Johnson L-R or the On-line Longley-Rice Tool may overestimate the possible RLOS link 
distance in real world conditions 
• Inclusion of a significant link margin (15 dBm or greater) provides a closer estimate of a “safe” 
RLOS coverage area due to the complexity and variability of RF signal attenuation at low altitudes. 
• Every sUAS may not be an optimal candidate for BVLOS operations due to variety of constraints 
such as battery life.  In addition, as these tests have shown with the sUAS used in these tests link 
maintenance is critical to sustained sUAS operations.  Although the FAA is allowing approximately 
1300 sUAS to be used in 333 Exemption operations a determination of the utility of these systems 
for BVLOS operations has not been made. 
 
Additional testing in different environments or geographies and with different radio system or frequencies 
may add to the knowledge base.  This additional testing may be warranted.  Further analysis of the collected 
data can also be performed using a code developed for the government called SAGE.  This software is not 
commercially available, but NSMU has access to it and can perform additional checks and produce more 
detailed coverage maps.  This was not done at this stage since the software is not available to all users.  
With the uncertainties shown, it is logical to choose a conservative approach in selecting a safe and reliable 
RLOS operational distance. 
 
2.3 Operational Framework Technical Report and Assessment 
2.3.1 Introduction and Background 
The New Mexico State University (NMSU) and University of North Dakota (UND) Alliance for System 
Safety of UAS through Research Excellence (ASSURE) teams were tasked with researching Detect and 
Avoid (DAA) technology in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) that could enable Beyond the Visual Line 
of Sight (BVLOS) operation of small UAS weighing under 55 lbs (sUAS) within limited portions of the 
National Air Space (NAS) while achieving a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft operating in a 
similar manner.  
 
BVLOS is similar to Extended Visual Line of Sight (EVLOS) and other operations where the sUAS is not 
in the immediate proximity of the operator.  In general, BVLOS is an operating environment where the 
sUAS is out of sight due to distance and the limitations of the human visual system.  This section (2.3) is 
focused on providing an Operational Framework that defines the environment and conditions under which 
the recommended requirements will enable sUAS operations BVLOS.  Although this framework may not 
be prescriptive nor does it include an exhaustive set of actions, the framework does include strategies that 
can build upon FAA and industry actions that should result in an increase in BVLOS flights in the near 
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term.  These strategies and the relevant research that should/must accompany them will help the USA 
expand BVLOS safely, effectively, and efficiently.  Additionally, this framework has relevance to the 
future, ‘will-be’ state of technology—autonomous BVLOS operations without a human in the loop.   
 
Considerations for BVLOS operations involve a number of interrelated elements that are needed for safe 
flight.  These elements result in potential constrains on the systems and operations.  The three elements of 
significant interest are 1) the conditions or locations in which one flies must be conducive to safe flight 
operations; 2) the operator must operate in a safe fashion; and 3) the aircraft themselves must be capable of 
reliable and safe BVLOS operations. 
 
To put each of these elements in context a number of use cases were collected.  These provided information 
on what types of BVLOS operations were envisioned by end users.  A short summary of this and how it 
relates to formulating an operational framework is presented in the following section.  A significant element 
in flight operations is the radio link.  Radio Line of Sight (RLOS) testing was completed to assess estimation 
tools and potential limitations.  It is clear that command and control should be maintained at all times, 
which by its nature implies a reliable and consistent radio link.  In many ways, this becomes one of the 
driving factors in what can be done BVLOS. 
 
A set of assumptions and limitations is presented to refine the framework.  This initial set is based on best 
practices and gathered use case information, and presents a lowest common denominator upon which can 
be expanded in the future.  Expansion could be via additional mitigations used (DAA for example), imposed 
self-separation, and/or contingency management. 
 
Additional context is provided from looking at the Science and Research Panel (SARP) “Well Clear” 
definition for sUAS, the FAA BNSF (Burlington Northern and Santa Fe) Pathfinder Effort, and a number 
of international activities that are applicable and relevant.  Some specific aircarft considerations are also 
included since not all approved sUAS are designed for or would be adequate or safe candidates for BVLOS 
operations. 
 
2.3.2 Collected Use Case Information Considerations 
Actual use cases can provide insight into potential BVLOS operations.  A report titled “FAA Interim 
Technical Report, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Use Cases and Detect and Avoid Approaches” dated 
October 26, 2016 (revised January 18, 2017) was provided to the FAA to assess current use case 
information.  This report captured sUAS use cases (applications of the sUAS) as well as DAA approaches 
for identifying aircraft in the immediate operating airspace.  The capture of this information was envisioned 
to occur most effectively through a Request for Information (RFI) in the Federal Business Opportunity (Fed 
Biz Ops) web site maintained by the Federal Government.  This call and response cycle produced some 
useful information, but it was clear that additional information was needed from actual and potential users. 
 
To supplement the information from Fed Biz Ops, data calls were made to the Technical Analysis and 
Applications Center (TAAC) (operated by New Mexico State University) List Serve as well as published 
on an AUVSI website.  The goal was to ensure that the distribution was as wide as possible to reach the 
entire community.  It is believed that the RFI was distributed as widely as possible. 
 
Of the use cases that were reported, most were for mapping, land/area monitoring, and straight line 
inspections.  Use cases reported operating altitudes between 50 and 700 feet AGL, with the most typical 
operating altitudes were between 50 and 100 feet AGL.  Use case airspeeds ranged between 6 and 33 knots, 




To supplement the data further, the 333 Exemption Holders information on the FAA website were all 
reviewed to elicit summary sUAS information.  Summary information from more than 5,000 exemption 
holders was provided in the Use Case report.  In addition, a unique request was sent to more than 4,400 333 
exemption holders for information regarding their operations as well as potential DAA approaches.  
Information received as a result of that data call varied in its level of detail, but has provided relevant 
experiential information to generalize use cases.  The descriptive categories provided for each response 







Climb / Descent Rates 
Flight Patterns 
 
The gathering of BVLOS use case information was a challenge.  Since BVLOS operations for the most part 
were not authorized by the FAA, there were few that could be provided as actually tested cases.  There were 
a number of areas where BVLOS operations are a natural next step for the particular operators and this 
information, where applicable, was provided.  With all of the gathered information considered, and in an 
attempt to understand the data, defined uses were created to sort each docket by business use.  Eleven 
general uses were identified, specified as follows: 
 Aerial Data Collection 
 Aerial Photography/Videography 
 Aerial Surveying/Mapping 
 Agriculture 
 Emergency Services 





 Surveillance/Monitoring, etc.  
 
Each of these use cases was further broken down into subcategories to allow additional definition.  This is 
included in the Use Case report and is not repeated here.  The numbers for the broad usage requests by 
category were detailed with the highest number of requests for Aerial Photography/Videography. 
 
All of the general categories outlined above have potential BVLOS flight opportunities or applications.  
The ones shown in bold above are those that were identified through the responses as having either a 
specific, defined, or expressed pressing desire to fly BVLOS.  It is not to say that these are more important 
than the others, it only indicates that, for example, there are operators now who could immediately expand 
to BVLOS missions/flights if given the go ahead.  This is logical for applications like Agriculture, Mapping, 
Search/Rescue, etc. 
 
Each of these use cases is different when one looks at the flight pattern.  Inspection of linear infrastructure 
BVLOS flights would involve longer, straight, and narrow flight corridors.  Agriculture-related BVLOS 
flights could be focused on repetitive, stepped-parallel flight passes to cover a wide area.  These different 




It should also be noted that there was a huge variety of vehicle types (close to 500 different UAS systems 
from the 333 approvals) and a large number of manufactures (almost 200 different manufacturers in the 
listings in the 333 approvals).  For reference, most of the applications were for 4-copters (total of 6,586), 
followed by a similar number of requests for fixed-wing (818), 6-copter (726), and 8-copter (879).  There 
were 153 different 4-copter platforms requested.  Not all of these should be considered equal in terms of 
quality, reliability, or performance.  This variation alone has implications regarding what can or cannot be 
considered reasonable for safe operations.  One size does not fit all when looking at this variety in forms, 
formats, and producers. 
 
A take away recommendation for the framework is that not all BVLOS operations are the same and may 
not require the same sets of rules or approaches.  For example, rules applicable for linear infrastructure 
BVLOS operations may be burdensome on other types of flight patterns and vice versa.  These potential 
options need to be considered in the context of the technologies and equipment being used, and the flight 
operational plans executed. 
 
2.3.3 RLOS Testing Considerations 
One element that is required for the development of an Operational Framework is assessment of functional 
radio line-of-sight for real world applications.  A theoretical model assessment was completed and 
documented in an August 2016 report to the FAA titled, “Test Plan for the Validation of the Radio Line-
of-Sight Model for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems”.  The approach was to verify this through field 
testing and to provide real world data for comparison. 
 
The test location for the RLOS model validation is north of Las Cruces, New Mexico, on the Chihuahuan 
Desert Ranchland Research Center (CDRRC).  New Mexico State University operates the CDRRC in order 
to protect and ensure availability of its resources for teaching, research, and extension endeavors that benefit 
the citizens of New Mexico as originally declared in Congressional Act S4910, 1927. 
 
The CDRRC encompasses almost 100 square miles.  This area is on gated, access controlled property owned 
by NMSU.  The airspace of the CDRRC falls within the NMSU Flight Test Site, and the current FAA 
Certificate of Authorization (COA) also covers this airspace.  NMSU/PSL has significant UAS operating 
experience with a variety of UAS platforms in nearby airspace for low-altitude operations and over this 
area for higher UAS operations.  The terrain within the CDRRC varies from the Summerford Mountain to 
extended desert plains with no obstacles.  The terrain consists of high desert scrub to the north and igneous 
mountains to the south.  Creosote bush dominates the upper slopes of the mountains and the hills along the 
river, and at lower elevations the creosote bush type grades into either the mesquite type that grows on 
sandier soils or the tarbush type that grows on heavier soils.  Ground vegetation is important to assessing 
RLOS due to its absorption.  The population on the ground consists of a single residence at the Ranch 
headquarters approximately one mile from the tower, and cattle and wildlife are the only other inhabitants.  
A 100 ft tower is located at the operations center. 
 
In the test plan report, various modeling approaches were discussed and it a RLOS range that may be 
achieved in applications of sUAS was developed.  That propagation was modeled using the well-respected 
Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model (Longley and Rice 1968), which was developed by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce in 1968.  The test plan addressed the data collection in a test setting to validate 
the developed model.  There are a number of different approaches that can be used to assess the coverage.  
Both a simplified mathematical model based on a version of the Longley-Rice model and an online based 





The field testing was completed and documented in an FAA Interim Technical Report titled, “Radio Line 
of Sight (RLOS) Coverage Field Tests with a 900 MHz Antenna (100 mW)”.  This report was submitted to 
the FAA on February 2, 2017.  A summary of the finding is presented in the following paragraphs. 
 
The static and flight test operations were centered at latitude 32.51716, longitude -106.83065, on the CDRR.  
Testing was performed between two 3DR radios (3DR v2 telemetry SiK radio with the stock antennas), 
operating at 915 MHz with 100 mW transmitters (20 dBm).  One unit was placed at 1 m above ground level 
at various locations on the ranch.  This unit was attached directly to a laptop computer running MavLink 
control software.  This allowed the laptop to record the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) of both 
the control unit (laptop) and the remote unit.  The second unit radio was either connected to a fixed pole for 
the initial testing or to a small UAS.   
 
The initial static testing was performed with the remote unit mounted to a 20 ft tower/pole.  These tests 
were designed to confirm the testing processes and procedures.  The resulting data did provide a clear 
demarcation line of where the communication link degraded at distance.  In the case of the UAS flights, a 
Pixhawk flight control unit was used and mounted as a payload below a quad-copter (remote unit), which 
was control operated at 2400 Mhz at a nominal height of 100 ft AGL.  Test data were also collected at 200, 
300, and 400 ft AGL.   
 
Field results were plotted and compared to both an on-line calculator [one that incorporates the Longley-
Rice (L-R) model, terrain databases, and user entries for the radio characteristics to produce detailed 
coverage maps], and a simplified Longley-Rice model developed by NMSU’s E. Johnson.  Based on field 
data, an estimated field observable RLOS coverage map was drawn for a visual comparison between the 
models and field observations. 
 
Based on the limited sample and analysis time permitted, the results of the field test indicate that in the 
scenario flown the simplified model and the on-line calculator model provide estimations of RLOS 
coverage that are too coarse.  The flight area consists of rolling plains to the north of the static test point 
and a rugged mountain range to the south.  As the simplified model assumes a uniform terrain type (plains, 
hilly, mountainous, etc.), it cannot adequately account for a radio coverage area that spans multiple terrain 
types.  This field testing has demonstrated that real world RLOS conditions differ from the analytical 
models.  While the mathematical models may attempt to replicate ideal conditions, there are site specific 
influences that can impact the actual link distances.  The following conclusions are drawn from this testing: 
 The manufacturer supplied radio specifications under ideal conditions may overestimate the 
possible RLOS link distance in real world conditions. 
 Generalized Longley-Rice models (in this case the Johnson L-R) without actual terrain elevation 
data require the operator to incorporate more than a single-model-estimated RLOS if the area of 
operation spans multiple terrain types. 
 The On-line Longley-Rice Tool overestimated the coverage area based on the assumed input 
parameters.  Fine tuning of the input parameters may improve this, but an average user may not 
be able to improve the inputs without testing. 
 The Johnson L-R or the On-line Longley-Rice Tool may overestimate the possible RLOS link 
distance in real world conditions. 
 Inclusion of a significant link margin (15 dBm or greater) provides a closer estimate of a “safe” 
RLOS coverage area due to the complexity and variability of RF signal attenuation at low 
altitudes. 
 Every sUAS may not be an optimal candidate for BVLOS operations due to variety of constraints 
such as battery life.  In addition, as shown with the sUAS used in these tests, link maintenance is 
critical to sustained sUAS operations.  Although the FAA is allowing approximately 1300 sUAS 
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to be used in 333 Exemption operations, a determination of the utility of these systems for 
BVLOS operations has not been made. 
 
Additional testing in different environments or geographies and with different radio systems or frequencies 
may add to the knowledge base.  This additional testing may be warranted.  With the uncertainties shown, 
it is logical to choose a conservative approach in selecting a safe and reliable RLOS operational distance. 
 
There are a number of resulting recommendations for the Operation Framework from the RLOS testing.  It 
is recommended that: 
 One needs to be conservative due to potential overestimate using manufacturer’s specifications 
for the RLOS link. 
 If the potential flight area has mixed terrain, then the most conservative terrain estimate should be 
used. 
 If there is an input value where the true or estimated value is not known, then the most 
conservative of the choices should be used. 
 Inclusion of a significant link margin (15 dBm or greater) should be used for modeling. 
 Additional RLOS testing would be valuable. 
 Variations in equipment need to be considered.  The FAA has approved over 1300 different 
vehicles under the 333 exemptions.  Not all of these vehicles should be considered for BVLOS 
operations. 
 
2.3.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
The assumptions and limitations used for the studies and that are recommended for the Operational 
Framework have not significantly changed from what was originally proposed.  There was a common sense 
to the original logic proposed and through further research and collection of data, these assumptions have 
held up to review and assessment.  The review of the use cases and the results of the RLOS testing have 





Table 27. Assumptions and limitations for BVLOS operations.  




Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) operations only 
3 Airspace 
sUAS operations will initially be limited to Class G and Class E airspace.  
Additional airspace may be evaluated as necessary. 
4 Altitude sUAS operations will be conducted from the surface to 500’ AGL 
5 Overflight 
sUAS operations will be conducted over other than densely populated areas, 
unless UAS complies with potential criteria or standard that demonstrates safe 





UAS will not be operated close to airports or heliports.  A distance of greater than 
5 miles is recommended.  Exceptions would be for permission granted from ATC 
or airport authority for operations within those areas either directly supporting 





UAS will not be operated close to critical infrastructure such as power plants, 
dams, etc.  A distance of greater than 3 miles is recommended.  Exceptions would 
be for permission granted from ATC, airport authority, or governing organization 
of the infrastructure for operations within those areas either directly supporting 
the critical infrastructure (ex. an Electrical utility company inspecting their own 




UAS operations will be restricted to within radio line of sight (RLOS) of a single, 
fixed ground-based transmitter. No “daisy chaining” of controls or handoffs of 




It is recommended that some safety-based design and/or configuration 
requirements be used.  These include aircraft painted in a highly-visible paint 
scheme to facilitate identification by other aircraft, strobe lights, etc. 
 
 
It would be beneficial if the sUAS were all designed to an Industry Consensus Standard and issued an FAA 
Airworthiness Certificate or other FAA approval.  As noted in section 2.3.3 above, a very large number 
(approximately 1,300) of sUAS have been approved by the FAA under the 333 Exemption operations alone.  
New vehicles and new versions of the approved vehicles are being introduced regularly.  While it would be 
good to have some consensus standard or defined FAA approval, this is likely not possible due to the sheer 
number of vehicles being used. 
 
There are some options to expand these assumptions in the future.  These would include assessment of 
potentials such as night operations, different classes of airspace, different meteorological conditions, higher 
altitudes, using multiple transmitters with handoffs, etc.  These will require another level of assessment. 
 
The assumptions and limitations above provide a clear set of bounds for couching an initial Operational 
Framework for safe operations BVLOS. 
 
2.3.5 Additional Considerations 
With this dynamic field and the continual introduction of new and innovative approaches, there are some 
additional considerations that are applicable to formulating the Operational Framework.  These additional 
considerations are noted in the sections below.  One refers to demonstration from over 10 years ago that is 
applicable to potential use cases.  Also included are some considerations from the recent SARP “Well 
Clear” for sUAS recommendations, the FAA BNSF (Burlington Northern and Santa Fe) Pathfinder effort, 




2.3.5.1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Operations and Validation Program (USOVP) 
Southwest Border Demonstration 
A variety of use cases have been identified for sUAS.  The changing regulatory climate, sUAS interest, and 
cost points have made sUAS attractive to a variety of different users.  Although this current FAA BVLOS 
effort has identified a variety of sUAS use cases, one UAS demonstration that occurred in December 2004, 
the Southwest Border Demonstration, developed several general uses for UAS applications in the NAS, 
other than for DoD, that are still relevant today (Copeland et al. 2005).  Although sUAS were not used for 
this demonstration, the general use cases (point, pattern, and wide area surveillance/observation) are 
relevant to the sUAS BVLOS framework.  The following background, process description, and outcome 
describe within a general taxonomy the general use cases and a portion of the framework that came from 
the Southwest Border Demonstration. 
 
The UAS Systems Operations and Validation Program (USOVP) was established, by Congressional 
mandate, to develop airspace and procedures to support UAS flight tests in the NAS.  The USOVP was a 
federally funded program intended to pathfind UAS flights between New Mexico, Alaska, and Hawaii.  
NMSU had previously conducted UAS flights in New Mexico, but all flights had remained in the local Las 
Cruces airport traffic area.  Local and regional UAS flights also had been conducted at various locations in 
Alaska as part of USOVP.  The Southwest Border Demonstration served to expand the existing UAS 
operating envelope by incorporating flights in the regional airspace along the international border in 
southern New Mexico. 
 
The Southwest Border Demonstration was conducted from 10 to 16 December 2004 south-southwest of 
Las Cruces, New Mexico, by the NMSU Physical Science Laboratory (NMSU/PSL).  Day and night UAS 
missions were conducted in the airspace of the southwest border region.  The demonstration concept was 
designed to safely perform UAS flights in the NAS as would occur if civil UAS missions were being 
conducted.  An incremental approach was used, with each mission becoming more complex as it was 
conducted.  The demonstration scenarios were designed to highlight the enhanced operational capabilities 
offered by UAS and demonstrate their application to the various civil, emergency, and law enforcement 
missions performed at that time in the southwest border region and elsewhere in the NAS. 
 
In order to develop the most robust use case scenarios over 30 different Federal, State, local government, 
and civil organizations were gathered.  These organizations provided the necessary safety and accuracy for 
the demonstration.  Teaming with national, state, and local government agencies was essential.  
Organizations that supported the scenario development input included:
 Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) 
 The Federal Aviation Administration, 
 Federal Communication Commission 
 DOD Area Frequency Coordinator 
 NM Director of Homeland Security 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (ICE) 
 NM State Aviation Division 
 DOI/Bureau of Land Management 
 JTF North 
 NM Border Authority 
 NM State Police 
 Doña Ana County Sheriff’s Office 
 New Mexico Tech 
 Las Cruces City Airport Manager 
 USAF 46th Test Group 
 SAIC 
 General Dynamics Ordnance and 
Tactical Systems 
 Brandes Associates, Inc 
 
In addition to the above other organizations involved with general civil activities also participated. 
 
2.3.5.1.1 Mission Overview 
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The Southwest Border Demonstration was designed to display the capability of safely operating UASs in 
the regional airspace along the southwest border between the United States and Mexico and to integrate the 
UAS flights with local civil and law enforcement agency operations.  NMSU employed a crawl-walk-run 
approach in executing the demonstration, beginning with basic flight maneuvering and navigation and 
progressing through an increasingly complex mission plan.  A total of five flights, two check-out and three 
missions, were conducted during the demonstration.  The checkout flights were conducted to verify that the 
UAS airframe and sensor were functioning correctly.  A route navigation flight was conducted to confirm 
control links and sensor data transmissions over the planned operating routes. 
 
2.3.5.1.2 Scenarios 
Demonstration flights encompassed a series of modular scenarios.  Modular scenarios, termed Scenarios 
A, B, and C, were designed to address the demonstration objectives and allow the integration of lessons-
learned from prior flights.  Demonstration missions were planned to incorporate a combination of scenarios 
during the course of the flights.  Each scenario represented a different type of operational monitoring 
activity that is applicable to a variety of different use cases, including point, line, and wide area surveillance.  
Tasks performed during flights included: 
(1) Line observation of power lines, roads, and railroad tracks, 
(2) Open area observation of farms, open range, forest, lakes, and cattle, and 
(3) Tracking of vehicles, aircraft, and people. 
 
Since the scenarios were modular in design, they could be accomplished in any sequence, or could be 
repeated or skipped at the discretion of the mission commander, allowing for flexibility in attaining overall 
demonstration objectives.  Depending upon the situation, a mission flight may include all four scenarios, 
or a single scenario repeated several times.  The mission commander selected the scenarios to be 
accomplished during each flight based upon results of previous flights, feedback from homeland security 
representatives, and progress in attaining demonstration objectives.  Each of the four scenarios including 
the operating locations, scenarios, and demonstration events are included in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
2.3.5.1.2.1 Scenario A: Border Patrol Checkpoint 
The United States Customs and Border Protection (CPB) Agency checkpoint west of Las Cruces on 
Interstate 10 (I-10) was the focal point of the Scenario A.  The UAS established an orbit beginning two 
miles west of the I-10 check point and extending three miles past that point.  During the scenario, a test 
vehicle with four personnel traveled west on I-10 and stopped along the highway ¼-mile east of the 
checkpoint.  Two people (simulated targets) exited the vehicle and proceeded on foot to the north and west, 
walking around the border patrol checkpoint and then south back to I-10.  The vehicle then proceeded 
through the checkpoint and continued westbound for ¼-mile where it awaited the arrival of the simulated 
targets that were walking around the checkpoint.  Related to Border Checkpoints the described situation is 
informally referred to as “walk arounds” and is performed by persons trying to avoid Border Patrol Agents.  
During the scenario, the payload sensor was observed by CBP personnel in the checkpoint.  CBP Agents 
monitored the two simulated targets walking around the checkpoint, as well as the accompanying vehicle 
as it passed through the checkpoint and subsequently picked up the two people after they returned to the 
road. 
 
2.3.5.1.2.2 Scenario B: Designated Point Surveillance 
The UAS was commanded to a designated location in order to investigate a suspicious vehicle.  The UAS 
established an orbit and eventually tracked the ground vehicle.  Once the orbit was established, a second 
ground vehicle arrived at the location, exchanged passengers, and both vehicles departed in different 





During one night mission, the demonstration team was directed to listen, look, and report when they heard 
the UAS.  This was done to obtain an estimate on detecting the UAS at night for law enforcement agencies. 
 
2.3.5.1.2.3 Scenario C: Designated Line Surveillance 
The UAS was commanded to a designated location along a railroad track, identified as Aden.  The UAS 
established an orbit between Aden and a second point on the railroad track identified as Lanark.  The UAS 
maintained the correct VFR (Visual Flight Rules) altitude while orbiting between the two points (Aden to 
Lanark).  The payload operator scanned the railroad track and the vicinity for activity of interest.  Real-time 
diversions from the established orbit to investigate items of interest were coordinated by the mission 
commander. 
 
2.3.5.1.2.4 Scenario D: Border Surveillance 
The UAS was commanded to a designated location approximately three miles north of the international 
border.  The UAS flew a track that paralleled the border until reaching the designated turn point.  Upon 
arrival at the turn point, the UAS made a 180° turn to the north, adjusted altitude, and flew the same track 
in the opposite direction.  The payload operator performed wide area scans with the UAS sensor package 
to identify areas and activities of interest.  Areas of interest were investigated by the UAS in an orbit mode. 
 
2.3.5.1.2.5 Scenario E: Diversion Scenario 
The diversion operation occurred while performing any one of the other general scenarios or use cases.  The 
Mission Commander was provided the general location of a target from the CBP.  The Mission Commander 
tasked the UAS crew to locate the target and provide assistance/information to the CBP Agent.  When the 
target was located using its sensor, an attempt to track the person and/or vehicle was made while assisting 
Agents in directing CBP assets to make contact with the target. 
 
2.3.5.1.3 Conclusion 
The FAA COE Task A2 has determined a variety of use cases for potential BVLOS.  The Southwest Border 
Demonstration developed scenarios and use cases based upon input from over 30 different constituent 
organizations.  A unique outcome from these use cases was their further classification into three broad use 
cases: point, line, and wide area surveillance/search.  The ability to map use cases into a general 
taxonomy has merit and allows dealing with the different sUAS BVLOS more efficiently and effectively.  
In addition, there are numerous similarities within the broad taxonomies that are shared such as takeoff, 
enroute, and landing which allows another grouping of common requirements for analyses and research.  
The ability to summarize use cases, missions, and portions of similar flight profiles allows more global vs. 
granular comparison and may facilitate a more general regulatory approach capturing large numbers of 
sUAS BVLOS uses. 
 
2.3.5.2 SARP “Well Clear” for sUAS 
The SARP was charged with developing a well clear definition for sUAS operating at low altitudes.  This 
process followed the one previously developed for the initial recommendation for well clear for other-than-
small UAS.  This is discussed herein in §3.2.1.  The SARP-recommended well clear definition is a “hockey 
puck” shape that requires 2000 ft horizontal and 250 ft vertical separation for sUAS. 
 
In addition, Weinert (2016) provided details regarding the approach to developing the recommendations.  
The then current definition of well clear for sUAS needed to be extended to BVLOS.  This new definition 
was to be based upon risk, unmitigated, and operational suitability.  Risk modeling was performed that 
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required the development of low altitude encounter models that did not exist.  An outcome of the modeling 
was that risk was not sensitive to the assumptions, which was attributed to slow sUAS airspeeds. 
 
2.3.5.3 FAA BNSF Pathfinder Effort 
The FAA has a number of pathfinder efforts targeted at specific areas to explore commercial use of UAS 
beyond operations proposed in its draft UAS rule.  CNN is researching visual line of sight operations for 
newsgathering in urban areas.  PrecisionHawk is investigating agricultural operations for rural areas, flying 
outside line of sight.  The PrecsionHawk effort is in many ways the type of mission identified as a highly 
desired application for BVLOS flights from the surveys completed. 
 
The FAA tasked Burlington Northern and Santa Fe (BNSF) Railway, the second-largest freight railroad 
network in North America, with inspecting rail infrastructure (e. g., opportunity to diminish derailment risk) 
beyond visual line of sight.  BNSF operates 32,500 miles of track.  The pathfinder effort with BNSF 
Railway is focused on BVLOS operations in rural, low risk, well defined locations.  These series of flights 
with BNSF Railway were designed to show how UAS can enhance the safety of critical infrastructure by 
aiding with inspections such as: 
 Continuous overflight of assets 
 Tunnel and bridge inspections 
 Track inspections 
 Track integrity flights 
 
A goal was to improve inspections and keep employees out of harm’s way and harsh conditions.  BNSF 
worked with Insitu ScanEagle for this pathfinder. 
 
These initial pathfinder flights took place in New Mexico and overflew some of the BNSF rail lines.  This 
concentrated inspection of rails, rail beds, etc. was an excellent application of BVLOS flights within a well-
defined operational area.  BNSF Railway was exploring command-and-control challenges as part of their 
infrastructure inspections.  This specific application of BVLOS flights operations in rural or isolated areas 
required an extensive infrastructure.  While this is an excellent example of a well-defined and executed 
plan for BVLOS operations, it is resource intensive: microwave/fiber optic, physical plants, spectrum 
assets, legacy train control systems, and existing towers for new aviation communication (Graetz and 
Guterres 2016).  This unique example may not be applicable to other operations.  This application is noted 
here because it does involve BVLOS operations but may not be germane to many potential users who are 
small businesses and do not have this level of infrastructure. 
 
2.3.5.4 International Activities 
Within the USA the FAA originally authorized the Pathfinder efforts to help facilitate sUAS activities to 
include BVLOS.  These were not the only BVLOS flights that were taking place, especially when 
considering the international scene.  Within New Zealand a sUAS operator can fly BVLOS with a 
certification, and the same is true in Poland.  In addition the Polish Civil Aviation Authority also requires 
training that extends beyond theoretical to obtain a certificate.  These international activities have value-
added information since many of these systems are commonly used around the world. 
 
2.3.5.4.1 Canada 
The Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council (CARAC) Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems Program 
Design Working Group has developed recommended practices and guidelines for sUAS operators for 
BVLOS (Baillie et al. 2016).  The plan is for these recommendations to be turned into regulations for sUAS 
depending on Transport Canada’s approach.  The process for developing the candidate regulations has been 
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divided into four phases defined by UAS weight, VLOS, and BVLOS.  The remainder of this section 
describes the current Canadian guidelines, which are not yet regulations. 
 
A general prerequisite is that a sUAS operator seeking to operate BVLOS for the first time must have a safe 
record and be a compliant VLOS operator.  Additional details on the Canadian recommendations are 
provided in Table 28. 
 
 
Table 28. Canadian sUAS operator’s requirements to operate BVLOS.  
Requirements Detailed Parameters 
Age 18 years 
Medical Cat 4 declaration 
Knowledge Ground school course to include: air law and procedures, flight instruments, 
navigation, flight operations, meteorology, human factors, theory of flight; and 
passing grade on test. 
Experience Within 24 months received practical UAS training and manufacturer training 
with assessed satisfactory proficiency. 
Skill An instructor letter certifying the pilot has demonstrated normal and 
emergency procedures. 
Credits Private pilot’s license or higher satisfies the knowledge requirement, active and 
retired Canadian forces pilots also satisfy the knowledge portion, active and 
retired Canadian forces pilots with UAS qualifications satisfy knowledge, 
experience, and skill requirements. 
Pilot Recency Acted as pilot within past 5 years from date of planned flight, met the 
requirements for the permit within the past 12 months, and active as pilot 
within the past six months for both day and night operations. 
Flight 
Instructors 
Meet all the above requirements and possess 50 flights or six hours of flight 
time including instruction techniques, solo, and night operations. 
 
 
There are additional requirements for BVLOS under reduced visibility VFR, night VFR, and IFR.  While 
the operator requirements are likely of interest to some, the reader should focus on a few points that the 
Canadians have included in their guidelines to date.  An occlusion of the sUAS (even behind a building) is 
BVLOS.  Also, night and reduced visibility flights are allowed, which have an impact on see and avoid and 
its associated technologies. 
 
Other sections of the Canadian guideline address a variety of operator and organizational recommendations.  
Of particular interest is the sUAS design standard included in the guideline.  Presently, no design standards 
exist for sUAS BVLOS in the USA.  As stated elsewhere in this report, the FAA has authorized well over 
1,000 separate sUAS for 333 exemptions in the NAS; however, no distinction has been made for sUAS that 
may be optimized for BVLOS or that meet some minimal operational capability.  The proposed Canadian 
design standard for sUAS for VLOS and BVLOS operations includes the following systems: 
 Navigation 
 Autopilot 
 Radio communication and lost link 
 Sense and avoid 
 Lost link 
 Flight termination 
 Systems and equipment 
- Air speed 
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- Pressure altitude 
- Direction sensing 
- Ground/surface feature and cloud detection 
- Launch and recovery 





Newer proposed sections specific to BVLOS include C2 (Command and Control), navigation, autopilot, 
radio communications, and control links. 
 
The minimum system capabilities required for VLOS operations are defined by Canadian Aviation 
Regulations.  Twelve capabilities are required, and many of those can be achieved by direct visual 
observation such as remaining clear of clouds.  For day BVLOS operations, all of the VLOS capabilities 
are recommended except those for night operations, and 18 additional recommendations have been 
proffered.  For night VFR, 6 additional recommendations are proposed, and for BVLOS IFR, the 
recommendations include those for night VFR as well as 5 additional capabilities.  The Canadian approach 
has produced a set of recommendations that do specifically address sUAS design requirements.  The 
document also addresses the entire system to even include organizational requirements.  The detailed 
parameters included in the Canadian document were not technically evaluated or validated; however, this 
type of document does provide a more holistic systems approach to overall sUAS requirements for these 
unique BVLOS operations.  A regulatory body may not be desired, but these types of details, if adopted by 
industry, should produce a sUAS tailored to BVLOS applications. 
 
Transport Canada has reviewed the guide.  In addition, in late 2016, Transport Canada approved the 
Foremost UAS Range in Alberta as the first range for BVLOS operations. 
 
Unmanned Systems Canada published the best practice guide for sUAS operating BVLOS that has been 
reviewed by Transport Canada.  In addition to the Canadian activities, several other countries have approved 
the first UAS BVLOS operations in their airspace in the last few years.  The Israelis have also approved the 
first autonomous BVLOS flight without a pilot.  These additional country examples are not an exhaustive 
review of all sUAS BVLOS activities but do illustrate that there are activities around the globe. 
 
2.3.5.4.2 Switzerland 
The country’s Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FCCA) granted a country-wide BVLOS authorization to 
senseFly.  The first of its kind permission includes the following restrictions: altitude of 500 feet AGL, 
1000 feet over urban areas, and the required use of visual observers specifically monitoring a 2 km radius 
of airspace for other aircraft.  With this permission, a danger area no longer will be required for BVLOS 
operations by senseFly. 
 
2.3.5.4.3 Denmark 
The first approved BVLOS sUAS operation was granted in 2017 to Heloscope from the Danish Transport 
Agency.  The BVLOS use case is power line monitoring.  The sUAS will operate along a pre-programmed 
route with a human monitoring the flight and available to take over the flight if necessary.  This first Danish 
BVLOS activity includes participation by the University of Southern Denmark, the University of Aalborg, 





In addition, UAS Denmark has been created as an international test center.  Part of its mission is to 
specifically accommodate BVLOS testing. 
 
2.3.5.4.4 Norway 
The Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority issued permanent national approval to the IRIS Group in 2017 for 
BVLOS of powerline inspections in all of Norway.  Other entities involved with this action include eSmart 
Systems, which has the stated long-term goal of autonomous BVLOS airborne powerline inspections. 
 
2.3.5.4.5 Finland 
In August 2016, the first international cargo flight took place between Hanko, Finland, and Haapsulu, 
Estonia.  The air distance between these two countries is 108 km, but traffic patterns extended the flight 
distance to about 150 km.  This flight took place in a closed airspace corridor for the BVLOS flight.  The 
altitude permission for the corridor that was obtained was for 2000 ft AGL and the corridor was 3 km wide.  
The UAS that was operated for the first UAS BVLOS flight was the AR3000.  A planned handoff of the 
ground station control occurred mid-way due to anticipated signal strength capability. 
 
2.3.5.4.6 Israel 
Airobotics was the first organization (in the world) to be approved to fly fully automated BVLOS by the 
Civil Aviation Authority of Israel (CAAI) without a pilot.  Artificial intelligence and software replace the 
UAS pilot making decisions and taking action in flight.  The Airobotics UAS was certified through a two-
year process beginning in 2015.  The Civil Safety Aviation Authority also has issued a license to Airobotics 
for commercial operations at a mining site in Australia. 
 
2.3.5.4.7 United Arab Emirates 
Nokia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) General civil Aviation Authority entered into an agreement in 
2016.  The Nokia UAV Traffic management (UTM) concept will be used to manage UAS in and around 




China has issued rules applicable to civil UAS, including BVLOS operations.  These rules are consistent 
with both current FAA and EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) direction.  Night operations are 
authorized for BVLOS but not VLOS.  Air route priority is always for manned flight.  ICAO-relevant 
(International Civil Aviation Organization) standards are applied for emergency situations during UAS 
BVLOS flights.  China’s rules make continuous reference and use of the cloud. 
 
2.3.5.4.9 Australia 
CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) has allowed both EVLOS and BVLOS testing since 2014 for 
package delivery.  CASA granted permission for ongoing BVLOS flights as early as 2016.  To date, BVLOS 
flights have taken place in remote areas with no people or infrastructure in the immediate area.  CASA 
requires an assessment of the planned airspace, including other users, the local environment, anticipated 
weather, aircraft performance, and communication performance.  One operator—Geometric 
Technologies—conducted a series of BVLOS flights in 2016 with the use case being easement inspections 
for vegetation encroachment and power line monitoring with the DT-18 UAS. 
 
2.3.5.5 Other Aircraft Considerations 
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It is worth noting again that the actual aircraft that could be used for BVLOS operations are not of the same 
quality or have the same level of maturity.  The FAA has approved well over a thousand aircraft under 333 
exemptions.  Not all of these are capable of BVLOS operations due to flight time, batteries, communication 
links, and more.  Not all of these should be considered as candidates for BVLOS operations.  There has 
been no conclusive research done that assesses the different designs or any of the structural or operational 
considerations. 
 
Research was completed under an ASSURE task titled ‘Surveillance Criticality for SAA–Low Altitude 
Operations Safety’.  This work was completed by a team of Universities led by North Carolina State 
University.  This research was designed to develop a safety assessment process to determine the 
contributions of technology, pilots and controllers in aircraft separation assurance and collision avoidance.  
This assessment was used in an operational UAS Con Ops to evaluate the potential hazards, failure modes, 
effects, and criticality of selected ABDAA (Airborne Detect And Avoid) technologies.  The technologies 
that were studied included TCAS, ADS-B, GBSAA (Ground Based Sense and Avoid), and Cellular based 
SAA (LATAS).  The impacts were focused toward RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics)/ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) F-38, UTM (Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Traffic Management), and ADS-B spectrum management strategies.  This work pointed out some 
specific technology limitations of the electronic systems related to performance and reliability.  For 
example, data reliability and dropouts can significantly impact required well clear distances if this is the 
only data source received BVLOS.  These studies to date define some considerations, but do not fully define 
what specific vehicles are or are not capable or should be allowed to perform BVLOS.  This proves to be a 
challenge when trying to define an Operational Framework that can be applied to all sUAS since all sUAS 
are not intrinsically equal or the same. 
 
Not unlike for manned aircraft that operate at different altitudes, or have more than one engine, varied 
passengers, etc., a sUAS that is going to be operated BVLOS needs definition of what minimum equipment 
and capability list is necessary for safe operation.  This list can come from a variety of sources such as 
RTCA, ASTM, another consensus group, the FAA, etc.  Similar to the Canadian document and other 
international initiatives, the majority of regulators and users appreciate that a BVLOS sUAS does need 
different attributes than a VLOS “utilitarian” sUAS. 
 
2.3.6 Operational Framework Overview 
2.3.6.1 Strategies and Recommendations 
The goal of the Operational Framework is to define the environment and conditions that will enable sUAS 
operations BVLOS.  The use case information noted above provides a number of different potential 
operational environments.  Most of these have been limited in geographical distance due to the initially 
imposed LOS requirement from the FAA.  The specific use cases that explore BVLOS have not yet been 
pushed into the mainstream.  From a top level perspective, the cases and the resulting framework must meet 
the listed assumptions and limitations defined in §2.3.4 above.  This provides a starting point.  Some or all 
of these assumptions and limitations can be expanded upon as desired, but this initial set provide a solid 
starting point. 
 
Extracting from almost all of the use cases gathered, they involved operations primarily conducted from 
the surface to 500’ AGL.  There was little information that went up to 1,000’ AGL.  It was a significant 
challenge to gather functional and performance information on the vehicles and operations that could 
inform both the functional requirements for the UAS and the potential threat posed from other users of the 
operational environment. 
 
The Operational Framework for potential sUAS BVLOS operations has three interrelated elements that are 
needed for safe flight.  The conditions or locations in which one flies must be conducive to safe flight 
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operations, the operator must operate in a safe fashion, and the aircraft themselves must be capable of 
reliable and safe BVLOS operations. 
 
The recommended Operational Framework constraints follow the assumptions and limitations noted in 
regard to operations time, meteorological conditions, airspace, altitudes, and overflight.  Operational control 
by one single operator within RLOS of a single, fixed ground-based transmitter limits the physical distance 
one can operate a sUAS, but does remove any potential hand off issues that can be a system reliability issue. 
 
The recommended constraints, based on the assumptions and limitations for the operational conditions are 
as follows: 
 Daytime operations 
 Visual meteorological conditions 
 Class G and Class E airspace 
 Surface to 500’ AGL 
 
The operator must operate in a safe fashion.  When looking at how a sUAS pilot flies, there are a number 
of elements beyond the normal flight training or legal considerations that provide additional constraints: 
 Overflight over other than densely populated areas 
 Operations greater than 5 miles from an airport 
 Operations greater than 3 miles from critical infrastructure 
 sUAS operations restricted to within RLOS of a single, fixed ground-based transmitter 
 Aircraft should be made as visible as possible 
 Phases of flight (see below) 
 
There are some exceptions to the above as noted for example when doing inspections of critical 
infrastructure or airports when arranged for by the controlling entity. 
 
The different phases of flight can necessitate different operator interactions.  Takeoffs and landings are 
critical operational periods and it is recommended, for safety reasons, that they take place within LOS of 
the operator.  Departure, enroute, and operational phase flight plans should be designed to fly at minimal 
reasonable flight altitudes to avoid any potential GA (General Aviation) aircraft, and far from any margins 
where one meets a geographical or population risk.  For example, a system failure or operator error should 
not result in the aircraft flying over people or over an airport by accident. 
 
Just as the phases of flight can necessitate different operator interactions, the use cases appear broad but 
can be condensed to make research, communication, and recommendation/regulatory development 
streamlined.  Whether the SARP, USOVP, or another taxonomy is used, all use cases can generally be 
categorized into a three to five general use case types.  This classification and decomposition should be 
done with the existing potential use cases as well as new ones that are discovered. 
 
Big areas of potential uncertainty are the capability and reliability of a sUAS.  This is a significant concern.  
As noted above, not all sUAS are equal when comparing the quality, construction, and reliability.  There is 
a potential danger in allowing all aircraft that have been approved under the 333 exemptions to be used for 
BVLOS operations.  A desire may be to be as open as possible with aircraft to be used for sUAS applications 
and potential use cases.  Coupled with this is the foundation of flight safety that must be at the core of all 
BVLOS operations.  To that end, it is recommended that all sUAS used for BVLOS be potentially designed 
to an Industry Consensus Standard and/or issued an FAA Airworthiness Certificate or other FAA approval.  
This may be the only way to ensure that BVLOS operations can be done with equipment and systems that 
are capable of safely performing BVLOS operations.  Commercial electronics and other systems are 




The variability in the systems and components makes this area a challenge.  Even with clearly defined well 
clear definitions, a few missed update packages on location for example can cause issues.  sUAS 
performance related to airspeeds, endurance, maneuverability (climb rates, descent rates, turn rates, etc.) is 
published by some manufacturers, but there is no specific accountability or checks made to ensure that the 
actual aircraft meets the published standards.  An Industry Consensus Standard and/or issuance of an FAA 
Airworthiness Certificate or other FAA approval would provide a level of accountability for performance 
related items. 
 
The inclusion of a DAA system can mitigate some of these concerns.  There are a number of potential 
approaches proposed for this.  A list of both GBSAA and ABSAA (Airborne Sense And Avoid) 
manufacturers and systems was gathered and provided to the FAA.  The solutions are varied and attack the 
problem from a number of different technology angles.  This area has an ever evolving technology base 
and it is difficult to define the DAA system requirements, performance, reliability, communications range 
and reliability, sub-system redundancy, overall system latency, sensor performance, and notification and 
alerting—and all within acceptable SWaP (Size, Weight, and Power) restrictions.  Cost is a consideration 
when looking at all of these potential approaches.  The most informed way of assessment is through testing.  
This is proposed for follow on efforts.  Flight testing will help further identify any constraints related to 
collision avoidance (CA), self-separation (SS) minima, and contingency management. 
 
From a safety standpoint again, a number of potential approaches could be employed to assess risk and 
decision processes related to risk acceptability.  Real time or mission planning/related risk management 
tools were not explored, but can be developed as part of the Safety Management System (SMS)/Safety Risk 
Management (SRM) work performed herein (§3.4).  The SRM assesses a large number of potential 
conditions (~250), but not all are valid for all conditions. 
 
2.3.6.2 Summary 
This section contains a summary of all of the primary strategies and recommendations to help facilitate 
sUAS BVLOS operations in the NAS: 
1) Require a minimal set of limitations for BVLOS operations 
a. Operating time: daytime 
b. Meteorological conditions: Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) 
c. Altitude: ~500 feet AGL 
d. Overflight: no densely populated areas 
e. Airport proximity limitations: greater than or equal to 5 miles 
f. Critical operating limitations: greater than or equal to 3 miles of critical infrastructure 
g. Operational control: RLOS will determine distance; no daisy chaining of control stations 
h. Aircraft visibility: optimize color, lighting, and design for conspicuity 
2) Develop a consensus-and research-based design strategy 
3) Utilize common phases of flight to facilitate recommendations and potential regulatory input to 
the FAA 
4) Develop a taxonomy and use cases that result in a manageable set of recommendations for 
regulatory and recommendation purposes 
5) ASTM could lead the development of design and other data for BVLOS operations based upon 
current and proposed research 
6) A DAA system—either airborne or ground-based—must be operational with the system 
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7) sUAS BVLOS operations in the NAS can take place without extensive and very expensive 
infrastructure 
8) International operations and requirements should be considered in formulating the BVLOS 
requirements for the USA 
9) Develop a more robust RLOS model for BVLOS 
10) Utilize SMS to assess risk as BVLOS evolves 
11) Utilizing candidate DAA and other enabling BVLOS technologies, develop, verify and validate 
test methodologies for these current systems and apply this to future systems 
12) Anticipate that the near future will demand autonomous BVLOS without a human pilot 
 
3 Comparison of Approaches 
3.1 Pilot Visual See and Avoid (SAA) Performance 
One of the tasks is a review of Visual Observer (VO) and pilot SAA performance to provide context relative 
to the performance of DAA systems, which are the focus of this effort.  A very brief summary of previous 
work in this area is provided in this section.  It is noted that Williams and Gildea (2014) provide an excellent 
summary of work in this area. 
 
According to Antuñano (2002), humans have three types of vision, known as photopic, mesopic, and 
scotopic vision.  Photopic vision occurs in daytime or in highly illuminated environments, when the eyes 
rely on the foveal cones to see and interpret sharp images and colors of objects.  Mesopic vision occurs at 
dawn, dusk, or full moonlight and is characterized by a decrease in visual acuity and color vision.  For these 
conditions, the foveal cones and rods are required to maintain normal visual performance for a given 
situation.  Scotopic vision is similar to mesopic vision, but occurs in darker conditions, such as nighttime, 
partial moonlight, or low illumination conditions.  These conditions create difficulties for the foveal cones 
to maintain the appropriate visual acuity and color perception.  In these conditions, if an individual looks 
directly at an object for longer than a few seconds, the appearance of the object will diminish—this is known 
as the night blind spot.  With the night blind spot, which owes to the absence of rods in the fovea and is 5-
10° wide, an object being viewed directly at night can go undetected or fade after the initial detection.  Thus, 
the average VO is expected to perform better in a highly-illuminated range versus a poorly-illuminated 
range. 
 
As discussed by Antuñano (2002), the normal vision field extends upward 60° and downward 75°, totaling 
to a 135° field.  The sharpest vision extends across about 1°, and occurs within the foveal field.  The normal 
horizontal visual field varies due to its reliance on facial structures (e.g., noses can interfere with vision), 
and the foveal field is the central 1°. 
 
A number of studies have been conducted to study pilot and visual observer performance.  Crognale (2009) 
conducted four experiments to determine the effectiveness and aptitudes of VOs, including their ability to: 
1) Detect a UA approaching head-on from an undisclosed direction, 
2) Determine the distance and altitude of UA, 
3) Evaluate detection distances under conditions of reduced uncertainty regarding the positions of 
UA, and 
4) Estimate the potential for collisions between UA and other aircraft. 
To test 1), two Scan Eagle UA (approximately 40 lbs and wingspan of 10 ft), one painted gray and the other 
orange, were flown.  Observers wore earplugs to eliminate the noise that could lead to positional detection 
through acoustics and were told to look at the ground until the UAS had been positioned at one of eight 
directions from the observer (N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, or NW and about 1.5 km from the observer).  Though 
no correlation with the color of the UAS was detected, this experiment yielded a detection rate of 97% and 
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a mean detection distance of 327 m, with a range of 21 m to 1,400 m.  With a detection distance of 327 m, 
this yields the potential for a 13 second window to formulate a plan and perform a collision avoidance 
maneuver.  It is suggested that at least 12 seconds are required for an adequate risk assessment to be 
performed if there is potential for a collision, in order to safely preform an avoidance maneuver.  However, 
for the Crognale (2009) study, if a successful detection is defined only as one that provides at least 12 
seconds of response time, the rate of accurate detection drops to 49%. 
 
The second experiment tested fourteen VOs using about two or three tests each to judge their ability to 
determine the altitude and distance of an UA.  This experiment revealed that participants were relatively 
poor at determining both distance and altitude of UA.  The average error in distance estimates was about 
40% greater than the actual distance and altitude errors were about 60% from the actual altitude.  The third 
experiment was conducted to evaluate detection distances under conditions where there were reduced 
uncertainties in UA position.  This produced an average detection limit of 1,276 m for a UA as it flew away 
from the participants and an average 898 m detection distance for UA reacquisition.  The final experiment 
tested the ability of VOs to estimate the potential for collision between UA and aircraft.  The result of this 
experiment was the VOs were unable to estimate the potential for collision if they were unable to see both 
the aircraft at the same time.  
 
Dolgov et al. (2012) considered temporal effects (e.g., dusk, night) and their overall impact on VO 
performance.  They observed that there was no degradation in safety between day and night conditions, and 
measures of visibility favored night conditions. 
 
Dolgov (2016) is one of the most recent studies.  This study considered the ability of a VO to maintain 
visual contact with a manned aircraft, while at the same time maintaining visual contact with two small 
unmanned aircraft used in the study (AeroVironment, Inc. Wasp and Raven).  In this study, VO performance 
during daytime operations was generally lower than for dusk and nighttime operations.  This resulted 
mainly due to the accessory lighting of the sUAS and manned aircraft.  For the manned aircraft (a light-
sport, two seat aircraft having a wingspan of 8.5 m), the three observers were able to visually acquire it at 
average distances of 1.28 km (day), 2.02 km (dusk), and 2.09 km (night).  These compare to 0.72 km (day), 
1.0 km (dusk), and 0.83 km (night) for the Raven and 0.76 km (day), 0.56 (dusk), and 0.76 km (night) for 
the Wasp.  Executing an avoidance maneuver is based on a reaction time to separate the approaching aircraft 
after detection, whether manned or unmanned, away from each other.  Visual detection depends upon the 
approach speed and size of the two aircraft, along with other factors such as contrast of the aircraft against 
the sky or terrain, etc.  In the Dolgov (2016) study, the time available for a safe maneuver of the sUAS 
away from the manned aircraft ranged from 32 seconds during the day to approximately 52 seconds for 
dusk and night operations.  While this study was not specifically considering the ability of the manned 
aircraft pilot to detect the sUAS, it was reported that the sUAS were never detected by the safety visual 
observer on board the manned aircraft during the day or at dusk, and the larger of the two sUAS (Raven) 
was only detected during three of the nineteen night events. 
 
In comparing individual pilot SAA to individual VO visual performance, Williams and Gildea (2014) 
concluded that individual VOs have several advantages: 
1) VOs can dedicate up to 100% of their time to detecting traffic whereas pilots typically spend only 
35% of their time on this task, 
2) Conflicting traffic is more likely to be in relative motion to the ground observer than to the pilot of 
a manned aircraft, which is more likely to draw the attention of the observer, 
3) VOs are less likely to have objects (e.g., cockpit obstructions) obscuring their view of traffic, 
although this could be offset by the empty-field myopia effect (lack of objects in a clear sky 
resulting on eyes focusing only a short distance from the observer). 
Given these and the results of Dolgov (2016), one can conclude that for relatively small manned aircraft, 
an optimistic average detection distance for MA pilots is on the order of 0.8 miles during the daytime, with 
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this distance increasing at night through the use of accessory lighting.  (It is noted that this is based upon 
the literature examined herein, and does not include findings from Pathfinder Focus Area II.)  As discussed 
by Williams and Gildea (2014) and Morris (2005), the actual MA pilot intruder detection distance in a given 
scenario depends upon many factors, including sky condition, cockpit obstructions, and interaction 
geometries. 
 
3.2 Survey of DAA Criteria and Recommended Baseline Performance 
This set of tasks is directed at establishment, for sUAS, of sensing distance criteria for collision avoidance 
and maintenance of well clear (self-separation).  The focus here is on self-separation.  Because of the scope 
of this issue, it was approached by leveraging efforts of other groups [e.g., RTCA SC228 (Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics Special Committee 228) and SARP (Science And Research Panel)] and by 
supplementing these efforts with HWIL (HardWare In the Loop) simulation efforts. 
 
3.2.1 Literature Review 
3.2.1.1 RTCA SC228 
The Science and Research Panel developed the initial recommendation for well clear for other-than-small 
UAS.  As described by Cook at al. (2015), this recommendation is a modified tau (τmod) for horizontal well 
clear, with 35 seconds from collision or a minimum of 4000 ft separation, and a fixed vertical distance of 
700 ft.  This was accepted by RTCA SC228 for other-than-small UAS, and then was modified, with FAA 
concurrence, such that the vertical distance is reduced to 450 ft.  The RTCA SC228 has used this well clear 
definition for other-than-small UAS to further develop concepts relative to well clear, including prediction 
of loss of well clear and TCAS interoperability. 
 
3.2.1.2 SARP 
The SARP developed the initial recommendation for well clear for other-than-small UAS.  Subsequent to 
this, SARP was charged with developing a well clear definition for sUAS operating at low altitudes.  A 
detailed description of this development is beyond the scope of effort and is being provided by SARP 
members.  However, Investigator Askelson participated in this process.  The following description is a 
high-level account of this process based upon that participation. 
 
The development of a well clear definition for sUAS operating at low altitudes generally followed the same 
process applied in the development of the well clear definition for other-than-small UAS.  However, efforts 
for sUAS operating at low altitudes were significantly limited by lack of data regarding how intruders 
commonly fly at low altitudes.  These intruders are most commonly, in areas away from airports, emergency 
medical aircraft, crop sprayers, and possibly aircraft that have emergencies.  Some data regarding these 
types of flights were obtained, but were limited.  A combination of actual flight data and simulated flight 
profiles (e.g., for UAS flights at low altitudes) were utilized to help develop the needed well clear definition.  
The final result was risk based, with the risks of an NMAC given well-clear violation and of a MAC given 
NMAC determined through Monte Carlo simulations (with no assumed maneuvering to avoid either NMAC 
or MAC).  Based on these, a risk-based definition for well clear that is solely distance-based was produced.  
The driver for use of a distance-based definition, as opposed to a time-based definition (tau), is the relatively 
low speeds of sUAS relative to intruders.  This performance differential resulted in time-based definitions 
providing no significant advantages to distance-based definitions.  The final recommendation is separations 
of 2000 ft horizontally and 250 ft vertically. 
 
The development, during the period of performance for this effort, of a proposed well clear definition for 
sUAS operating at low altitudes was very significant.  It informed both simulations performed in this effort 




3.2.2 Definition of Encounter Timeline and Elements 
Understanding sensing distance requirements can be enabled by delineating the steps within the DAA 
function.  Once defined and with associated durations for each step, one can estimate required distances 
given encounter closure rates.  Moreover, definition of the encounter timeline and elements enables 
attribution of hazards to specific functions within DAA, which is the approach that is used in the Safety 
Management System (SMS)/Safety Risk Management (SRM) efforts presented in §3.4. 
 
Previous work that was considered in the development of this timeline includes Coulter (2009) and Hottman 
et al. (2009). 
 
The primary steps in this timeline are Detect, Track, Evaluate, and Maneuver.  In the detection step, some 
means (e.g., an instrument like a radar) is used to sense the presence of something that must be avoided.  
The highest priority intruder is manned aircraft, but this could include fixed objects like towers, houses, 
trees, etc. 
 
In the second step, Track, the path of the intruder is estimated.  In the case of fixed objects, this is 
elementary.  However, for moving targets, this step can be complex, and the accuracy of the resulting track 
depends both upon the behavior of the intruder and upon the accuracy with which the position(s) of the 
intruder are determined in the Detect step. 
 
The Evaluate step involves determining whether the identified intruder poses a threat.  Herein, “threat” is 
taken to mean that some action is required to either avoid violating well clear, as defined for sUAS operating 
at low altitudes, or a collision, which, of course, takes higher precedence.  Numerous considerations are 
contained within this step, including determining whether something is a threat, determining which threats 
are of greatest importance (e.g., an aircraft vs. a fixed object), etc. 
 
The final step in the timeline is Maneuver.  In this self-explanatory step, one maneuvers ownship to avoid 
producing an unwanted state (e.g., violation of a well-clear boundary).  Numerous factors must be 
considered in the determination of the maneuver that is executed.  These include proximity (e.g., τmod), the 
type of intruder, whether multiple intruders are present, right-of-way rules, etc.  The possibility of fixed 
objects constraining the path that one might take to resolve a conflict is captured by the “Constraints” oval 
in Fig 55. 
 
For the primary steps in this timeline, some detail regarding “sub-steps” or “sub-functions” is provided.  
These provide some detail, but of course do not cover all of the sub-functions.  The intent is to illustrate 






Figure 55. Illustration of the encounter timeline.  
 
 
3.2.3 Estimation of Collision Avoidance and Self-Separation Thresholds 
3.2.3.1 Introduction 
Under the auspices of the ASSURE research partnership, the engineering team has contributed its efforts 
toward meeting specific goals in the A2 program by developing and using a real-time flight simulation 
testbed to evaluate multiple interactions between small UAS and manned aircraft.  In creating simulation 
infrastructure and conducting a number of preliminary test encounters, this effort contributes to evaluation 
of requirements for DAA systems, specifically sensor system performance and high level understanding of 
well clear requirements for small UAS (FAA Sponsored “Sense and Avoid” Workshop 2009; Hottman et 
al. 2009; FAA Sponsored “Sense and Avoid” Workshop 2013; Cook et al. 2015). 
 
The scope of the project is defined so that researchers may evaluate encounter dynamics when confronted 
with the performance characteristics of small UAS operating at low altitudes in uncongested airspace.  The 
effort also provides abilities to model types of manned air traffic that will likely be encountered in day-to-
day operation as well as the ability to evaluate relative advantages and limitations of different sensors, 
including GPS-based systems like ADS-B, radar systems, active scanning systems, and passive scanning 
systems. 
 
Through this testbed, researchers may devise tests that combine interactions between the various limitations 
of sensors, UAS systems, human limitations, and other relevant metrics that may expose the effects of these 
interactions on small UAS flight safety.  This testbed has already been employed to evaluate appropriate 
well-clear boundaries between UAS and traffic common to this environment. 
 
3.2.3.2 Methods 
3.2.3.2.1 Simulation Testbed 
The testbed consists of a combination of off-the-shelf and custom software and hardware.  Multiple systems 
are networked to perform a series of roles including the small UAS “ownship”, an “intruder” aircraft 
normally operating as a general aviation airplane, a suite of sensor emulation functions, data and metrics 










The current configuration of the testbed’s hardware is organized into three General Purpose Computers 
(GPCs) by their particular roles.  All aircraft are simulated using Cloud Cap’s Piccolo autopilot systems.  
Normally GPC 1 (Fig. 58) is used in a software-in-the-loop configuration (SWIL) to simulate one or more 
intruder aircraft and to filter intruder telemetry into a format consistent with different types of sensors.  With 
telemetry feedback from “ownship” on GPC 3, the intruder operator may control intruder flight plans and 




Figure 57. Full simulation testbed; GPC 1, bottom; 
GPC 2, right; GPC 3, upper left; external flight 
systems and GCS, top.  
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Figure 58. GPC 1 intruder aircraft systems and sensor 
processing (not on display).  
 
 
GPC 2 (Fig. 59) is primarily used to both record relevant data from all aircraft and, if required by the 
scenario, run an automatic avoidance algorithm developed in-house in place of pilot action.  The system 
records both state data for the aircraft and appropriate metrics relevant to DAA evaluation.  The avoidance 
algorithm is run optionally and activated by the ownship pilot on GPC 3 as if the algorithm were on-board 
the small UAS.  For the algorithm to perform appropriately, it is provided appropriate intruder data 
processed to emulate the limitations of sensors.  For instance, data may be delayed or rendered intermittently 
available to emulate saturation of transceiver systems such as ADS-B or to emulate the limited update rates 
of radar systems.  Data may also be limited by both range and field-of-view to emulate on-board active and 




Figure 59. GPC 2 data recording and algorithm.  
 
 
GPC 3 (Fig. 60) encompasses both the ownship aircraft systems as well as a sensor display system provided 
in one of two display engines.  Ownship autopilot may be run in a variety of configurations including fixed 
wing and multicopter.  Fixed wing configuration is normally run using autopilot hardware in a HWIL 
configuration.  This provides three modes of control including direct pilot control using an RC console, 
waypoint control via the autopilot interface, and automatic control provided by the avoidance algorithm 
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when activated by the pilot.  Multicopter control is run using a SWIL configuration, with two modes of 
control including waypoint control via the autopilot interface and automatic control provided by the 




Figure 60. GPC 3 ownship systems (left) and sensor display (right).  
 
 
The sensor displays system ingests both ownship and emulated sensor data from GPC 2 and displays the 
information using a highly customized Google Earth engine as shown in Fig. 56.  The sensor display may 
be configured using multiple avoidance thresholds based upon sUAS and intruder performance 
characteristics and environmental restrictions (e.g., restrictions of flight paths owing to obstacles). 
 
3.2.3.2.3 Software 
3.2.3.2.3.1 Piccolo System 
Piccolo Command Center’s robust and flexible feature set enables not only navigation methods common to 
most UAS (including manual RC control and waypoint navigation), but also makes available command-
loop overrides via software control which enables an in-house DAA avoidance algorithm to control the 
ownship aircraft.  Likewise, multiple payload and autopilot telemetry data streams enable communications 
with the other systems in the testbed.  For instance, telemetry from the intruder on GPC 1 may be processed 
as simulated sensor data for both the avoidance algorithm and the ownship’s sensor display.  The specifics 
of custom software solutions follow. 
 
3.2.3.2.3.2 Sensor Simulation 
Sensor limitations have a possibility of drastically changing pilot actions for avoidance maneuvers.  With 
this in mind, two different sensor types were developed including Automatic Dependent Surveillance – 
Broadcast (ADS-B) and electro optical systems.  More in depth explanations for each sensor type tested is 
listed below. 
3.2.3.2.3.2.1 ADS-B 
ADS-B is a surveillance technology where an aircraft determines its position via satellite navigation and 
periodically broadcasts its position and state information to other ADS-B equipped aircraft to enable it to 
be tracked.  Broadcasting this information allows pilots of ADS-B equipped aircraft to have up-to-date 
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position and state information of nearby aircraft with an update rate of 1 Hz.  The data provided through 
ADS-B includes aircraft position, heading, velocity, and state information.  Range is only limited by 
constraints on bandwidth and signal propagation, so a several mile radius is easily maintained.  Due to 
requiring GPS satellite visibility and potential signal interference, it is possible signal dropouts may occur.  
To simulate this limitation, a modifiable “probability to receive” value was added to the ADS-B sensor data 
emulation.  This means that for each 1 Hz heartbeat, there is a randomized chance at a defined probability 
that the ADS-B signal from a given aircraft will be received and made available to the pilot or algorithm.  
Tests were run using ADS-B signal availability of 100%, 60%, and 40%. 
 
3.2.3.2.3.2.2 Electro-Optical Systems 
With electro optical systems being increasingly popular as a sensor type on small UAS, a method to simulate 
such a sensor was developed.  Most electro optical systems have limited range and field of view horizontally 
and vertically with an update rate based on system configuration and performance.  These limitations were 
incorporated into an optical sensor data emulator for the system that emulates these restrictions and modifies 
the data stream being provided to the pilot and algorithm appropriately.  While the intruder’s position falls 
within the configured range and field of view it will show up on the provided GCS display. 
 
3.2.3.2.4 Metrics 
To facilitate the ability to easily quantify performance associated with a given simulated encounter, metric 
calculations were added to the simulation test bed on GPC 2.  This software takes in relevant state 
information for ownship and intruders and calculates a given set of metrics based on this state information.  
The metric information from each encounter was combined to allow for easier sorting and comparison of 
encounters for analysis. 
 
3.2.3.2.4.1 Selection 
To facilitate easy determination of performance for an encounter and to compare against other encounters 
a set of metrics were chosen that best quantify performance and are relatively easy to calculate.  The metrics 
chosen include vertical deviation, cross track deviation, time deviation, minimum separation, horizontal 
separation at minimum, and vertical separation at minimum.  For algorithm-based encounters, initial 
commanded heading, indicated airspeed, and vertical velocity are calculated.  These metrics best illustrate 
the performance of an encounter and allow for easy identification of encounters that failed to maintain a 
specified minimum well clear distance. 
 
3.2.3.2.4.2 Implementation 
The metric calculations were implemented on GPC 2, shown in Fig. 56.  These calculations were written 
into custom software that interfaces between the Piccolo software or autopilot and the GCS display and 
algorithm.  This software takes in relevant ownship and intruder state and telemetry information, performs 
metric calculations, and passes the state and telemetry information to the GCS display for display purposes 
or the optional algorithm to perform avoidance maneuvers.  The metric software is setup to automatically 
generate time-stamped metric files based on the current date and time.  Along with generating metrics, this 
software also logs relevant ownship and intruder state information to similarly-named state files that can be 
associated with a given set of metric values and encounters.  The values written out to the metric file 
represent the minimum or maximum values, dependent on the metric, seen during the course of an 
encounter.  To distinguish between metric encounters, the ability to automatically or manually signal the 
start and stop of an encounter was implemented.  For the case of automatic start and stop conditions, a 
configurable distance-based threshold was used and for the case of manually starting and stopping the 
metric calculations, a configurable button was added to Piccolo Command Center on GPC 3 that allows the 
pilot to start and stop a metric encounter.  At the start of an encounter, the metric conditions are reset and a 
state file for the given encounter is generated to be written to over the course of the encounter.  Once the 
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end of an encounter has been detected or indicated, the current metric values for the encounter are written 
out to the metric file representing the current set of encounters as a single line with the current timestamp 
and associated state file name. 
 
3.2.3.2.5 Automatic Avoidance Algorithm 
Along with manual and waypoint control, the test bed allows for the integration and testing of an optional 
automatic avoidance algorithm on GPC 2.  This algorithm is fed current ownship state and simulated sensor 
data for intruders passed from the metric software.  For the purposes of the encounters presented in this 
paper, an avoidance algorithm actively developed and flight tested since 2008 by the Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Engineering (UASE) team at the University of North Dakota was used (Martel and Wang 2010; 
Martel et al. 2011; Foerster et al. 2012; Mullins et al. 2012a,b). 
 
The automatic avoidance algorithm developed by the UASE team at the University of North Dakota is 
based on the Interval Programming Architecture, shown in Fig. 61, where environmental data from sensors 
are used by multiple behaviors to generate and populate behavior-specific decision spaces based on the 
performance limits of the aircraft.  These decision spaces are weighted and summed together to create a 
final decision space used to determine the best command vector for the current ownship and intruder state 
information.  The implemented behaviors include waypoint seeking, steadiest path, intruder avoidance, 




Figure 61. Interval programming structure.  
 
 
3.2.3.3 User Roles 
In running simulations on the testbed, user roles are normally divided into the UAS pilot and experiment 
operator (Figs. 62-63).  The pilot role on GPC 3 may be expanded to accommodate multi-crew 
environments as necessary, but test conduct normally assumes a single pilot.  The experiment operator will 
normally conduct the flight of any intruder aircraft and monitor systems functions on both the intruder 
station (GPC 1) and the algorithm and recording station (GPC 2).  To accommodate a variety of possible 
ownship scenarios, the pilot may use three different controller methods in DAA operation, including: direct 
control that utilizes the pilot RC style console, waypoint navigation directly via the GPC, and activation of 






Figure 62. Systems display for intruder as flown by 
experiment operator.  Display shows both ownship 
(south-bound from north) and intruder (circled, red 
from east) including flight plans for both.  
 
 
    
Figure 63. Systems and sensor display of pilot role.  On pilot system display, only ownship is visible (circled, 




3.2.3.4 Ownship Flight 
The goal of ownship simulation is to provide at least the primary emblematic performance profiles for the 
kinds of small UAS expected to make up the current and future sUAS fleet.  For the testbed, ownship 
simulation includes two common UAS configurations in the small UAS fleet, one multi-rotor and one fixed-
wing.  The multi-rotor configuration attempts to model the performance of the popular DJI Phantom 4, a 
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good fit for a notional multi-rotor aircraft fleet that is expected to be used extensively in aerial inspection 
operation.  Such aircraft fit a role investigating a platform with high maneuverability but low forward speeds 
that limits overall agility in many manned-unmanned scenarios.  The second fixed-wing UAS fits a 
similarly common profile with a nominal cruising speed of 30-50 knots. 
 
3.2.3.4.1 Multi-Rotor 
The multi-rotor simulator models one of the most popular systems available on market, the DJI Phantom 4.  
A flight model created for Piccolo Command Center provides performance characteristics and operating 
limits consistent with the Phantom whose performance specifications follow in Table 29. 
 
 
Table 29. Phantom 4 performance characteristics.  
DJI Phantom 4 Air Speed (Knots) 
Max Ascent Speed 11.66 
Max Descent Speed 7.78 
Max Ground Speed 38.88 
Cruise Speed 29.16 
 
 
The multi-rotor simulation is implemented in a software-in-the-loop configuration.  This setup provides 
both waypoint navigation and avoidance algorithm operation.  For ownship experiments with the multi-
rotor, waypoint navigation and avoidance maneuvering were emphasized above automatic avoidance. 
 
Piccolo primary navigation is normally assumed to be waypoint based.  While convenient and appropriate 
for most common UAS missions, this naturally makes avoidance maneuvering difficult.  Creating a 
waypoint can easily delay a maneuver, increasing the risk of near-midair collisions.  Therefore, the 
simulation team created sets of regularly located “escape” waypoints for flight tests as shown in Fig. 64 for 
waypoints 1 through 16.  The waypoints were set up in a 360° circular pattern surrounding the mission 
operations area in approximately 22.5° increments.  Waypoints 98, 99, and 30 comprise the lost 
communication waypoint, primary landing waypoint, and alternate hover waypoint, respectively.  Each 
could be redeployed depending on the needs of the experiment.  In this way the multi-rotor could be 
navigated along its normal sensing flight plans between waypoints 20, 21, 22, and 23 and sent to escape 
waypoints or landing waypoints as appropriate.  Should further action be needed, autopilot command loops 











The fixed wing model uses a previously developed UAS flight model based on the BTE Super Hauler used 
in flight operations over a number of years.  The UAS is a simple all-wood frame UAS with a Desert 
Aircraft 100 CC engine that is easy to fly, maintain, and modify for various experiments.  The performance 
profile of the Super Hauler is similar in scale to many small UAS flying similar sensing missions emulated 
in the tests.  Availability and familiarity with the systems made utilizing this model for simulation a natural 
fit.  The model’s performance characteristics are listed below in Table 30. 
 
 
Table 30. BTE Super Hauler performance characteristics.  
BTE Super Hauler  Ownship Airspeed 
(Knots) 
Stall Speed 35.77 
Cruise Speed 38.88 
Max Ground Speed 58.32 
 
 
The HWIL implementation of the ownship systems allows direct access to the autopilot hardware and also 
enables direct pilot control via the RC console.  The systems allow single switch activation of manual 
control of the aircraft, enabling simulation of pilot response to intruder encounters.  As with multi-rotor 
navigation, a similar waypoint setup with “escape” waypoints appropriate for the fixed wing aircraft were 
set up as shown in Fig. 65.  These safety waypoints are shown as waypoints 20 through 35.  Likewise, flight 






Figure 65. Fixed wing operating area with safety waypoints.  
 
 
3.2.3.5 Intruder Flight Patterns 
The intruder aircraft operates in a SWIL configuration using an adapted form of the Super Hauler model.  
The model uses an upgraded engine that can be tuned to provide fast cruise speeds between 80 and 100 
knots.  This simulates the speed range expected of general aviation (GA) intruders common at very low 
altitudes that may conflict with small UAS operations.  In the opinion of researchers, the speeds of aerial 
applicators and medical flights will commonly not vary significantly from these profiles this close to terrain.  
Informal opinions gathered from several applicator pilots confirms that speeds between 80-100 knots are 
common profiles on crop-dusting runs.  Table 31 shows the performance bounds of the adapted Super 
Hauler model.  While not perfectly simulating a particular model of GA aircraft, these characteristics 
capture the category and performance likely to be encountered. 
 
 
Table 31. Intruder performance characteristics.  






Stall Speed 35.77 35.77 
Cruise Speed 83.4 100 
Max Ground Speed 83.4 106 
 
 
Flight plans for intruders varied between five different profiles.  As in the previous figures, ownship 
operations are assumed to be at or around 200 feet AGL, splitting the difference between ground level 
where aerial sensing is less useful and an assumed 500 ft ceiling.  For several intruder encounter geometries, 
the flight paths are intended to capture common, possibly difficult scenarios: an approach-from behind 
condition, head-on encounter, and 90° offset either from the left or right directions.  These geometries may 
be varied by altitude, but are generally co-altitude to capture the difficult pilot decisions involved in whether 
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to avoid horizontally with aircraft having limited performance or to climb toward the 500 ft ceiling or 
descend toward ground level. 
 
The other two primary configurations model the climbing and descending behavior of crop-dusting aircraft.  
Two of the most common turn patterns of such aircraft may be a simple U-turn from one application run 
on the field below to another, executing a constantly shifting race-track pattern as the airplane completes 
application runs as shown in Fig. 66.  The alternative involves a P-turn (Fig. 67) which follows the U-turn 
but adds a continuing descending 90° turn and then an opposite 90° turn to simulate the airplane adjusting 
to make a crop-dusting run adjacent to the previous run.  In real life such aircraft are constantly adjusting 
and shifting climbs, turns, and descents to accommodate the variations in local fields where obstacles, field 
dimensions, and power lines dictate a crop-duster’s strategy.  These two turns, however, should adequately 
simulate the types of encounters small UAS might see in adjacent fields as crop-dusting aircraft fly at near 




Figure 66. Emblematic crop-duster maneuver: climbing U-Turn to reverse course.  Apex of turn (short of 
waypoint 9 when configured for pre-turn logic) approaches ownship path (N-S in green) at or near same 






Figure 67. Emblematic crop-duster maneuver: climbing P-Turn to reverse course.  Apex of turn beyond 
waypoint 48 crosses ownship path (N-S in green) at or near same altitude as ownship.  
 
 
In this way a wide selection of scenarios varying intruder speed, sensor ranges, geometries, pilot control 
(whether human on-the-loop, waypoint, or manually controlled), and other limitations were employed to 
find a series of observations and initial findings useful for uncovering DAA needs whether involving sensor 
capability, algorithm capability, or pilot-machine interaction.  A discussion of particular simulations, 
observations, and recommendations follow. 
 
One safety note for both ownship and intruder is that both simulated ground level at an altitude of 3,000 ft.  
This prevents the possibility of one or both aircraft contacting ground level and tumbling in simulation, 
especially if a vehicle like the intruder is simulating crop-dusting patterns.  Metric recording systems and 
the autopilot system both detect whether either aircraft has descended below an arbitrary limit.  In the case 
of the crop-dusting patterns, ground level for the intruder is set several feet below 3,000 to accommodate 
control noise and limits of the autopilot controller during rapid climbs and descents. 
 
3.2.3.6 Analysis 
Total simulations to date number 117, including systems tests and follow-up tests as simulation testbed 
performance changes were evaluated.  As testing progressed, an array of intruder encounters evolved from 
several parameter sweeps to investigation of particular parameters.  The consequences of particular 
variables such as sensor range or sensor availability exposed a number of particular risks.  Outlined below 
are several themes discussing the results of specific aircraft encounters or groups of encounters as these 
issues emerged. 
 
3.2.3.6.1 Well Clear Distance Thresholds and NMAC (Near MidAir Collision) 
One of the primary goals for simulating DAA systems is the evaluation of sensors and ownship 
maneuverability with regard to both well clear thresholds and Near MidAir Collisions (NMACs).  For well 
clear, the group ran simulated encounters at arbitrary well clear distances of 4000 ft using a constant vertical 
distance of 250 ft.  For NMACs the group used standard TCAS thresholds at 500 ft horizontally and 100 ft 
vertically, attempting to define a minimum range at which NMAC events are likely to occur given pilot 
attempts to maneuver clear.  Both methods and the resulting observations are discussed below.  It should 
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be noted that no NMAC events occurred unless very limited sensor ranges were used.  This important 
consideration will be explained later as sensor limitations are discussed at length. 
 
3.2.3.6.1.1 Pilot Controlled Well Clear 
There were, however, many breaches of the 4000 ft well clear radius.  In many cases ownship still remained 
well clear as the pilot attempted to either climb or descend.  While often successful, this introduced safety 
risks that will be discussed later.  For purely horizontal maneuvers, no clear weakness emerged except that 
the numbers of well-clear violations at 4000 naturally increased when flying faster intruders at 100 kts.  
Likewise, the number of violations increased when considering the adverse head-on geometry.  This can 
probably be attributed simply to the fact that limited time to react and avoid resulted in more well clear 
violations (see Fig. 68).  Under optimal sensor conditions, however, this time-to-react concern is mostly 




Figure 68. Well-clear violation shown on sensor display in 
adverse head-on geometry.  Pilot (ownship, white) 
maneuvered late to avoid intruder (red), inducing violation.  
 
 
3.2.3.6.1.2 Algorithm Controlled Well Clear 
Most encounters focused predominantly on pilot control and avoidance.  While not emphasized, the in-
house avoidance algorithm, when tested under similar conditions, could normally avoid any given well-
clear distance given an adequate triggering range.  Given sufficient distance, the algorithm would attempt 
to “hug” close to the well-clear boundary as it efficiently avoided the intruder while attempting to remain 
close to its original course.  In fact, across all experiments, the pilot would usually engage much more 
conservatively, avoiding earlier and sooner than the algorithm. 
 
For reasonable triggering distances, it is expected that any appropriate algorithm may avoid a given well 
clear distance.  There is not yet an assumption for what this triggering distance should be.  This is not to be 
confused with any particular definition of well-clear, but with the algorithm’s activation threshold to remain 
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well clear.  Such a distance, while not well within the scope of this research, could be designed to be purely 
distance-based, distance-based evaluated by time, or purely tau-based, as some current well-clear methods 
use. 
 
3.2.3.6.1.3 Vertical Well Clear 
Several attempts to remain well clear using a 250 ft vertical threshold were, in most cases, successful—
most commonly when attempting waypoint control.  Across manual control encounters, episodes of the 
ownship airplane ballooning past the 500 ft AGL height limit were common.  This was commonly caused 
by difficulty holding the aircraft level as power and altitude changes were made.  In the heat of an avoidance 
maneuver, the pilot might not have time to adequately re-trim the aircraft for changing climbs, leveling off, 
and speed changes.  The environment of small UAS BLOS required skills similar to instrument flight, with 
the addition that fast avoidance maneuvers be made under the same conditions while using RC control.  A 
well trained RC pilot may be able to adequately maintain altitudes, but the maneuver remains a high-skill 
one and not one to be attempted without adequate training. 
 
Descents likewise were difficult to execute and quickly abandoned as unlikely candidates for avoidance.  
The likelihood of impacting ground level rendered the maneuver highly risky.  Immediate landing attempts 
via multi-copter were nearly impossible.  Automated waypoint-based landing sequences were too slow to 
remain vertically well clear from the intruder.  Possibly an estimated or hard landing could be attempted 
via direct manual control of the multi-copter, but this was beyond scope of the simulation testbed 
development. 
 
Overall, the most successful well-clear attempts used conservative assumptions and saw the intruder at 
large distances such as those 3 nm and above.  Varying geometries with more favorable dynamics than 
head-on encounters might mitigate some of the well-clear violation frequencies and lower well-clear 
boundaries offer further room for maneuver, but limited sensor ranges and fields-of-view will naturally 
make this proposition difficult. 
 
3.2.3.6.2 Sensor Limits 
Sensor limits emulated three different limitations.  One was the possibility of reduced availability of a GPS 
or ADS-B based system, another the limitation of sensor range, and a third the limitation of field-of-view.  
The ADS-B based limitation provided random availability of data packets to the sensor display and 
avoidance algorithm.  Availability of packets could be reduced as a percentage.  Simulations attempted 
encounters at 100% (normal operation), 80%, 60%, and 40% availability.  A pilot attempting manual 
avoidance maneuvers under any reduced availability would commonly still be able to either remain well 
clear or nearly well clear no matter the availability percentage.  This success implies that conservative 
maneuvering attempts of a human pilot likely provided greater time and space to avoid. 
 
The algorithm encountered more difficulty, however.  An algorithm without using track prediction (that is 
every intruder packet is maintained as current) introduces increased risk of avoiding in an incorrect direction 
or incorrectly abandoning an avoidance maneuver when the intruder is actually still present.  With straight-
line track prediction, the algorithm mitigated the limited availability of the intruder correctly in most cases.  
The one limitation was the presence of rapidly maneuvering intruders, specifically the crop-dusting P and 
U turns.  With an intruder constantly changing direction, especially in the case of the P-turns, experiments 
revealed that in most cases the algorithm struggled to remain well clear, especially at 40% availability 
where stretches of five or more seconds could pass without intruder data being passed to the ownship’s 
sensor display. 
 
The second sensor limitation involved range limits.  Experiments varied limited viewing range between 3.5 
nm down to 2600 ft.  The ability to maintain a well clear boundary of 4000 ft depended partly on ownship 
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category.  Where the fixed-wing ownship could successfully avoid given at least a 2.6 nm range of 
detection, the multi-rotor ownship could not and required at least 3.5 nm detection range.  Both categories 
were unable to maintain well clear distances of 3000 ft below 1.75 nm detection ranges.  2000 ft ranges 
were similar, however, requiring 1.75 nm detection. 
 
Given well-clear violations at particular ranges, the team also experimented with NMAC, seeking to reduce 
detection range for both aircraft categories until NMACs began to occur.  This is the only set of experiment 
conditions other than limited field of view that resulted in NMAC events.  Under these conditions, NMAC 
events occurred for fixed-wing ownship at 4000 ft detection ranges.  For multi-rotor, this occurred at 2700 
ft detection ranges.  In all cases, the objective assumed that well-clear had already been violated and that 
only NMAC avoidance was appropriate.  And for both aircraft, large maneuvers usually involving rapidly 
climbing turns were required. 
 
The third primary limitation was to limit the field of view of sensors as might be expected in passive, vision 
sensor classes.  The primary assumption was to limit detection field of view to a total of 120° horizontally 
(60 right and left) and 75° vertically (37.5 up and down).  Encounters under adverse conditions focused on 
90° intruder encounters as well as both P and U turn encounters.  In all cases, the sensor display detected 
the intruder too late, causing NMAC events.  In two cases, ownship never detected the intruder.  Expanding 
the field of view to 180° by 75° prevented NMACs but increased the hazard to avoidance as the pilot was 
unable to correctly detect when or where the intruder had passed.  This sometimes required ownship to turn 
toward the intruder’s expected position to re-expose the intruder to the limited sensor view as shown in Fig. 




Figure 69. 180° field of view demonstrating regaining intruder contact (intruder in 
yellow) after slight left turn.  
 
 
3.2.3.6.3 Control Methods 
The fixed-wing ownship simulation employed three different modes of control: manual, waypoint, and 
algorithm.  The multi-rotor ownship employed two: waypoint and algorithm.  Algorithm performance has 
already been discussed but bears summarizing: the in-house algorithm as a stand-in for any possible 
avoidance algorithm will normally navigate closer to well-clear distances and perform capably given 
sufficient detection range and data availability.  Limitations to sensors, though, may dramatically impact 
algorithm performance.  The primary desire to evaluate human control in both waypoint and manual control 
exposes two trends for both fixed-wing and multi-rotor.  Generally, the more precise the control method 
and the more confident the pilot can be in the control method, the more successful and efficient the outcome.  
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This primarily indicates that waypoint control is normally the more optimal strategy of the two.  Pilots 
engaging in manual control of the fixed-wing aircraft commonly struggled under task saturation attempting 
to balance intruder position evaluation, aircraft trim, and instrument control of the aircraft under constant 
heading, speed, and altitude changes.  Where a normal TCAS resolution advisory normally issues audio 
alerts with a command direction, the pilot looking at intruder position must evaluate strategy as the two 
aircraft converge.  Experimenters noticed that this would commonly result in the ownship pilot making 
avoidance maneuvers early if possible, perhaps making more of a strategic evaluation to not just remain 
well-clear of the intruder, but remain well-clear of the area the intruder is in, possibly abandoning the small 
UAS’s mission—at least temporarily. 
 
Waypoint control resulted in less of this uncertainty and closer avoidance distances, most likely due to the 
precise control available to the pilot.  Considered as a measure of efficiency, time-in-avoidance and distance 
avoidance (measurements such as cross-track deviation and vertical deviation) were consistently smaller 
for waypoint navigation.  This prompts the observation that waypoint navigation may be preferable in DAA 
beyond line-of-sight navigation with some particular caveats regarding waypoint control assumptions to be 
discussed in recommendations. 
 
3.2.3.6.4 Aircraft Category and Performance 
Of the two aircraft evaluated, the fixed-wing and the multi-copter, it was clear that the fixed-wing was the 
more maneuverable of the two aircraft and could normally execute avoidance maneuvers and remain well-
clear more easily and more often, commonly due to the aircraft’s greater available power.  The multi-rotor, 
again emulating the performance of an average, popular quad-copter, simply requires greater detection 
ranges to remain well clear, especially if maneuvering horizontally.  The pilots attempted to descend, climb, 
and even land the aircraft in an attempt to take advantage of smaller well-clear vertical distances, but were 
often unable to do so for reasons to be discussed shortly.  In most cases the horizontal missed distance of 
the multi-rotor was smaller than that of the airplane. 
 
The only time this condition reversed is where well-clear has already been violated and the multi-copter 
attempted merely to avoid NMAC.  This occurred during the sensor range limit tests and exposed the 
primary advantage of the multi-rotor: the ability to make quick vertical maneuvers to avoid, which the 
airplane was unable to do.  This capability was less useful for remaining well-clear, but more useful for 
avoiding NMAC events. 
 
3.2.3.6.5 Airspace Maneuvering Limits 
Setting a 500 ft limit on maneuvering room significantly limited the ability of either aircraft to remain 
adequately well clear.  The airplane, while able to maneuver ahead of time via waypoint navigation, proved 
difficult to control quickly at precise altitudes well clear above the intruder and still below the 500 ft ceiling.  
Descending below the intruder was likewise difficult.  Multi-rotor waypoint navigation could enable more 
precise maneuvering above and below an intruder, but limitations and a general preference to avoid 
horizontally prevented these strategies from being preferable. 
 
One significant issue with vertical avoidance is the uncertainty of altitude whether between barometric 
altitude and GPS altitude or between the installation errors of two barometric altimeters.  The possibility 
that such uncertainties may wipe away any margin in vertical maneuvering further limits the suitability of 
vertical maneuvers.  Likewise, the presence of obstacles below makes descending a difficult course of 
action to recommend. 
 
One possibility available to the multi-rotor is to land.  This might be possible as an emergency maneuver, 
but is slow when considering waypoint-based landing under normal autopilot control laws.  In scenarios 
tested, experimenters found that attempting to land via waypoint required too much time to travel to the 
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landing waypoint and execute a controlled, slow descend to ground level.  Even this inadequacy ignores 
the risks inherent in attempting a landing beyond line-of-sight where the landing site may not have been 
surveyed ahead of time. 
 
Given these limitations, it is not likely that vertical maneuvering becomes particularly useful for well clear 
avoidance as long as the UAS are constrained to 500 ft AGL.  This means that horizontal maneuvering and 
the performance and sensor requirements of small UAS dominate safety considerations.  This does not 
mean that vertical maneuvering is always incorrect.  Pilot judgment and further tests may expose situations 
where combined and vertical maneuvers may allow for decreased sensor ranges. 
 
3.2.3.6.6 Visual Display Systems 
The visual display system used for ownship DAA avoidance shows relative positions and headings of 
ownship and intruder aircraft.  An additional feature allows custom clearance rings to be displayed around 
intruders such as that shown in Fig. 70.  For several tests, the team tested similar scenarios where the pilot 
would maneuver ownship either manually or via waypoint navigation with well clear distance rings either 
visible or not visible.  Results from these tests indicate that avoidance maneuvers were much more 
conservative, resulting in larger minimum distances, than with the rings visible.  This is indicative of pilot 
comfort in maintaining well clear by maneuvering closer to visible well-clear rings.  Implementation of a 





Figure 70. Appearance of well-clear ring just 
before violation as seen in Fig 68.  
 
 
3.2.3.7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The simulation efforts, while not exhaustive, have nevertheless revealed a number of observations on which 
several initial recommendations can be made. 
 
3.2.3.7.1 Well Clear Recommendations 
Several assumptions used during the simulations should be emphasized.  First, the conditions of the tests 
centered on adverse conditions in a purely rural environment.  As the well clear observations showed, the 
ability for a pilot to remain well clear is hampered most when time available to avoid is limited, such as 
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when encountering faster intruders in a head-on condition.  Second, the research group used standard TCAS 
near midair collision definitions: 500 ft laterally and 100 ft vertically.  Third, the group assumed a distance-
based well clear threshold. 
 
Given these conditions, the optimal well clear distance for small aircraft is probably close to a radius of 
4,000 ft, absent of other circumstances and limitations such as sensor limitations on a DAA system or 
unusually fast aircraft.  When reducing available detection distances in head-on scenarios, pilots 
encountered difficulty avoiding NMAC events even when responding rapidly and making significant 
climbing or descending turns.  As noted before, no NMAC events occurred outside this detection range 
unless some other sensor limitation prevented ownship from seeing the intruder at all, as with limited field 
of view. 
 
It may be that with more extensive tests and as sample size of tests increase this distance may expand or 
shrink.  Likewise, there may be test conditions such as the assumption of faster intruders of an order of 120-
150 knots that may push a required threshold out further, but under the assumptions tested for rural 
environments below 500 ft, the threshold is a reasonable marker. 
 
3.2.3.7.2 High Level DAA Recommendations 
Other recommendations cover experience gained through the breadth of tests, as well as several other edge 
cases.  The engineering group recommends the following for sensors: to avoid NMAC events, sensors will 
require at least the same detection distance as the well-clear radius discussed above.  This requires that any 
sensor system be able to sense, resolve, and issue appropriate data or warnings to the pilot or algorithm, if 
used, by 4000 ft.  Using the 4000 ft threshold, the group found that to maneuver and remain well clear, 
sensor detection ranges greater than 2.6 nm are required.  Should the required threshold expand or shrink, 
this distance may also change.  It should be reiterated that this is again based on the conservative edge cases 
of pilot response in worst case encounters like head-on. 
 
Field of view is a case where the required angle depends on relative speed.  Closure geometries at 90° will 
not allow a DAA system equipped on a slow speed UAS to detect a much faster intruder that can remain 
outside the detection area through NMAC.  While faster UAS may not require a larger horizontal range, 
the group recommends at least a 180° field of view or regard.  The group also recommends that wider fields 
of view be considered depending on the probability of closure angles at greater than 90°.  A full 360° 
requirement should be considered if manned-overtaking-unmanned scenarios are deemed common enough 
that lack of detection increases risk to an unacceptable level. 
 
One recommendation includes the UAS’s autoflight system as part of a DAA total package.  If human-in-
the-loop control is an assumption, any autoflight system must accommodate the pilot’s need to rapidly and 
effectively control the aircraft to remain safe and well clear of the traffic in question.  Multiple times, the 
experimenters noticed that the inability to exercise direct control over the UAS quickly inhibited the 
effectiveness of the maneuver.  Where direct manual control (RC mode) can be difficult if the pilot must 
deal with limitations such as airplane trim and fast maneuvers in what is effectively an instrument flight 
environment, direct autopilot control could become difficult where the pilot needed to make two or more 
changes to the system, such as unlocking a configuration or clicking a standard computer dropdown menu, 
to change airspeed or altitude immediately.  In the future, the team recommends that any autopilot expecting 
human-in-the-loop control must be capable of aircraft trajectory changes within as few control inputs as 
possible.  For instance, a transport category autopilot system in altitude hold mode will normally have a 
rotating knob that allows quick changes in hundreds of feet.  If full manual control will not be the primary 





No specific recommendations are made regarding limited availability or update rates.  The group has 
uncovered no major loss of performance when dealing with intermittent information.  In nearly all 
scenarios, given sufficient distances described above, pilots were able to interpolate and avoid areas where 
intruders momentarily disappeared.  Two caveats follow this recommendation, though.  One caveat is that 
intermittent or slow-update detection should be accounted for in the required distance to detect.  For 
instance, the update of the simulation testbed’s sensor display is 1 Hz and range and threshold 
recommendations are based upon this capability.  Slower update rates will need to be incorporated into 
threshold assumptions before deployment.  A second caveat is that the group did not simulate adverse 
detection conditions when dealing with multi-sensor fusion.  For instance, low-update-rate sensors fusing 
poorly with faster update sensors may ghost an intruder’s return treating it as two aircraft. 
 
Automatic algorithm response was not emphasized in these tests.  However, the exposure of certain 
algorithm methods to a diversity of sensor behaviors and capabilities and its response must be accounted 
for when deployed.  The team’s in-house algorithm was upgraded to handle track prediction, for instance, 
to account for random sensor dropouts down to 40%.  This is reasonable for most air traffic assumed to be 
on a consistent course whether level, climbing, or descending.  Maneuvering traffic, such as that 
encountered when dealing with simulated crop-dusting flights, will likely require further development.  No 
specific recommendation beyond accounting for sensor limitations is made at this time. 
 
3.2.3.8 Future Work 
There remain many avenues for further work and research beyond the scope of the current research.  Further 
work may expand and improve the simulation testbed.  For instance, accommodating real-world data feeds 
into simulation, for instance ASR/ARSR (Airport Surveillance Radar/Air Route Surveillance Radar) data 
or ADS-R (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast) or TIS-B (Traffic Information Service-
Broadcast) traffic could be used to evaluate the edge cases where service volume fails either normally (by 
equipment limit) or due to obstacles or terrain.  The engineering team also identified the development of 
simulated sensor visualization to be highly useful in evaluating pilot response when confronting the 
limitations of vision sensors in tracking and avoiding an intruder.  Such a 3D system would emulate the 
viewable information directly from the sensor, including its limitations.  This means that the display could 
mount visualization techniques on top of the visual sensor emulation already in use.  For instance, an 
intruder might only fade or grow into view given the range limit of a particular sensor.  Fields of view could 
be dynamically expanded or shrunk in a similar fashion.  Camera resolution could be emulated through the 
use of a pixilation filter.  All possibilities gear toward human target recognition and could feed into human-
machine interface evaluation of the adequacy of the sensor and avoidance maneuvering in a similar small 
UAS environment like that under current study. 
 
Other possible work expands the work on the potential of the simulation testbed’s current capabilities to 
determine outcomes between manned-unmanned encounters.  Focused study on human response versus 
further tuned avoidance algorithm could yield finer results on the DAA sensor and tracking needs of 
automatic versus pilot avoidance.  Consideration of avoidance as a strategic decision (that is, to remain well 
clear of not just the intruder but of the area occupied by the intruder and possibly ending or delaying the 
UAS mission) versus a tactical decision (to remain well clear of the intruder) could reveal possible changes 
in the level of expected safety in low altitude airspace as well as possible tradeoffs between economic costs 
(delays in mission completion) and safety gains.  Further testing of the current system may also simply 
expand the gamut of possible manned-unmanned interactions and yield more knowledge of further edge 
cases in DAA capability.  For instance, limited field-of-view sensors when encountering aircraft that, while 
not constantly maneuvering as a crop-duster does, could miss a single intruder turn, climb, or descent.  The 
likelihood of an intruder to execute at least a single, sudden trajectory change could affect overall level of 
safety; however, the interaction between the likelihood of such maneuvers and small UAS is mostly 
unknown.  Finally, there is risk in predominantly vertical encounters that has not yet been evaluated and 
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would be potentially fertile ground in understanding capabilities of both intruder and ownship of varying 
performance profiles.  A small UAS climbing into the path of a constant altitude intruder probably yields a 
different set of detection and maneuvering possibilities.  Likewise one can consider the reverse, where the 
intruder is climbing into the UAS, possibly disrupting control links temporarily.  Other possibilities exist 
for further testing, but the simulation testbed remains a capable method of real-time test. 
 
3.3 Survey of Existing/Developing DAA Technologies and Performance 
3.3.1 Literature Review 
Reviews of DAA technologies are provided by Hottman et al. (2009) and Yu and Zhang (2015).  These 
provide excellent summaries of both challenges associated with DAA and with the types of technologies 
being applied to these challenges.  The approaches are generally divided between cooperative approaches 
(e.g., TCAS, Mode-C/S, ADS-B) and non-cooperative approaches.  As outlined in these reviews, non-





Within these groups sub-groups exist.  For instance, within the radar group one may use a Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR) or a non-SAR radar.  Moreover, approaches can be divided into passive/active and 
ground-based/airborne approaches.  Perhaps the only approach not explicitly considered in these reviews 
is use of pre-existing signals (e.g., television) for DAA.  This has been explored, but will require significant 
effort prior to practical application (Kleinman 2017). 
 
As these reviews and the embedded references indicate, numerous approaches to DAA are being explored 
in a research setting.  While all of these are of significant interest, the focus herein is on the most promising 
approaches that have been developed beyond the proof-of-concept point.  These are considered below using 
data collected from industry by numerous means (e.g., a Fed Biz Opps call, direct interactions, etc.). 
 
3.3.2 DAA Approaches ITEM 
An important step in developing an understanding of the current state of the DAA industry was the DAA 
approaches ITEM (Information Technical Exchange Meeting), which was effectively conducted 
concurrently with the Use Case Data Call.  As described in §2.1, this assisted with identification of 
companies/entities involved in DAA efforts and with identification of approaches being pursued. 
 
3.3.3 Architecture Delineation 
3.3.3.1 DAA Sensor on/off Board 
SWaP (Size, Weight, and Power) imposes the most severe constraint on utilization of sUAS DAA systems.  
Thus, this is the top-tier characteristic that is used to delineate different DAA approaches for sUAS.  This 
not only matches how most people think about such systems, it provides a natural division for both many 
of the hazards that may be encountered with such systems and with other characteristics of such systems 
(technical performance, limitations, communication requirements, cost, etc.). 
 
3.3.3.2 Degree of Autonomy 
The next level of delineation for sUAS DAA systems is the degree of autonomy.  Herein, the word 
autonomy is used in the general sense of “acting independently”, wherein the sUAS has a DAA system and 
utilizes that information to take action without input from a human.  In fact, in such a system, a human is 




Autonomous systems represent one far end of the spectrum with regards to this characteristic.  On the other 
end of this spectrum is Human In The Loop (HITL).  In such a DAA system, the pilot plays a critical role 
in avoiding intruders.  However, the exact degree of human involvement varies. This can be illustrated 
using Fig. 71.  In such a system, minimal pilot involvement occurs when the pilot is responsible only for 
the Execute Maneuver step.  Additional pilot involvement occurs when the pilot is responsible for the last 
two or three steps.  The greatest amount of pilot involvement occurs when the pilot is responsible for all 
four steps.  While it may seem to be counterintuitive that the pilot may be responsible for the Detect step 
in a BVLOS DAA system, one can conceive of such a system.  For instance, EO data could be transmitted 
to a display that a pilot uses to identify intruders.  While such an approach is not likely, it is possible and, 
thus, is included herein. 
 
Within HITL systems, function allocation can be further subdivided.  For instance, within the Evaluation 
step, cues (e.g., visual or aural) can be provided to alert the pilot of potential conflicts.  In such a case, the 
pilot is alleviated, at least partially, of having to identify potential conflicts.  Moreover, the system may 
provide recommended resolutions.  Again, this, at least partially, reduces the responsibility to evaluate the 
best course of action, although in such a system the pilot may reject the recommended resolutions. 
 
In a Human Over the Loop (HOTL) system, human intervention is possible.  Otherwise, such a system is 
autonomous.  Such a system may or may not provide cues to illicit human intervention (visual, aural, etc.).  
In such a system, the human plays the role of a manager rather than of an active participant, but can take 
on an active participant role if needed. 
 
3.3.3.3 Active/Passive Sensor 
The final delineation level is whether a sensor is active or passive.  An active sensor produces a signal that 
interacts with objects that enables their detection (e.g., radar).  A passive sensor does not produce a signal, 






Figure 71. Illustration of architectural impacts on human involvement in the system.  The flow chart 
represents the DAA encounter timeline.  The brown arrow represents an autonomous system, the orange 
curly bracket represents a HOTL system, and the orange arrows represent HITL systems.  
 
 
3.3.4 Assessment of Performance, Limitations, and Effectiveness 
3.3.4.1 DAA Companies 
To develop an understanding of the trade-offs associated with sUAS DAA systems, information regarding 
companies/entities in this area was gathered so that data regarding DAA systems that they are 
developing/provide could be acquired.  This was accomplished through formal means, for example the RFI 
and analysis of section 333 data described in §2.1, and less formal means that include interaction with 
companies/entities at meetings such as AUVSI XPONENTIAL and TAAC.  Through these processes, a list 
of 67 companies/entities was compiled (Table 32).  As is apparent in Table 32, not every company/entity 
is actively engaged in DAA, with each company/entity provided in Table 32 for completeness.  Moreover, 




As a means of characterization, companies that are focused on GBDAA, ABDAA (Airborne Detect And 
Avoid), or both, were identified.  In addition, it was recognized early in this process that many companies 
are either interested in DAA and/or may provide technology that support DAA, but are not necessarily 
focused on DAA.  Thus, the classification system described in the Table 32 caption was developed.  Then, 
based on all information available, a subset of 13 companies/entities that are focused on DAA and that 
could provide the most useful information regarding DAA capabilities was identified (yellow highlighting 
in Table 32).  Thus, this process identified a broad group of DAA-related companies and also what appear 
to be the DAA companies that are most engaged at this time (DAA-intensive companies).  Further 
investigation indicated that IMSAR had produced the spin-off company Fortem Technologies and that the 
relevant DAA work was being pursued by that company.  Moreover, collection of addition information 
indicated that TopCon is not a DAA-intensive company.  Thus, subsequent results are based upon 
information gathered through interactions with the 11 DAA-intensive companies identified in Table 32. 
 
It is noted that Point Of Contact (POC) information (contact name, phone number, and email address) was 
gathered for the companies/entities listed in Table 32.  These data are not provided herein owing to privacy 





Table 32. DAA companies/entities.  Green indicates GBDAA companies, blue indicates ABDAA companies, purple 
indicates companies that are interested in/pursuing both GBDAA and ABDAA, yellow indicates DAA-intensive 
companies, and grey signifies companies removed from the initial DAA-intensive list.  DAA Company Tiers are: 1 
= Company provides or integrates a complete DAA system, 2 = DAA sensor company, 3 = Produces a sensor that 
could be used for DAA, 4 = Company that provides non-sensor elements, 5 = Company that has related technology 
but is not currently focused on DAA, 6 = Potential user, ? = Unknown.  
Company/Entity DAA Company Tier Notes 
ADS Corp. 5  
ADSYS Controls Inc. 2 Interested in EO/IR. 
Aerial Applications ?  
Aeroprobe Corp. 1 or 2 Airborne sense and avoid (weight < 200 g). 
Aeryon Labs Inc. 1 or 2 Airborne sense and avoid (EO/IR). 




Solid State Laser/Lidar, 75 lb system coming, 
150 m range. 
AeroVironment Inc. 1  
AFRL 6  
Airelectronics 3 
Autopilot for UAS IR sensor and going to go 
to EO camera (power regulation). 
Airmap 4 
GBSAA input to BVLOS RFI (visualization 
system). 
Airware 4 Looking at sensing structures. 
Alexander Technical 
Coordinators 
? ABSAA and GBSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
American Robotics 6  
Analog Devices 5 
Yes!  Provides components for collision 
avoidance radar, connect to tech. 
ANSUR Birdeye ?  
ASC LLC ?  
Blighter 2 Not at AUVSI but on UND radar list. 
Botlink 4 Visualization 




DeTect Inc. 2 ABSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
Dynetics ? GBSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
Echodyne 2 Not at AUVSI but on UND radar list. 
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Embry-Riddle 6  
ENSCO ? GBSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
Fortem Technologies 2 On- and off-board radar. 
FreeFlight 2 
Early stages of developing DAA 
capabilities—primarily an ADS-B developer.  
Miniaturizing ADS-B for use within UAS and 
DAA systems. 
Georgia Tech 6  
Gryphon Sensors 1  
Harris 1 Do not know which sensor to score for Harris. 
Honeywell 1 ABSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
IMSAR LLC 1 SAR 
Inertial Sense 5 
Miniature IMU/GPS systems.  Not really 
interested in DAA themselves, but happy to 
provide performance capabilities of 
equipment.  Should be some value in 
estimating performance per SWaP. 
INSITU 4 
Supporting elements include GCS, potential 
visualization. 
InterDigital ?  
Iris Automation 1 Working on EO-based DAA system. 
JCPX Development 3 
European anti-drone fighting system, but some 
interest in GBSAA (though very expensive 
system, not designed for DAA but rather for 
NATO military defense). 
Knife Edge Software 5  
Kongsberg Geospatial 4 
Situational awareness 3D software, GCS 
interfaces.  VERY interested in research 
effort. ASSURE member. 
L3 5  
Modern Technology 
Solutions Inc. (MTSI) 
6 ABSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
NASA Langley 
Research Center 
6 Interested in receiving study data. 
Proxy Technologies ?  
R Cubed Engineering 1 
Multimode ZEUS radar (weather, DAA, 
Synthetic Aperture, Doppler) that is under 10 
lbs. and can be used either as ground-based 
DAA (NRC, NASA) or as primary radar in 
airborne DAA (NAVY, AirForce) with 
BVLOS platforms.  Also provided ABSAA 
input to BVLOS RFI. 
Rockwell Collins 4  
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SARA 1 Not at AUVSI but on UND radar list. 
SBT Inc. ?  
Sensurion Aerospace 5  
Squarehead 5 
Have brochure.  Has acoustic sensors to do 
obstacle avoidance. 
SNC 2 System for large aircraft, but not for smalls. 
SRC 2 
Has DAA experience/sensors as LSTAR is 
part of the Army GBSAA system.  Also 
provided GBSAA input to BVLOS RFI. 
THALES 6  
TopCon 1 
Currently developing DAA solution for their 
systems. 
Trackimo 5 
GPS trackers.  No specific DAA system here, 
but could be a sensor for a DAA algorithm. 
Uavionix 2 
Micro ADS-B units.  No non-cooperative 
DAA, but sensors make it easy for installing 
ADS-B In/Out on sUAS. 
UAS in the NAS 6  
UASUSA 6 Sell UAS. 
US Army 6 USA GBSAA SME's; not an RFI responder. 
USDA/ARS Jornada 
Experimental Range 
6 Use case input to BVLOS RFI. 
UTC 2 Sensors that support DAA systems. 
UtopiaCompression 1 EO/IR DAA. 
Vectornav 5 GPS/IMU sensors.  No DAA systems. 




Ximea 5 High speed mini cameras. 
Xcraft 5 
Small UAS manufacturer.  Working on 




3.3.4.2 Data Collection 
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Data regarding the 11 companies identified in Table 32 were collected by obtaining publicly-available 
information (e.g., data from web sites) and by interacting with the POCs.  This process was enabled through 
the development of DAA survey sheets, which where Microsoft Excel™ files that enabled entry of relevant 
data and descriptions of data items.  These sheets were developed based upon the metrics used to evaluate 
systems, which are described below. 
 
3.3.4.3 Company Information 
High-level information regarding the DAA approach of each DAA-intensive company is provided in Table 
33.  As is apparent from Table 33, EO/IR and radar are the most common approaches being pursued by 
DAA-intensive companies.  It is noted that one company, SARA, is pursuing a passive acoustic approach.  
It is further noted that the emphasis in this inquiry has been on systems that enable detection of all intruders.  
Thus, cooperative-only approaches were not evaluated in detail. 
 
 
Table 33. DAA approaches of DAA-intensive companies.  
Company On/Off Board Active/Passive Sensor Type 
AeroVironment On Board Passive Unknown 
Defense Research Associates On Board Passive EO/IR 
DeTect Inc. On/Off Board Active Radar 
Echodyne On Board Active Radar 
Fortem Technologies On/Off Board Active Radar 
Gryphon Sensors Off Board Active Radar 
Iris Automation On Board Passive EO/IR 
R-Cubed Engineering On/Off Board Active/Passive ADS-B &Radar 
SARA On Board Passive Acoustic 
UtopiaCompression On Board Passive EO/IR 
Vigilant Aerospace Systems On Board Passive EO/IR 
 
 
High-level information regarding each company, primarily obtained from web pages, is provided in the 
following sections.  It is noted that companies that have an interest in both on and off board approaches are 
considered henceforth according to their leading approach.  Thus, DeTect Inc. is considered to be an off 
board company and Fortem Technologies and R-Cubed Engineering are considered to be on board 
companies. 
 
3.3.4.3.1 Off Board 
3.3.4.3.1.1 Detect Inc. 
DeTect Inc. is a radar company providing advanced products in intelligent radar remote sensing and sensors 
for aviation safety, security by surveillance, environmental protection, weather, and wind measurements 
utilizing 280 radar systems operating worldwide.  Presently, DeTect Inc. is located in Florida, Colorado, 
Virginia, Canada, and England, with offices in over 80 countries.  The HARRIER Security and Surveillance 
Radar is a product that allows for detection and tracking of small, non-cooperative, low radar-cross section, 
and non-linearly moving targets.  This radar works well in high clutter environments and comprehends false 
positives from birds.  HARRIER includes an SQL (Structured Query Language) data system that interfaces 
with third party video for a real-time simulation at specific regions.  HARRIER has a subsystem known as 
the HARRIER GBSAA (Ground Based Sense And Avoid) Airspace Surveillance Radar (ASR) that operates 
at S- and/or X-band that can be installed on an automated tower system or fixed tower.  The HARRIER 
GBSAA ASR features: an integrated TCAS and ADS-B to assist with secondary surveillance monitoring, 
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day/night camera options, standard or custom data outputs for third party integration, two and three 
dimensional Geofence capability with user configurable alerts/actions, and a Video Draping Module that 
shows live video overlaid on a terrain map.  A few applications of this radar include airspace monitoring of 
all cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft, low radar-cross section recognition capabilities, and full 
control of a UA. 
 
3.3.4.3.1.2 Gryphon Sensors 
Syracuse Research Corporation (SRC) Inc. formed Gryphon Sensors to solve DAA issues within the 
commercial aviation market.  Gryphon Sensors provides a SkylightTM system that delivers a three-
dimensional target-detection-and-tracking radar that operates regardless of the environmental conditions 
and time of operations.  This system can be combined with additional sensors such as a slew-to-cue Electro-
Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) camera and others based on the request of the user. 
 
3.3.4.3.2 On Board 
3.3.4.3.2.1 AeroVironment 
AeroVironment is a leading provider of UAS systems for the U.S. military.  Their systems are heavily used 
to provide ISR data.  In addition, AeroVironment is working to serve civil sectors, including law 
enforcement, agriculture, and energy.   
 
3.3.4.3.2.2 Defense Research Associates 
Defense Research Associates (DRA) has developed DAA technology to assist with the highest level of 
safety that is necessary to operate in the NAS.  This technology provides UA with an on-board EO-based 
system to assist with detecting, tracking, and alarming the user when a MAC is credible. 
 
3.3.4.3.2.3 Echodyne 
Echodyne is a privately-owned company with the main focus of integrating Metamaterial Electronically 
Scanning Array (MESA) based systems for a variety of applications that yields fast scanning and low SWaP 
and offers an active or passive option.  Echodyne builds complete radars along with passive and active 
subsystems using MESA.  Complete radars encompass MESA joined with a full radar transceiver, power, 
processing electronics, and APIs (Application Programming Interfaces). 
 
3.3.4.3.2.4 Fortem Technologies 
Fortem Technologies, Inc. is a privately held, venture-backed company that delivers an ultra-small SWaP 
radar for small manned aircraft as well as the data necessary for safe BLOS UA operations.  The technology 
was developed over the last few years and is available now to meet the security expectations of the public 
and the safety requirements of national regulatory agencies. 
 
3.3.4.3.2.5 Iris Automation 
Iris Automation is developing a collision avoidance system for UA to enable beyond visual line of sight 
operations. 
 
3.3.4.3.2.6 R-Cubed Engineering 
R-Cubed Engineering has worked to develop DAA solutions for both cooperative and non-cooperative 
intruders.  These include ADS-B based solutions and radar-based solutions.  Work in this area has included 
not only sensor utilization, but also algorithms that identify conflicts. 
 
3.3.4.3.2.7 Scientific Applications and Research Associates (SARA), Inc. 
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The applications of Scientific Applications and Research Associates, Inc. (SARA) Passive Acoustic Non-
cooperative Collision-Alert System (PANCAS) include utilizing UA to detect a possible threat and track 
the intruder and change course if safe separation is lost—with or without operator intervention.  There are 
various advantages to the PANCAS sensor: all-weather collision-avoidance capabilities allowing for UA 
to assist in the detection of intruders and maintain safe separation, the sensor hardware can be integrated 
into small UA, the system offers spherical instantaneous coverage (assists with detection of traffic from 
any angle), the acoustic sensor provides cueing of narrow field-of-view sensors, and sound sources are 
detected at all hours in all-weather conditions. 
 
3.3.4.3.2.8 UtopiaCompression 
UtopiaCompression has a variety of different technologies, with the most pertinent being their SAA (Sense 
And Avoid) capabilities of any entity whether it be a manned powered or unpowered aerial machines (e.g. 
airplanes, gliders, blimps, parachutes, etc.).  UtopiaCompression provides a low SWaP SAA solution for 
DAA of non-cooperative aircraft that may or may not have on-board electronics (i.e., transponders or ADS-
B).  Their solutions involve passive intruder detection, monocular passive ranging, collision avoidance 
Ladar, imminent collision detection, and autonomous cloud avoidance. 
 
3.3.4.3.2.9 Vigilant Aerospace Systems 
Vigilant Aerospace Systems is a provider of both licensing and commercialization of NASA flight safety 
technologies and a developer of situational awareness, collision avoidance, and autonomous flight products 
for manned and unmanned aircraft.  The key features of their products include, but are not limited to, traffic 
awareness and visualization for BVLOS, real-time DAA with traffic alerts and specific avoidance 
commands, 2D and 3D synthetic cockpit views, and real-time weather radar overlay. 
 
3.3.4.4 Evaluation of Off Board Approaches 
3.3.4.4.1 Metrics 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in evaluating approaches was establishment of the metrics that would enable 
comparison.  Metrics that would provide measures of important characteristics of systems are, of course, 
desired.  These had to be weighed against the ability to obtain information regarding these metrics.  
Information regarding, for instance, system (sensor plus processing systems, displays, etc.) characteristics 
such as data latency, assurance, bandwidth, and security are very difficult to obtain because either the 
information is unknown owing to lack of testing or because information is not being publicly-provided at 
this time.  Because of this, the metrics that were developed focused on sensor characteristics, as information 
regarding sensors is much more available.  Metrics were categorized into three primary groups: sensor 
performance, operational environment, and utilization. 
 
A confounding factor was establishment of metric values for specific metrics.  The lack of standards for 
characteristics such as detection range, for instance, resulted in dependence upon evolving 
recommendations, such as the SARP-proposed definition for sUAS well clear, and results developed within 
(e.g., detection distances required for maintaining well-clear discussed in §3.2.3.6.2).  The metrics, metric 
values, and corresponding scores that are used to evaluate off board systems are provided in Tables 34-36.  
As is apparent in these tables, a five-point Likert scale (5 is best performance) is used for scoring systems.  




Table 34. Off board DAA sensor performance metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated with the performance levels provided 
in the table.  
Sensor Performance 1 2 3 4 5 
Horizontal Range (ft/km/mi/nmi) ≥ 10560/3.22/2.0/1.74 
26785/8.16/5.07/4.41 ≤ 
hr < cat 3 
43010/13.11/8.15/7.08 ≤ 
hr < cat 4 
59235/18.05/11.22/9.75 ≤ 
hr < cat 5 
≥ 75460/23/14.3/12.4 
Vertical Range (ft/km/nmi) ≥ 235/0.072/0.039 
285/0.087/0.047 ≤ vr < 
cat 3 
335/0.1/0.055 ≤ vr < cat 
4 
850/0.26/0.14 ≤ vr < cat 5 ≥ 1450/0.44/0.24 
Horizontal Resolution/Accuracy (ft) ≥ 1000 500 < hr < 1000 250 < hr ≤ 500 100 < hr ≤ 250 ≤ 100 
Vertical Resolution/Accuracy (ft) ≥ 200 100 < vr < 200 50 < vr ≤ 100 20 < vr ≤ 50 ≤ 20 
Scan Time/Update Rate (s) ≥ 8 2 < st < 8 1.5 < st ≤ 2 1 < st ≤ 1.5  ≤ 1 
Sensor Latency (s) ≥ 5 2.0 < sl < 5.0 1.0 < sl ≤ 2.0 0.1 < sl ≤ 1.0 ≤ 0.1 
Sensitivity (m2) ≥ 20 (CRJ) 
5  < sens < 20 (King 
Air) 
1 < sens ≤ 5 (Cessna 
172) 
0.05 < sens ≤ 1 (human) 
≤ 0.05 (small 
UAS/birds) 
Aircraft Classification/Type None Big v small 
Big v small and Fixed v 
rotary wing 
MA intruder aircraft type 
All intruder (MA, 
UA, and bird) 
intruder type 
Probability of Detection (per sample) < 70% 70-85% 85-95% 95-99% > 99% 
False Alarm Rate (per sample) > 10% 5-10% 2.5-5% 1-2.5% < 1% 
 
 
Table 35. Off board DAA operational environment metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated with the performance levels 
provided in the table.  
Operational Environment 1 2 3 4 5 
Temperature Range (°C) 0 to +20 -20 to +40 -40 to +50 -55 to +50 -55 to +85 
Humidity Range (%) 20-80 10-90 0-90 0-95 0-100 
Lighting Conditions Night Only Day Only 
Away from minor (lightbulb) 
artificial light sources 
Away from major 
(spotlights) artificial light 
sources 
All 





Table 36. Off board DAA utilization metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are metric scores associated with the performance levels provided 
in the table.  
Utilization 1 2 3 4 5 
Acquisition cost ($) > $500,000 $100,000-$500,000 $10,000-$100,000 $1000-$10,000 < $1000 
Crew requirements 
Requires additional FT 
crew 






Reduces existing FT 
crew 
Resources Needed for Installation 
> 24 hours or 
establishment of new 
permanent infrastructure 
16-24 hours or 
establishment of 
relocatable infrastructure 
8-16 hours 1-8 hours 
< 1 hour (plug and 
play) 
Ease of Use 
> 16 hours training, 
currency limits 
8-16 hrs training, 
currency limits 
4-8 hours training, 
annually 
1-4 hours one time 
training 
0-1 hours one-time 
training, intuitive 






Results for off-board approaches are presented in Table 37.  Before analyzing the results, it is important to 
consider the challenges associated with such an analysis. 
 
It is apparent that this field is relatively young, with few DAA-intensive companies.  Considering that most 
DAA-intensive companies have an on board focus, this means that the amount of data available for 
evaluation of off board approaches is severely limited.  This is compounded by the fact that not every 
company is able or ready to provide all of the data that are desired.  This resulted data being available from 
the two candidate companies for only two metrics, with data from one company providing information for 
11 other metrics and no data being available for six metrics.  Moreover, only one off board approach—
radar—is represented.  While other approaches may be possible, companies appear to be focused on radar-
based off board approaches. 
 
As indicated in Table 37, radar-based off-board approaches appear to perform fairly well with regards to 
range and resolution.  Performance is lower when it comes to scan time and sensor latency.  One company 
indicated that it can provide excellent information regarding aircraft types. 
 
Operational environment data were limited.  For the metrics for which scores are available, systems appear 
to provide medium performance. 
 
Acquisition cost and ease of use metrics may be barriers to utilization of radar-based off board systems.  






Table 37. Off board system scores.  
Radar (2 Companies) 
Metric Average High Low Comments # of Values 
Reported 
Sensor Performance 
Horizontal Range 5 5 5  2 
Vertical Range 5 5 5  1 
Horizontal Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
5 5 5  1 
Vertical Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
    0 
Scan Time/Update Rate 2 2 2  1 
Sensor Latency 3 3 3  1 
Sensitivity     0 
Aircraft Classification/Type 5 5 5  1 
Probability of Detection      0 
False Alarm Rate     0 
Operational Environment 
Temperature Range 2 2 2  1 
Humidity Range     0 
Lighting Conditions     0 
Range of Winds 3 3 3  1 
Utilization 
Acquisition Cost 1.5 2 1  2 
Crew Requirements 3 3 3  1 
Resources Needed for 
Installation 
    1 
Ease of Use 1 1 1  1 
Reliability/Mean Time to 
Failure 
5 5 5  1 
All Metrics 3.68 5 1  15 
 
 
3.3.4.5 Evaluation of On Board Approaches 
3.3.4.5.1 Metrics 
Metrics for on board approaches are provided in Tables 38-42.  Metrics were organized into four primary 
groups: sensor performance, SWaP, operational environment (either based on established standards or 
ranges), and utilization. 
 
One of the metrics for which establishment of values was most challenging is (horizontal) range.  For this, 
a score of 3 was assigned to the distance that simulations (§3.2.3) indicated enabled avoidance of an NMAC.  
A score of 4 was assigned to the distance that enabled maintenance of well clear (2000 ft horizontally per 
the SARP-proposed definition) as indicated through simulations (§3.2.3).  The best score (5) enables action 
by the time the intruder reaches the “warning” boundary, which is approximately 30 s beyond the well-
clear boundary (tau-framework). 
 




Table 38. On board DAA sensor performance metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated with the performance levels provided 
in the table.  
Sensor Performance 1 2 3 4 5 
Horizontal Range (ft/km/nmi) ≥ 1850/0.56/0.3 
3000/0.9/0.5 ≤ hr < 
cat 3 
4000/1.22/0.66 
≤ hr < cat 4 
10650/3.25/1.75 
≤ hr < cat 5 
≥ 14600/4.45/2.4 
Vertical Range (ft/km/nmi) ≥ 235/0.072/0.039 
285/0.087/0.047 ≤ 
vr < cat 3 
335/0.1/0.055 ≤ 
vr < cat 4 
850/0.26/0.14 ≤ 
vr < cat 5 
≥ 1450/0.44/0.24 
Horizontal Resolution/Accuracy (ft) ≥ 1000 500 < hr < 1000 250 < hr ≤ 500 100 < hr ≤ 250 ≤ 100 
Vertical Resolution/Accuracy (ft) ≥ 200 100 < vr < 200 50 < vr ≤ 100 20 < vr ≤ 50 ≤ 20 
Scan Time/Update Rate (s) ≥ 8 2 < st < 8 1.5 < st ≤ 2 1 < st ≤ 1.5 ≤ 1 







Sensor Latency (s) ≥ 5 2.0 < sl < 5.0 1.0 < sl ≤ 2.0 0.1 < sl ≤ 1.0 ≤ 0.1 
Sensitivity (m2) ≥ 20 (CRJ) 
5 < sens < 20 (King 
Air) 
1 < sens ≤ 5 
(Cessna 172) 
0.05 < sens ≤ 1 
(human) 
≤ 0.05 (small UAS/birds) 
Aircraft Classification/Type None Big v small 
Big v small and 




All intruder (MA,UA, and bird) intruder 
type 
Probability of Detection (per sample) < 70% 70-85% 85-95% 95-99% > 99% 
False Alarm Rate (per sample) > 10% 5-10% 2.5-5% 1-2.5% < 1% 
 
 
Table 39. On board DAA SWaP metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated with the performance levels provided in the table.  
SWaP (Size, Weight, and Power) 1 2 3 4 5 
Size (cm3) > 101,614 4500-101,614 2700-4500 168.75-2700.00 < 168.75 
Weight (kg) > 3.3 (7.25 lbs) > 1.13 to ≤ 3.3 (7.25 lbs) 
> 0.15 to ≤ 1.13 (2.5 
lbs) 
> 0.050 to ≤ 0.15 
(0.33 lbs) 
≤ 0.050 (0.11 lbs) 
Power to Operate (W) 
> 12 - 28 V @ 25 W or 
requires auxiliary or 
self-contained power 
supply. 





Table 40. On board DAA operational environment based on established standards metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated 
with the performance levels provided in the table.  Categories correspond to those in RTCA (1984).  
Operational Environment 
Based on Established 
Standards 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low Operating Temp/Category (°C) 0 -5 -15 (A1-A3) -20 (B1) -45 (B2) 
High Operating Temp/Category  (°C) +25 +35 +45 +55 (B1) +70 (B2) 
High Short Time Operating 
Temp/Category (°C) 
+25 +35 +45 +55 +70 (B2) 
Low Temperature Ground 
Survival/Category (°C) 
0 -10 -25 -40 -55 (B2) 
High Temperature Ground 
Survival/Category (°C) 
+25 (B2) +40 (B2) +55 (B2) +70 (B2) +85 (B2) 
Temperature Variation/Category (°C 
min-1) 
1 2 (C) 5 (B) 7.5 10 (A) 
Humidity/Category 
Category A with +40 
°C in step 1 
Category A with +45 
°C in step 1 
Category A (standard 
humidity environment) 
Category C (severe 
humidity environment I) 
Category B (severe 
humidity environment I) 
Waterproofness Category Category X 
Category W but only 
falling mist 
Category W Category R Category S 
Sand and Dust Category Category X  
Category D only 
passing first cycle 
 Category D 
 
 
Table 41. On board DAA operational environment metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated with the performance levels 
provided in the table.  
Operational Environment 1 2 3 4 5 
Temperature Range (°C) 0 to +20 -20 to +40 -40 to +50 -55 to +50 -55 to +85 
Humidity Range (%) 20-80 10-90 0-90 0-95 0-100 
Lighting Conditions Night Only Day Only 
Away from minor (lightbulb) 
artificial light sources 
Away from major 







Table 42. On board DAA utilization metrics and metric values.  Numbers within the top row are scores associated with the performance levels provided in the 
table.  
Utilization 1 2 3 4 5 
Acquisition cost ($) > $500,000 $100,000-$500,000 $10,000-$100,000 $1000-$10,000 < $1000 
Crew requirements 




Accomdated by existing 
crew 
Existing crew workload 
reduction 
Reduces existing FT crew 
Resources Needed for 
Installation 
OEM factory installed 
only 
8-16 hours, OEM site 1-8 hours OEM, user site 
1-8 hours user, some 
customization 
< 1 hour user (plug and 
play) 
Ease of  Use 
> 16 hours training, 
currency limits 
8-16 hrs training, 
currency limits 
4-8 hours training, anually 1-4 hours one time training 
0-1 hours one-time 
training, intuitive 
Reliability/Mean Time to 
Failure (hrs) 






Results for on board systems are present in Tables 43-45.  As with off board systems, analysis is 
complicated by the fact that the field is relatively young, with a limited number of companies actively 
developing DAA solutions, and the fact that not every company is able or ready to provide all of the data 
that are desired. 
 
Results for radar-based systems are presented in Table 43.  As is apparent, information for nearly all of the 
metrics is available, although for some only one input is available.  Arguably, the greatest challenge for 
such systems is having enough range to detect aircraft far enough away to enable avoiding them while 
keeping the SWaP manageable.  As indicated in Table 43, it appears as if this technology is starting to reach 
this level of performance, with detection ranges that enable NMAC avoidance and that are getting closer to 
enabling maintenance of well clear (according to the SARP proposed definition).  The SWaP required to 
accomplish this appears moderate, from a size and weight perspective, although the power requirements 
are still significant.  It is noted that FOV is also a concern with these types of systems, with performance 
being moderate for the systems that were considered.  As indicated in §3.2.3.6.2, simulations indicate that 
limited field of view has an impact on maintenance of well clear. 
 
For EO/IR systems, information for systems provided by two companies was obtained.  Since one of these 
companies is developing three different systems, the data in Table 44 includes input for four different 
systems.  As is apparent, the amount of information that is available for analysis is limited.  Based on one 
input value, it appears as if the range performance for this approach is not as good as that for off board 
radar-based systems and on board radar-based systems.  Relative to on board radar based systems, the SWaP 
requirements appear to be greater.  While no data regarding utilization was available, it is expected that 
such systems may have a lower price point, possibly lowering barriers to their use. 
 
The final approach for which data was obtained is (passive) acoustic.  As is apparent from Table 45, the 
amount of data available for this approach is minimal.  However, given the information that was available, 
it appears as if this approach has the potential to at least avoid NMAC.  Moreover, this approach appears 
to enable a complete FOV, thus eliminating the issue discussed in §3.2.3.6.2.  In addition, the SWaP 





Table 43. On board system scores for radar based systems.  
Radar (2 Companies) 
Metric Average High Low Comments # of Values 
Reported 
Sensor Performance 
Horizontal Range 3 3 3  2 
Vertical Range 5 5 5  1 
Horizontal Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
2 2 2  1 
Vertical Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
2 2 2  1 
Scan Time/Update Rate 5 5 5  2 
Field of View 2.5 3 2  2 
Sensor Latency 4.5 5 4  2 
Sensitivity 4 5 3  2 
Aircraft Classification/Type 3.5 5 2  2 
Probability of Detection  3 3 3  1 
False Alarm Rate 5 5 5  1 
Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) 
Size 4 4 4  2 
Weight 3 3 1  3 
Power to Operate 1 1 1  2 
Operational Environment 
Temperature Range 3 3 3  1 
Humidity Range      
Lighting Conditions 5 5 5  1 
Range of Winds      
Utilization 
Acquisition Cost 3.5 4 3  2 
Crew Requirements 5 5 5  1 
Resources Needed for 
Installation 
4 4 4  1 
Ease of Use 4.5 5 4  2 
Reliability/Mean Time to 
Failure 
5 5 5  2 





Table 44. On board system scores for EO/IR based systems.  
EO/IR (2 Companies/4 Systems) 
Metric Average High Low Comments # of Values 
Reported 
Sensor Performance 
Horizontal Range 2 2 2  1 
Vertical Range      
Horizontal Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
     
Vertical Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
     
Scan Time/Update Rate 5 5 5  1 
Field of View      
Sensor Latency      
Sensitivity      
Aircraft Classification/Type      
Probability of Detection  3 3 3  1 
False Alarm Rate 2 2 2  1 
Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) 
Size 2 2 2  1 
Weight 1 1 1  2 
Power to Operate 1 1 1  2 
Operational Environment 
Temperature Range      
Humidity Range      
Lighting Conditions      
Range of Winds      
Utilization 
Acquisition Cost      
Crew Requirements      
Resources Needed for 
Installation 
     
Ease of Use      
Reliability/Mean Time to 
Failure 
     





Table 45. On board system scores for acoustic based systems.  
Acoustic (1 Company) 
Metric Average High Low Comments # of Values 
Reported 
Sensor Performance 
Horizontal Range 3 3 3  1 
Vertical Range 5 5 5  1 
Horizontal Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
     
Vertical Resolution/ 
Accuracy 
     
Scan Time/Update Rate      
Field of View 5 5 5  1 
Sensor Latency      
Sensitivity      
Aircraft Classification/Type      
Probability of Detection       
False Alarm Rate      
Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) 
Size 4 4 4  1 
Weight 3 3 3  1 
Power to Operate 3 3 3  1 
Operational Environment 
Temperature Range      
Humidity Range      
Lighting Conditions      
Range of Winds      
Utilization 
Acquisition Cost      
Crew Requirements      
Resources Needed for 
Installation 
     
Ease of Use      
Reliability/Mean Time to 
Failure 
     




As is expected given the relative youth of this area, a limited amount of information was available for 
analysis.  A limited number of companies focus on DAA for sUAS and those that do are at different points 
in system development, which means that some either do not have information used in this analysis or are 
not ready to share their data.  Given this, conclusions drawn from these data should be considered with 
healthy skepticism. 
 
Given the data available, the following can be concluded: 
 The majority of DAA-intensive companies are pursuing on-board solutions. 
 The only off-board solution being pursued by companies identified as DAA-intensive is radar-
based.  It appears as if other approaches are in earlier stages of development. 
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 On board solutions being explored by DAA-intensive companies include active radar, passive 
EO/IR, and passive acoustic.  Of these, radar and EO/IR are the most popular approaches. 
 Off board radar-based systems have advantages regarding sensor performance (e.g., range), with 
the primary barrier being acquisition cost. 
 On board radar-based systems have utilization advantages (e.g., cost, installation), with the primary 
challenges being detection range and FOV within SWaP limitations. 
 On board EO/IR-based systems provide excellent update rates and may provide utilization 
advantages (e.g., cost).  However, FOV and SWaP appear to be challenges. 
 On board passive acoustic approaches appear to enable a complete FOV, with comparable range 
performance at an apparently lower SWaP requirement. 
 Data for some metrics (e.g., probability of detection, false alarm rate, operational environment 
limitations) were severely limited.  Additional data are needed to solidify results. 
 It is expected that some data are limited owing to a lack of flight testing.  Flight testing would 
enable both characterization of approaches and establishment of standards that will enable future 
system development. 
 
3.4 Assessment of Risks of Selected DAA Approaches 
3.4.1 Introduction 
3.4.1.1 The Safety Management System (SMS) 
The FAA encourages every aviation service provider to develop and implement a Safety Management 
System (SMS).  While the term aviation service provider includes air carriers, airlines, maintenance repair 
organizations, air taxi operators, single pilot operators, pilot schools and so on, the intent is to also include 
all entities involved in UAS activities as well.  The FAA SMS framework utilized by the research team is 
organized around four pillars of safety management: (1) Safety Policy, (2) Safety Risk Management, (3) 
Safety Assurance, and (4) Safety Promotion.  Each of these are essential for a safety-oriented management 
system. 
 
3.4.1.1.1 Safety Policy 
The first pillar in the SMS framework is Safety Policy.  This pillar defines the policies, procedures, and 
organizational structures that act as the foundation of the three functional pillars that follow (FAA 2015).  
Elements included in this pillar are (1) safety policy, (2) management commitment and safety 
accountabilities, (3) key safety personnel, (4) emergency preparedness and response, and (5) SMS 
documentation and records (FAA 2015).  This research team examined existing controls, such as policies, 
procedures, regulatory controls, and guidelines, with the goal of informing adaptations or additions for this 
novel use case. 
 
3.4.1.1.2 Safety Risk Management 
The second pillar, Safety Risk Management (SRM), identifies hazards and works to reduce risk to an 
acceptable level.  It is the formal process within the SMS that identifies the hazards, assesses the risk, 
analyzes that risk, and then controls for it (FAA 2015).  The SRM pillar is composed of two elements: (1) 
hazard identification and analysis, and (2) risk assessment and control (FAA 2015).  These elements enabled 
a better understanding of critical aspects and existing controls related to sUAS BVLOS operations.  This 
systemic perspective was used to identify potential gaps in existing controls and to offer recommendation 
for additional defenses and controls. 
 
3.4.1.1.3 Safety Assurance 
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Safety Assurance, the third SMS pillar, ensures that the risk mitigations put in place by SRM continue to 
be effective in a dynamic operational environment.  This pillar provides confidence that an organization 
meets or exceeds safety requirements by applying system safety concepts and quality management 
processes (FAA 2015).  The safety assurance pillar is composed of three elements: (1) safety performance 
monitoring and measurement, (2) management of change, and (3) continuous improvement (FAA 2015).  
While the scope of this effort is completion of the SRM process, flight tests under related and future efforts 
can offer validation for the safety assurance process and results of the preliminary risk assessment. 
 
3.4.1.1.4 Safety Promotion 
The final pillar, Safety Promotion, provides guidance for promoting safety as a core value and developing 
practices that support a sound safety culture (FAA 2015).  This pillar is composed of the elements (1) 
competencies and training and (2) communications and awareness (FAA 2015).  Presentation and 
publication of results from this effort will be used to raise public awareness of the risk management process, 
as well as offer industry stakeholders insight into the hazards, risks, controls, and opportunities unique to 
sUAS BVLOS operations. 
 
3.4.1.2 SRM Focus 
Giving initial focus to the Safety Risk Management (SRM) pillar of the SMS process, this effort (1) 
identifies hazards related to the operation of sUAS in BVLOS, (2) offers a preliminary risk assessment 
considering existing controls, and (3) recommends additional controls and mitigations to further reduce 
risk.  While this effort is framed within a relatively small set of conditions, this process aims to advance 
understanding of the critical aspects and existing controls in BVLOS operations for sUAS.  Application of 
these results advance efforts to realize BVLOS operations across a much broader portion of the NAS. 
 
3.4.2 Methodology 
This preliminary risk assessment for sUAS DAA in limited BVLOS Operations was accomplished utilizing 
the FAA SMS framework detailed in FAA (2015).  Members of the research team convened in a weekly 
workshop setting for an average of three hours across the period of performance. 
 
3.4.2.1 Assumptions and Limitations 
This risk assessment began with the following set of sponsor provided assumptions and limitations: 
 Day, Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) operations only. 
 A potential for night VMC operations enabled by new standards and rules. 
 UAS operations will initially be limited to Class G and Class E airspace.  Additional airspace may 
be evaluated as necessary. 
 UAS operations will be conducted from the surface to 500 ft AGL, with additional evaluation of 
the potential for operations up to 1,000 ft AGL.  
 UAS operations will be conducted over other than densely populated areas, unless UAS complies 
with potential criteria or standard that demonstrates safe flights over populated areas. 
 UAS will not be operated close to airports or heliports.  ‘Close’ is initially defined as within 3 miles 
of an airport unless permission is granted from ATC or an airport authority.  A distance of greater 
than 5 miles will be examined if needed to support an appropriate level of safety. 
 UAS operations will be restricted to within RLOS of a single, fixed ground-based transmitter. 
 Some safety-based design and/or configuration requirements may be specified (aircraft painted in 
a highly-visible paint scheme to facilitate identification by other aircraft, strobe lights, etc.) 
 Small UAS are potentially designed to an Industry Consensus Standard and issued an FAA 




In addition to these, the research team focused their efforts further by assuming the following: 
 sUAS PIC is subject to the eligibility requirements of 14 CFR §107.61 
“Subject to the provisions of §107.57 and §107.59, in order to be eligible for a remote 
pilot certificate with a small UAS rating under this subpart, a person must: 
(a) Be at least 16 years of age; 
(b) Be able to read, speak, write, and understand the English language. If the 
applicant is unable to meet one of these requirements due to medical reasons, the 
FAA may place such operating limitations on that applicant's certificate as are 
necessary for the safe operation of the small unmanned aircraft; 
(c) Not know or have reason to know that he or she has a physical or mental 
condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small unmanned 
aircraft system; and 
(d) Demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by satisfying one of the following 
conditions: 
(1) Pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of 
knowledge specified in §107.73(a); or 
(2) If a person holds a pilot certificate (other than a student pilot 
certificate) issued under part 61 of this chapter and meets the flight 
review requirements specified in §61.56, complete an initial training 
course covering the areas of knowledge specified in §107.74(a) in a 
manner acceptable to the Administrator.” 
 sUAS PIC is subject to the aeronautical knowledge recency of 14 CFR §107.65 
“A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft system unless that person has 
completed one of the following, within the previous 24 calendar months: 
(a) Passed an initial aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of knowledge 
specified in §107.73(a); 
(b) Passed a recurrent aeronautical knowledge test covering the areas of 
knowledge specified in §107.73(b); or 
(c) If a person holds a pilot certificate (other than a student pilot certificate) 
issued under part 61 of this chapter and meets the flight review requirements 
specified in §61.56, passed either an initial or recurrent training course covering 
the areas of knowledge specified in §107.74(a) or (b) in a manner acceptable to 
the Administrator.” 
 sUAS PIC is in compliance with the medical conditions of 14 CFR §107.17 
“No person may manipulate the flight controls of a small unmanned aircraft system or act 
as a remote pilot in command, visual observer, or direct participant in the operation of the 
small unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or has reason to know that he or she has a 
physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of the small 
unmanned aircraft system.” 
 RFI/EMI (Radio Frequency Interference/ElectroMagnetic Interference) evaluation is 
completed to ensure de-confliction. 
 Fully autonomous systems were not considered. 
 Intruders may be either cooperative or non-cooperative traffic. 
 Willful violations of 14 CFR and rouge actors in the case of the sUAS PIC and intruders 
were considered out of scope. 
 
Relative to the hypothetical DAA systems considered, it was assumed that the system must be operational 
for BVLOS flight and is able to acquire information regarding own ship position.  The DAA system was 
not construed to be responsible for providing information regarding attitude or direction of flight for 
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ownship.  Furthermore, it was assumed that DAA systems will utilize data fusion approaches that are 
consistent with best practices (e.g., best source selection or Kalman filtering).  Given these approaches, 
target location uncertainty would not be expected to exceed that of the best instrument. 
 
3.4.2.2 Hazard Identification and Analysis 
The SRM process identifies hazards for a specific operation and works to reduce risk to an acceptable level.  
In this preliminary risk assessment for sUAS BVLOS operations, hazards were defined as “a condition that 
could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in Title 49 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (49 CFR) part 830, §830.2” (FAA 2015).  Operationally, consideration was given to any real 
or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to people; damage to, or loss of, a system 
(hardware of software), equipment, or property; or damage to the environment.  In the hazard identification 
and analysis phase of this effort, conditions that fell under this definition and within the assumptions and 
limitations above were generated and then organized according to an architecture of system states illustrated 
in Fig. 72. 
 
Development of the DAA system architecture in Fig. 72 was an iterative process.  Description of potential 
DAA systems for sUAS was generally divided between GBDAA and ABDAA.  In this effort, hypothetical 
DAA systems were categorized as GBDAA only if all of the detect, track, evaluate, and maneuver functions 
occurred off board the aircraft.  Likewise, a system fell within a working description of ABDAA only if all 
of these DAA functions (i.e. detect, track, evaluate, and maneuver) were accomplished onboard.  If any of 
the four primary functions were shared between on and off board systems, the architecture was considered 
a hybrid design.  Within each DAA configuration, hazards coalesced into four components (1) Level of 
Autonomy, (2) Hardware, (3) Software, and (4) Sensor.  While these components reduce to a hierarchical 
structure in a general sense, hazards groups that related to Software and the Man Machine Interface (MMI) 
(and others) do not follow the strict hierarchical structure suggested by Fig. 72. 
 
Each of the four components were further separated into sub-categories to represent more minute 
differences between future DAA designs.  For example, hazards related to level of autonomy were divided 
among human execution errors [i.e., Human in the Loop (HITL)] or human management errors [i.e., Human 
over the Loop (HOTL)].  The hardware component included supporting software both on and off board the 
aircraft, as well as equipment that supports the MMI for both HITL and HOTL configurations, and also the 
equipment on which the algorithm resides.  The software component addressed hazards related to the 
algorithm as well as the software supporting the MMI, and the sensor component was divided between 
active and passive systems.  To emphasize architecture level differences between the ground-based and 
airborne models of DAA, systems states that were not given consideration (e.g., onboard supporting 
systems for GBDAA) are depicted by an unlabeled box positioned to mirror the corresponding element in 









3.4.2.3 Risk Assessment and Control 
In the next phase, the research team considered and documented existing controls for each of the nearly 250 
hazards identified in the previous phase.  Efforts to estimate severity and likelihood for each hazard resulted 
in a measure of initial risk.  As initial risk was reached, additional mitigations and controls were proposed 
to reduce risk to the lowest practical level.  In this phase of the SRM, great consideration was given to avoid 
recommending undue, unrealistic, or impractical mitigation requirements for sUAS BVLOS operations. 
 
Severity is defined as the consequence or impact of a hazard’s effect or outcome in terms of degree of loss 
or harm.  Severity is determined prior to, and is considered independent of, likelihood.  To assess this aspect 
of risk, a novel severity scale was developed.  Detailed in Table 46, this scale framed the severity of risks 
associated with sUAS BVLOS operations to a variety of effects on established separation criteria [e.g., 
MAC (MidAir Collision) and NMAC] and the evolving definition of well clear for sUAS.  Setting a MAC 
to represent a catastrophic effect and maintaining well clear as representing the minimal effect, the scale 
presents a narrow variation relative to scales in the extant literature that may range from single or multiple 
fatalities at catastrophic to injury or discomfort at the minimal-effect end.  In development and application 
of this scale, it was assumed that flight of the sUAS would be conducted such that maneuvering would 
occur to maintain well clear at all times (i.e., the UA is operated well clear, plus some distance, from the 
boundaries of the well surveilled volume).  Prior to use in the risk assessment and control process, this scale 
was examined and approved by the sponsor. 
 
 
Table 46. Well clear severity scale.  
 Catastrophic  Hazardous  Major  Minor  Minimal  
 1  2  3  4  5  
  Midair 
Collision 
(MAC) 
 Violation of well 
clear criteria 
resulting in a 
NMAC. 
(less than 500 ft 
horizontal and 
100 ft vertical) 






Violation of well 
clear criteria that 
does not require 
corrective action 







or sUAS takes 
precautionary 
action, impacts 
flight path of 




            
 
 
When estimating likelihood, the scale detailed in Table 47 was used to express rates of occurrence relative 
to a specific sUAS mission.  Adapted to be assessed relative to a single or specific sUAS mission, the 
likelihood scale below was also examined and approved by the sponsor prior to use in the risk assessment 





Table 47. Hazard likelihood scale.  





 A  B  C  D  E  
  Expected to 
occur more than 
once per week 
during a specific 
sUAS mission. 
Expected to occur 
about once every 




occur about once 
every year during 




once every 10 




occur less than 
once every 100 
years during a 
specific sUAS 
mission. 
            
 
 
The risk assessment matrix shown in Fig. 73 was used to categorize initial and residual risks into one of 
three possible risk levels (i.e. high, medium, or low).  Hazards categorized within the high risk area are 
considered unacceptable.  These hazards must be mitigated to medium or low-risk, and the predicted 
residual risk should be monitored and tracked in relation to the safety performance targets until the predicted 
residual risk can be verified.  As indicated in Fig. 73, hazards with catastrophic effects that are caused by 
single point events or failures, common cause events or failures, or undetectable latent events in 
combination with single point or common cause events are considered high risk, even if the possibility of 
occurrence is extremely improbable.  An example of a single point failure is found in a system with 
redundant hardware, in which both pieces of hardware rely on the same battery for power.  In this case, if 
the battery fails, the entire system will fail.  A common cause failure is a single fault resulting in the 
corresponding failure of multiple components.  An example of a common cause failure is found in a system 
with redundant computers running on the same software, which is susceptible to the same software bugs. 
 
Hazards categorized within the medium risk area are considered acceptable risks and represent the 
minimum acceptable safety objective.  While initial medium risk is acceptable, it is recommended and 
desirable that safety requirements be developed to reduce severity and/or likelihood.  These hazards should 
also be monitored and tracked in relation to the safety performance targets until the predicted residual risk 
can be verified.  Again, a catastrophic severity and corresponding extremely improbable likelihood qualify 
as a medium risk, provided that the effect is not the result of a single point or common cause failure.  If the 
cause is a single point or common cause failure, the hazard is categorized as high risk. 
 
Hazards categorized within the low risk area are considered acceptable risk without restriction or limitation.  
It is not mandatory to develop safety requirements for low-risk hazards; however, a monitoring plan with 










Completion of the risk assessment and control completed the SRM for sUAS BVLOS operations.  In total, 
the risks for nearly 250 hazards were identified, classified, and offered some degree or method of mitigation.  
An annotated listing of the initial and residual risks for each of the four major DAA system components 
(i.e. Autonomy, Hardware, Software, and Sensors) are offered below.  Initial risk of most hazards were 
mitigated with a single set of controls or mitigations.  In the case of several risks, however, multiple or 
elective mitigations—separated by “AND” and “OR” respectively in “additional controls”—were 
proposed.  The inclusion of these multiple or elective mitigations occasionally result in unique residual 
risks, as in the case of the hazard “Signal used for detection ceases” in the passive sensor component of 
GBDAA.  Hazards like this one result in the discrepancy between the number of hazards analyzed (i.e., 
238) and the higher number of initial and residual risks reported in each component below.  For the reader’s 
convenience, each hazard has been transposed into a table format in Appendix F. 
 
3.4.3.1 Level of Autonomy 
Hazards related to level of autonomy were divided among human execution errors [i.e., Human in the Loop 
(HITL)] or human management errors [i.e., Human over the Loop (HOTL)].  Again, note that fully 
autonomous systems were not considered within this effort and remain an object for future study.  A total 
of 29 hazards were identified within this component of GBDAA and ABDAA systems.  The majority of 
these hazards were represented within the HITL or human execution error classification; an area analyzed 
for GBDAA systems but not for ABDAA.  Initial risks (25) in the level of autonomy area all fell under 
high-risk classifications, indicating an area where existing controls may not adequately mitigate the hazards 
of BVLOS operations for sUAS.  Residual risks in this area were expected to be reduced to 2 high-risk, 13 
medium-risk, and 10 low-risk with the implementation of recommended mitigations and controls. 
 
In this component, the errors of execution committed by the PIC were identified as a single point of failure, 
barring situations when a second crewmember could be utilized to supplement decision-making.  A second 
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single point of failure was also recognized in the line of communication between the individual providing 
DAA guidance [e.g., VSO (Visualization System Observer)] and the PIC. 
 
3.4.3.2 Hardware 
Hazards related to hardware included supporting software both on and off board the aircraft, equipment that 
supports the MMI for both HITL and HOTL configurations, and equipment on which the algorithm resides.  
A total of 42 hazards were identified and analyzed within this component of DAA systems for sUAS use.  
The largest contingent of these hazards rested within supporting systems for both HITL and HOTL 
configurations.  Across the entire Hardware component, 55 initial risks were categorized as high-risk and 
6 were categorized as low-risk.  Following implementation of recommended mitigations and controls, 
residual risks in this area were expected to be reduced to 1 high-risk, 1 medium-risk, and 59 low-risk. 
 
The only single point of failure identified for this component was the possibility of data corruption between 
the DAA and flight control system resulting in an incorrect maneuver.  Minor data corruptions are known 
to exist in networking applications.  Though unlikely, this network connection in the supporting systems 
represents a single point of failure when—as in an ABDAA configuration—execution of the resolution 
maneuver may not necessarily be accomplished by the PIC. 
 
3.4.3.3 Software 
The software component of DAA for sUAS BVLOS primarily addressed those hazards related to the 
algorithm as well as the software supporting the MMI for both GBDAA and ABDAA system designs.  
Amassing a total of 64 hazards, the software component is second only to the sensors component in number 
of identified hazards.  Hazards in this component appear to be distributed with relative equity across 
algorithm and MMI for GBDAA and ABDAA configurations.  Initial risks across the entire component 
were classified as 32 high risks, 19 medium risks, and 4 low risks.  Residual risks, after considering the 
effect of recommended mitigations and controls, fell to 1 high, 5 medium, and 49 low-risk classifications, 
respectively. 
 
In this component, an algorithm that is improperly tested, configured, installed, etc., and is put into 
operation was considered a single point of failure.  An established level within, or equivalent to, the DO-
178 software development standards (RTCA 2011) was recommended as a mitigation to greatly reduce the 
likelihood of this risk.  A midair collision was still considered credible, however, depending on the time 
needed to recover the DAA system following a malfunction. 
 
3.4.3.4 Sensors 
Hazards related to active and passive sensor systems incorporated across both ground-based and airborne 
DAA system designs were the most numerous at 102.  In this component, hazards again appear to be 
distributed with relative equity across the four combinations of active and passive sensors for GBDAA and 
ABDAA.  Across these combinations of sensor hazards, 81 high, 24 medium, and 4 low initial risks were 
classified.  Following implementation of recommended mitigations and controls, residual risks in this area 
were expected to be reduced to 20 high risk, 34 medium risk, and 78 low risk. 
 
Without assuming a DAA system will have redundant sensors, mechanical and software failure within the 
DAA’s sensor emerged as single points of failure in every combination of active, passive, ground-based, 
and airborne DAA systems.  Along similar lines, sustained loss of signal due to interference, and detection 
holes in the well surveilled volume—perhaps caused by propagation issues or weather—also represent 
single points of failure worthy of continued consideration. 
 
3.4.3.5 Mitigation-Driven Results 
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SRM results are provided according to mitigation types in Appendix G.  These provide the mitigation, the 
associated hazard, the DAA function (detect, track, evaluate, or maneuver), initial risk, residual risk, and 
associated notes.  This format is expected to be enabling since DAA system producers will be most 
interested in what mitigations may be required.  The types of mitigations, along with the number of 
mitigations (GBSAA/ABSAA), are: 
 System Redundancy (50/36) 
 System Functionality (27/19) 
 Pre-Flight (25/21) 
 Training and Performance Evaluation (13/4) 
 Health Monitoring (19/16) 
 Procedural (26/21) 
 Medical (2/0) 
 Software Standards (2/3) 
It is noted that the number of mitigations for a type of system (e.g., GBSAA) do not add up perfectly to 
other numbers presented herein because multiple mitigations may be applied to a particular hazard.  
Because of this, individual mitigations may not be responsible for the total difference between residual and 
initial risks that are provided in Appendix G.  Finally, it is noted that the number of mitigations associated 
with software standards are low because an equivalent of DO-178C (RTCA 2011) was commonly assumed 
as an existing control for software-based systems. 
 
3.4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
Focusing on the Safety Risk Management (SRM) pillar of the SMS process, this effort (1) identified hazards 
related to the operation of sUAS in BVLOS, (2) offered a preliminary risk assessment considering existing 
controls, and (3) recommended additional controls and mitigations to further reduce risk to the lowest 
practical level.  The risk assessment began with a set of sponsor provided assumptions and limitations.  
Generally speaking, operations in day, VMC conditions, within Class G and E airspace over other than 
densely populated areas were considered within scope.  These operations were to be limited from the surface 
to 500 ft AGL (although flight up to 1000 ft could be considered), further than 3 miles from an airport or 
heliport, and within RLOS of a fixed ground-based transmitter.  Following its release, several eligibility 
requirements and conditions of 14 CFR §107 were added to this list of assumptions for consideration as 
existing controls in the risk assessment. 
 
3.4.4.1 Safety Risk Management 
Within the ground-based and airborne DAA configurations, hazards generally coalesced into four 
components (1) Level of Autonomy, (2) Hardware, (3) Software, and (4) Sensor (see Fig. 72).  Risks for 
nearly 250 hazards were identified within this architecture of system states, classified, and offered some 
degree or method of mitigation.  Of the four primary DAA components identified, hazards related to sensor 
systems were the most numerous at 102, followed in decreasing order by those related to software, 
hardware, and level of autonomy. 
 
Following implementation of recommended mitigations and controls, residual risks for sensor hazards were 
expected to be reduced to 20 high risks, 34 medium risks, and 78 low risks.  Not anticipated at the outset, 
relatively few differences surfaced between active ground-based and airborne DAA or between passive 
sensor systems in the ground-based and airborne configurations.  Residual risks in level of autonomy were 
expected to reduce to 2 high risks, 13 medium risks, and 10 low risks.  Inclusion of a practical performance 
evaluation (e.g., a check ride) or equivalent, and more stringent medical standards than those established 
under 14 CFR §107.17 for crewmembers operating sUAS BVLOS, emerged as common themes within 




Residual risks for software were reduced to 1 high risk, 5 medium risks, and 49 low risks; hardware residual 
risks were expected to be reduced to 1 high risk, 1 medium risk, and 59 low risks.  In both of these 
components, system redundancy and health monitoring of flight critical processes emerged as common 
mitigations.  Discussions around the health monitoring mitigation in particular begged consideration of 
pilot expectations and other human factors that would influence the preferred method (e.g. alerts, warnings, 
cautions) for communicating information, abnormalities, and failures to the PIC.  The challenges associated 
with Software Of Unknown Pedigree (SOUP) surfaced repeatedly across the software component with 
frequent reference to standards such as DO-178 (e.g., RTCA 2011) as a recommended mitigation. 
 
3.4.4.2 Potential Mitigations 
Throughout the discussion and assessment of the above risks, a relationship seems to emerge between 
operating environment (e.g., airspace density), sensor uncertainty, and procedural separation (e.g., well 
clear).  That is, the sensor uncertainty an operation is able to tolerate—and the extent of procedural 
separation minimums—for a given operation is dependent on the operating environment of the sUAS.  
Tolerance for positional uncertainty in approving BVLOS operations within airspace with low traffic 
density will be higher than in high density airspace.  Likewise, the temporal uncertainty of the DAA sensor 
(i.e., refresh or update rate) will also contribute to this model for BVLOS approval across the myriad of 
airspaces in the NAS.  An established threshold for sensor uncertainty may permit BVLOS approval in 
many areas.  Access to airspace with higher traffic density may not be precluded, but will certainly carry 
much higher criteria for DAA sensors.  Such a model might also inform minimum acceptable mitigations 
such as a requirement to communicate uncertainly to the PIC (e.g., visual or aural) and/or the degree of 
additional procedural mitigations (e.g., separation minima over and above well clear) necessary.  The model 
or metric represented by these relationships could offer a broader range of acceptable BVLOS solutions in 
the NAS for a proposed operation. 
 
In the way of an example, The Northern Plains Unmanned Aircraft Systems Test Site (NP UAS TS) has 
received approval for a BVLOS COA (Certificate Of Authorization or waiver) for operations of a large 
UAS out of the Grand Forks Air Force Base (GFAFB) under a waiver granted by the FAA.  A CONcept of 
OPerationS (CONOPS) was developed to support the COA case, which outlines the methods and 
procedures that will be used to safety and efficiently operate UAS in a BVLOS environment.  These 
operations will further research and develop BVLOS concepts, procedures, and supporting infrastructure 
for UAS, and will occur as Public Aircraft Operations as defined by 49 U.S.C. §40102, 49 U.S.C. §40125, 
and FAA Advisory Circular 00-1.1A.  The CONOPS has been produced as the result of the combined time 
and effort from many entities and personnel, including support from the FAA.  The NP UAS TS has full 
confidence in the ability for this concept of operations to be executed safety and effectively in the United 
States’ NAS.  To mitigate the risk of a mid-air collision, this CONOPS utilizes a visualization system 
connected to the Digital Airport Surveillance Radar (DASR) at the Grand Forks Air Force Base.  A 
dedicated radar observer uses the visualization system and information from the DASR to assist in the 
detection of all traffic, cooperative and non-cooperative, and provide that information to the PIC.  This 
CONOPS is expected to be modified and capitalize on technology advances as they become available.  
However, at the base of the CONOPS, no algorithms are required for the system to warn of potential 
conflicts.  This function resides primarily between the radar observer and the PIC as this system has a high 
level of human-in-the-loop capabilities.  A ground visual observer will be used at the launch and recovery 
area.  Once positive radar identification has been made, the radar observer will have the responsibility for 
see-and-avoid.  The radar observer and the PIC will employ well-clear volumes and first alert edges, which 
are defined volumes and boundaries of airspace around the UAS, to warn of potential conflicts.  The well-
clear volume and first alert edges are predefined to incorporate sensor uncertainty and are conservatively 
defined, which is effective in this setting given the relatively low airspace density.  The UAS will continue 
to utilize this technology to reach flight altitudes between 10,000 and 18,000 ft, where it will then perform 
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its mission.  When this technology is used in conjunction with appropriate procedures, this will mitigate the 
hazards associated with potentially encountering conflicting traffic in and around the UAS. 
 
As noted above, hazards categorized within the high-risk area are considered unacceptable.  These hazards 
must be mitigated to medium or low-risk.  Although 24 hazards could not be reduced below this level in 
the course of the risk assessment, mitigation may be found in the ever present option to have the sUAS 
simply go to ground in certain situations.  This mitigation was not employed casually for a number of 
reasons: (1) damage to the aircraft, (2) safety of persons and property on the ground, (3) practicality should 
operations be expanded to consider populated areas or operations over people, and (4) public perception of 
sUAS operations if over-applied.  Residual risks categorized as high-risk must be addressed, but application 
of this last resort is more complex than it appears on the surface.  Action items, however, do not stop at the 
high-risk threshold.  When predicted residual risk is categorized as either high or medium-risk, the 
associated hazards should be monitored and tracked in relation to set safety performance targets until the 
predicted residual risk can be verified.  It is even recommended that safety requirements are developed for 
residual risks in the low category and the associated hazards are monitored with at least one safety 
performance target in mind.  In addition to these verification efforts, future work might also focus on 
consideration and evaluation of the hazards associated with fully autonomous algorithms and development 
of a template for a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT).  Development of a FRAT could address threat 
and error management on the basis of a single flight—a micro scale by comparison—and be specific to a 
certain operator and operations. 
 
It is important to emphasize that this is the first step with regards to the SRM pillar for sUAS DAA.  
Important next steps include socialization with stakeholders to further refine the list of hazards, existing 
mitigations, inherent risks, relevant additional mitigations, and residual risks.  Through this process it is 
expected that important revisions will be applied.  As this process is based on subject matter expertise, 
uncertainty is present in all of these areas, with data especially needed to better understand inherent risk 
levels and the degree of risk mitigation (both likelihood and severity) associated with recommended 
mitigations and controls.  Thus, an additional next step is flight testing that enables validation and revision 
of this analysis.  Consequently, that provided herein represents a first, albeit very important, step. 
 
Application of these results to date can advance efforts to realize BVLOS operations across a much broader 
portion of the NAS.  However, as described above, a mature and effective SMS is a continual effort.  
Expanding these efforts into the safety policy, assurance, and promotion pillars will more fully realize the 
value of this preliminary assessment.  As demonstrated by the incremental progress of efforts like 
Certificates of Authorization or Waiver, Section 333 Exemptions, and most recently 14 CFR §107, 
“deliberately accepted risks” are a hallmark of extraordinary accomplishments for sUAS in the NAS. 
 
3.5 Flight Testing 
3.5.1 Collaboration with the Cooperative Airspace Techniques and Visualization (CATV) Project 
The Cooperative Airspace Techniques and Visualization (CATV) project was being executed during the 
same time as this project.  CATV, funded by Research North Dakota with Harris as the industry partner, 
had the following as objectives: 
 Evaluate the potential for providing information regarding aircraft obtained through primary radar 
returns through TIS-B messages. 
 Explore use of small ADS-B receivers as gap fillers (Harris ADS-B Xtends). 
 Test Harris RangeVue with local sensors as a GBSAA system. 
 Perform flight tests to evaluate the system. 




The execution of flight tests from October 2016-February 2017 enabled collection of information that was 
helpful to this effort.  Most notably, tests using the SARP-proposed well clear definition (§3.2.1.2) were 
executed.  These data are currently being analyzed as part of CATV, but preliminary results have been 
presented to SARP.  It is noted that in a couple of tests maintenance of well clear in the encounters was 
challenging.  The cause of these issues are currently being discerned.2 
 
In addition, data were collected using the University of North Dakota’s 2D Detect Inc. Harrier radar.  This 
data collection was supported by this effort, and provides a non-cooperative data set that will enable 
continued evaluation of these flight tests. 
 
3.5.2 Flight Test Support 
The University of North Dakota has worked on DAA challenges for many years.  Because of this, work on 
a current related project (e.g., CATV), and work on this project, numerous tools that support flight testing 
are available.  Some of these resources are described henceforth. 
 
3.5.2.1 Display Systems 
3.5.2.1.1 Ganged Phased Array Radar-Risk Mitigation System 
In the mid-2000’s UND was contracted (contract number FA4861-06-C-C006) by the United States Air 
Force to explore ways of integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) into the NAS.  The core of the 
risk mitigation system was three Ganged Phased Array Radars (GPARs) and other sensors connected to a 
set of Information Display Systems (IDSs).  This system is referred to as the GPAR-RMS (Ganged Phased 
Array Radar-Risk Mitigation System).  Publications regarding the GPAR-RMS include Marsh et al. 
(2009a,b; 2010a,b; 2011) and Reza et al. (2010). 
 
The GPAR-RMS was meant to be an extension of ground-based observer(s).  The system integrates aircraft 
position (latitude, longitude, and altitude) data from sources such as ADS-B, ground based radar, and 
telemetry data from Global Positioning System (GPS) equipped aircraft.  Sensor data are fused and 
forwarded to the Range Control Center (RCC).  Data from a weather station located at the (mobile) UAS 
operations center and Doppler weather radar (from a website) are forwarded to the RCC.  As the data are 
fused they are multicast (for scalability) to the IDSs, including a high-resolution wide-screen Range Control 
Center Information Display System (RCC IDS) and one, or more, high-resolution wide-screen Ground 
Observer Information Display Systems (GO IDSs).  The RCC IDS, which is modeled after existing Air T 
Well clear was actually maintained in these tests as aircraft were always separated by at least 500 ft 
vertically, with software-based altitude spoofing used to create scenarios that appeared to be co-altitude to 
the algorithms that were being tested.raffic Control display systems and existing Traffic Information 
Service-Broadcast display systems, displays the georeferenced GPS positions of all aircraft operating in the 
area, the georeferenced positions of ground-based hazards/targets, weather information, system health data, 
and an operational risk parameter.  The GO IDS, which is modeled after existing Flight Information Service-
Broadcast moving map display systems, portrays the positions of all aircraft operating in the area in relation 
to a specific UAS of interest, weather information, system health data, and the operational risk parameter.  
Both the RCC-IDS and GO-IDS were georeferenced to a Cartesian coordinate system.  Figures 74 and 75 
show the two main IDSs for the GPARS-RMS system. 
 
 
                                                     
2 Well clear was actually maintained in these tests as aircraft were always separated by at least 500 ft vertically, with 









Figure 75. GPAR-RMS GO IDS.  
 
 
3.5.2.1.2 Aerospace Aircraft Display System (AADS) 
3.5.2.1.2.1 John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences Flight Operations Requirements 
The John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences (JDOSAS) at the University of North Dakota (UND) 
is a world-renowned center for aerospace learning, nationally acclaimed for achievements in collegiate 
aviation education, atmospheric research, space studies, and computer science applications.  JDOSAS 
operates flight training centers at the Chandler-Gilbert Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, the 
University of Minnesota, Crookston at Crookston, Minnesota, and the University of North Dakota in Grand 
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Forks, North Dakota.  The JDOSAS flight operations at the Grand Forks International Airport|Mark 
Andrews Field (GFK) is the largest, with approximately 120,000 flight hours per year.  
 
About the same time the GPAR-RMS system was developed, UND’s Flight Operations became interested 
in a similar system to help them schedule and track student pilots.  While the IDSs developed for the GPAR-
RMS system worked well for the contract, they were not well suited for use by UND’s Flight Operations—
in particular the Supervisor of Flight (SOF)—for the following reasons: 
 As GFK is located in northeastern North Dakota, on the North Dakota Minnesota border, the 
JDOSAS has established practice areas in northeastern North Dakota and northwestern Minnesota.  
Practice areas are assigned to each training flight with the exception of Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR), cross country, and traffic pattern flights.  The purpose is to help spread the fleet out over a 
wider area, increasing safety and reducing risk to the flight crews.  The SOF monitors and assigns 
the practice areas based upon a maximum number in each.  Once an area is full, it is no longer 
available until one of the aircraft assigned to that area returns.  Some practice areas are used more 
than others, specifically ones that have other airports within them or that are closer to GFK (to 
reduce transit flight times).  Therefore, in addition to being able to locate aircraft, it is important 
for the SOF to have these practice areas displayed on the IDS. 
 As hazardous weather conditions may impact the fleet, or flight operations, weather situational 
awareness is important.  In order to assist with overall weather situational awareness, it was 
determined that the IDS should incorporate current NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration) Doppler radar data.  The radar overlay is most often used when incoming 
thunderstorms or blizzard conditions are forecast or spotted, and allows the SOF to provide 
guidance to dispatched aircraft regarding the incoming hazardous weather conditions. 
 To be consistent with information readily available and used by pilots, it was decided that the 
background should be an aviation sectional chart because these charts provide detailed information 
important to aviators, such as terrain elevations, ground features, airspace classes, ground-based 
navigation aids, radio frequencies, longitude and latitude, and navigation waypoints useful to pilots.  
However, as aviation sectional charts use a Lambert conformal conic projection system, the new 
IDS would require a coordinate transformation from the Cartesian coordinate system to the Lambert 




Figure 76. World map in Lambert conformal conic 
projection (source: Wikipedia).  
 
 
 It was also deemed important to include a search feature in which the SOF would be able to type 
an aircraft tail number (or call sign) into a search field and the IDS would locate and highlight the 
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desired aircraft on the display.  Basic information about the selected aircraft was also to be 
displayed, including altitude, heading, and ground speed.  
 Finally, it was desired that the IDS be a single display (that could be mirrored at a variety of 
locations) that had everything (aircraft, Doppler Weather radar overlay, practice area boundaries, 
etc.) georeferenced to the local aviation sectional chart. 
 
3.5.2.1.2.2 AADS Version I 
UND’s need led to the development of a new IDS, one specifically suited to UND’s needs.  However, the 
design of an IDS is not as obvious as one might think as there is no single model to follow.  As a Yuditsky 
et al. (2004) indicate, several different types of IDSs are in use throughout FAA facilities.  The variety of 
IDSs may be expected given the variety of tasks each FAA facility is expected to perform; however, what 
is not expected is that supposedly identical IDSs have different interfaces depending on who the contractor 
was.  Yet, it  can be argued that this is to be expected given the work of Nielsen (1999), who concluded that 
“No design standard can ever specify a complete user interface” and the work of Ahlstrom (2016) who 
points out that the same (interface) standard may be implemented in a variety of ways.  Given the lack of a 
uniform IDS model and the unique requirements of UND’s AADSs, it seemed prudent to design an IDS 
from first principles using a spiral model (such as Boehm’s) where the designers can work directly with 
those developing the rest of the system and with those who will use the resulting AADS. 
 
Using the Yuditsky et al. (2004) as a guideline, for example, it is seen that an IDS should be: 
 Well organized and that organization of the information and controls greatly affects the operator’s 
ability to effectively use the system. 
 Navigable and consistent. 
 Clearly indicative of when pertinent information was last updated. 
 Providing information that is complete and relevant.  Use of color and color combinations should 
be consistent.  Buttons should be represented in shades of gray and use a consistent font size and 
font type. 
 
Hardware selection is also an important issue as the use of a keyboard for required data entry should only 
be provided to operators who have the authority to enter data.  The use of a mouse or trackball versus a 
touch screen display has advantages and disadvantages.  Both facilitate interaction with the IDS.  However, 
use of a mouse/trackball requires the operator to coordinate the position of the physical device with the icon 
on the screen and when used with multiple displays the operator can momentarily lose track of the icon 
during screen-to-screen transitions.  Use of a touch screen can be problematic if the screen has a low touch 
resolution, a touch screen requires some form of adjustable mounting as the operator’s arm will fatigue, 
and a touch screen requires frequent cleaning to remove fingerprints that obscure information.  Yuditsky et 
al. (2004) indicate that touch screen users often preferred to use a trackball over their finger/stylus or a 
mouse.  Finally, screen size and resolution must be sufficient to clearly display the relevant information. 
 
Xing (2006) cites the non-standard use of color schemes by different manufacturers of ATC displays and 
proposes guidelines for use of color in IDSs such as: 
 To capture attention.  However, the effectiveness of color in this manner is highly dependent on 
the luminance and chromaticity differences of the colors used and on the consistent use of specific 
colors to represent specific situations across all components in the IDS. 
 To identify certain types of information to improve the operator’s effectiveness in retrieving 
relevant information in complex/cluttered displays. 
 To segment complex display scenes to organize/cluster related information.  However, in some 
cases segmentation is better achieved through a reorganization of the display. 
It should be noted that many of these concerns/requirements are echoed in the US Department of Defense’s 




Taking into account the previous work performed in this area (the GPARS-RMS RCC), the AADS was 
developed with the ability to: 
 Import near real-time data (1 second intervals) from the ADS-B transceiver. 
 Import and display regional Aviation Sectional Charts, allow the user to toggle this overlay on or 
off, and allow the user to set the transparency of this overlay. 
 Import and display (georeferenced to the sectional chart) the region’s NOAA Doppler radar data, 
allow the user to toggle this overlay on or off, and allow the user to set the transparency of this 
overlay. 
 Import from a file and display (georeferenced to the sectional chart) boundaries of regions such as 
aircraft practice areas and allow the user to toggle this overlay on or off. 
 Display cooperative aircraft types using NATO/APA (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization/American Pilot’s Association) icons (icons are rotated to indicate the current aircraft 
heading). 
 Allow the user to zoom, pan and/or scroll the display (the display is always North-up). 
 Provide the time and date of the last ADS-B, Doppler radar, and weather sensor (barometric 
pressure) updates. 
 Allow the user to select an aircraft via the mouse to obtain information (position, heading, etc.) 
regarding that aircraft. 
 Allow the user to search for aircraft via the tail number. 
 Display non-cooperative (or unknown) aircraft types using an icon that readily distinguishes them 
from other aircraft.  
 
The AADS has proven to be accurate enough with aircraft positioning relative to the aviation sectional map, 
which is enabled by the fact that ADS-B information is accurate to within several meters.  The SOF can 
zoom in and watch aircraft takeoff and land on the indicated runways at any airport in range.  Accuracy at 
this level is easily within 15 feet and is well within the tolerances needed for UND Flight Operations.  A 
ground-based ADS-B antenna is utilized that provides an exceptional range for a standalone system.  As of 
this writing, aircraft within 50 nm are visible within the system all the way to the ground.  Airborne aircraft 
at moderate training altitudes have been located out to 150 nm and beyond.  
 
The AADS has dramatically improved operational safety and situational awareness across the board for 
UND’s Flight Operations.  It is proven to be effective, efficient, and a game changing tool with regards to 
management and coordination of the dispatched fleet during normal operations as well as during times of 
inclement weather or in-flight distress.  AADS has helped UND Flight Operations move one step further 
up the aerospace ladder of excellence. 
 
3.5.2.1.2.3 AADS Version II 
While version I of the AADS did meet the demands of the SOF and feedback from them was very positive, 
concerns did arise and they were addressed in version II.  Version I was unable to receive Traffic 
Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B) data due to the configuration of the Garmin GDL-90 ADS-B 
receiver.  TIS-B allows non-ADS-B transponder equipped aircraft that are tracked with radar (e.g. MODE-
C/S) to have their location and track information re-broadcast to ADS-B equipped aircraft through the use 
of a ground station.  This data stream was deemed to be very important for future research applications of 
the AADS.  Thus, it was incorporated in version II.  Another consideration was human factor concerns 
obtained through feedback from the SOF that suggested that some changes to the menu options and their 
locations as well as changes to the colors used in the display area would be helpful. 
 
The most significant changes that were incorporated into version II of AADS are: 
 Import and display of near real-time ADS-B and TIS-B data from the ADS-B transceiver. 
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 The Doppler radar data are now georeferenced to the local aviation sectional chart using an inverse 
conversion to reduce conversion artifacts (e.g., blockiness). 
 Improved filtering of Doppler radar noise. 
 Aircraft icon colors are now blue and turn red after an aircraft stops transmitting (has landed, etc.) 
for a period of time (currently set at five minutes).  After another period of time (currently set at 
five minutes) these “red” icons are removed from the display.  This helps reduce display clutter, 
yet gives the SOF a very evident indicator of any aircraft that is no longer transmitting. 
 The tail-number search option was modified such that a stippled line is drawn from the display base 
of operations (GFK in Fig. 77) out to the aircraft (if found). 
 Sensors (Doppler radar, ADS-B, and atmospheric pressure) have more clearly defined timestamps 
that show the latest updates.  Currently, the timestamps are shown in green and turn red if a sensor 
has not responded within a set time period (specific to each sensor).  The default color may be 
changed to blue to match the aircraft icon color scheme, but the SOF does not consider this a 
priority.  So, this is still only a consideration. 
 The menus have a record option, so the SOF can more easily customize the display.  This option is 
useful when versions of the AADS are put in public places as one can customize the display and 
run the AADS with most of the GUI (Graphical User Interface) options disabled, thus protecting 
the identity of the aircraft/student pilots (FERPA - Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act). 
 Support for multiple airports was added via command line arguments and simple data files that 
hold the configuration details (Lambert conformal conic projection conversions, Doppler radar 
coordinates, etc.) specific to each airport (Phoenix–Mesa Gateway Airport in Fig. 78). 
 Greater conformance to DO-178B/C (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification). 
 The current atmospheric pressure is automatically uploaded to the display allowing the display of 
corrected (converted from ADS-B standard pressure altitude) mean sea level (MSL) altitude 
information for selected aircraft. 
 
Again, Fig. 77 shows the AADS when tracking aircraft operating out of GFK and Fig. 78 shows the AADS 
when tracking aircraft operating out of IWA (Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport).  Note that in both cases the 











Figure 78. AADS display for Phoenix–Mesa Gateway Airport (IWA).  
 
 
3.5.2.1.2.4 AADS Architecture 
While several different companies have recently begun to offer similar solutions for fleet tracking and 
surveillance, the AADS has offered UND the same, if not better, tracking and monitoring solutions from 
an in-house system at a mere fraction of the cost of packaged solutions.  UND’s software engineers are able 




With the current architecture/configuration, the AADS server interfaces, via a serial port, with a Garmin 
GDL-90 ADS-B Transceiver mounted on the roof of the five story flight services building at GFK.  The 
Garmin GDL-90 is connected to an omni-directional ADS-B antenna manufactured by dB Systems Inc. and 
is configured to operate with this single antenna instead of the two aircraft fin antenna commonly used with 
this system (this ADS-B unit is designed for installation on aircraft which is why fin antennas are commonly 
used for such a device).  The GDL-90 is also connected to the supplied GPS.  The antenna is approximately 
78 inches in length and was mounted such that it extended its height by approximately seven feet.  Thus, 
the top of the antenna is approximately 106 feet above ground level.  This antenna was installed with a 
lightning protection system and provides 9 dB/iso of gain operating at frequencies between 960 MHz and 
1215 MHz.  These characteristics enabled ADS-B data to be collected at ranges far exceeding those 
provided by the commonly used fin antennas.  As ADS-B data are received they are forwarded to any 





Figure 79. AADS architecture.  
 
 
3.5.2.1.3 Limited Deployment-Cooperative Airspace Project (LD-CAP) Flight Test Support 
The AADS was modified for use with a recent research project called the Limited Deployment – 
Cooperative Airspace Project (LD-CAP), during which test flights were conducted in northeastern North 
Dakota in September 2012 and July 2013, and in Virginia in August 2013.  This project is a collaborative 
research effort between several entities including the University of North Dakota, NASA-Langley, MITRE, 
and Draper Laboratories to test Cooperative Automatic Sense and Avoid (CASA) algorithms through 
simulation and flight testing, with the purpose being to provide data to aid with the integration of UASs 
into the NAS.  
 
Prior to the test flights, effort was directed at customizing the AADS to satisfy specific needs of the LD-
CAP effort.  These included the ability to insert geographical points and boundaries into the AADS to aid 
with aircraft encounter setup.  Toggle buttons were also added to allow the user to easily turn on and off 
these features in the display.  Other customized features for LD-CAP include the addition of adjustable 
distance circles around the two aircraft (configurable), the ability to show aircraft historical tracks, and the 
option to have an aircraft centric display that offers track-up or north-up orientation.  These features 
supported operations during the 2013 LD-CAP North Dakota flight tests.  AADS running in LD-CAP mode 
is shown in Fig. 80. 
 
During the 2013 North Dakota flight tests, three algorithms were tested using 134 encounters (note the 
labeled points in the lower left of Fig. 80).  Each algorithm successfully maneuvered the surrogate UAS 




In actuality, the flight test director utilized both versions of the AADS to help direct the encounters.  One 
AADS was set to the standard LD-CAP configuration (Fig. 80) while the other display was configured as 
an aircraft-centric display (Fig. 81) and was centered on the NASA surrogate UAS.  Each display was 
configured to show distance circles, LD-CAP encounter points, and LD-CAP special areas.  These displays 
allowed the flight test director to observe the encounters, see how close the aircraft came to each other 
(horizontally) via the distance circles, monitor altitudes through the ADS-B data stream, and determine if 
changes to the encounter setup or algorithms were needed before the next flight.  The AADS running in the 
LD-CAP GO (Ground Observer) mode with aircraft (surrogate UAS) heading “up” is shown in Fig. 81. 
 









The LD-CAP flight tests were approximately 60 nm from the ADS-B antenna and data were collected down 
to approximately 1000 feet AGL at that range.  Aircraft were also tracked out to 100 nm (depending on the 
aircraft’s altitude).  The wide bandwidth of the antenna also allows for processing of Mode S/C targets on 
the 1090 MHz band with an addition of a 1090 receiver (anticipated future purchase).  This setup provided 
robust and reliable ADS-B data that were very important to the success of LD-CAP flight tests.  To gain 
even more from this effort, the potential generation of TIS-B messages using primary radar returns is being 
explored.  This would rebroadcast the primary radar return only targets (non-cooperative targets) as a TIS-
B message that can then be displayed—making the entire airspace semi-cooperative. 
 
3.5.2.1.4 Cooperative Airspace Technology and Visualization (CATV) Flight Test Support 
The AADS was again modified for use with a current research project called the Cooperative Airspace 
Technology and Visualization (CATV) project, where once again test flights are being conducted in 
northeastern North Dakota to evaluate DAA algorithms, with the purpose being to provide data to aid with 
the integration of UASs into the NAS.  CATV is very similar in intent to the LD-CAP project; however, as 
the specific needs of the project are different the AADS was once again modified to better suit the needs of 
the project. 
 
In this case, the AADS was further modified (from that shown in Fig. 81) in that a road map was added to 
aid in locating where the flight operations were occurring.  Additionally, two detect and avoid (DAA) 
algorithms were included.  One is based on a “hockey puck” (the SARP-recommended 2000 ft horizontal 
and 500 ft vertical separation) and a second based on the RTCA SC228 tau (time to collision) method.  
Upon startup the user can specify which DAA method is to be used.  In either case, offending aircraft are 
painted red, yellow, or white (from the normal blue) to signify their level of intrusion.  Details regarding 
the seriousness of the intrusion are also provided on the display (lower right) and logged to a data file.  The 





Figure 82. AADS display in CATV mode.  
 
 
3.5.2.1.5 Future Developments 
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UND Aerospace is currently working to expand its ADS-B coverage of northeastern North Dakota by 
installing two additional ADS-B units (units that can receive both 1090 and UAT signals) and by replacing 
the current GDL-90 with a similar dual-band unit.  The resultant data streams will be fused into a single 
stream and served out to the AADS (or derivative) displays by a computer/server located in a “machine 
room”.  This will improve coverage, especially for aircraft operating at low altitudes, capacity by allowing 
more AADS IDS to be connected, and reliability by having the server located in a properly managed 
machine room. 
 
3.5.2.2 Warning Provision Investigation 
One of the areas investigated is the methods currently in use to alert pilots to the various hazards that they 
may encounter.  Three methods were investigated: audible, tactile, and visual. 
 
3.5.2.2.1 Audible 
Commercial aircraft use audible warnings for a variety of alerts.  However, general alerting sounds are 
chosen by the manufacturer of the cockpit systems.  Stall warnings, autopilot disconnect alerts, fire alarms, 
etc. are not standardized, with the exception of the words spoken by the Ground Proximity Warning 
System/Terrain Awareness Warning System (GPWS/TAWS) and Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) systems.  Even sounds within aircraft from the same manufacturer may be different.  For example, 
the fire warning in a Boeing 737 sounds like a physical fire bell, while that on a Boeing 777 is an electronic 
"beep beep beep" sound.  In addition, research has found that, on average, a pilot could remember and 
differentiate ten different caution/warning signals, leading the FAA to limit the amount of different warning 
signals to eight (Part 25 certification), with speech counted as one of those eight.  However, there is no limit 
on the number of spoken audible warnings.  Table 48 shows the general audible alerts for one type of 





Table 48. General audible alerts.  
3 low pitch tones  Auto pilot disconnect 
Repeating mid pitch tones Incorrect takeoff configuration 
3 high pitch tones Exited selected altitude 
Constant tone Desired altitude reached 
“APU” APU overspeed or overtemp 
“Door” Open/unsafe passenger door 
“Jetpipe overheat” Overheat indicator in jetpipe/pylon 
“Smoke” Smoke detection in cabin 
“Wing overheat” Overheat in fuselage wing anti-ice ducts 
“Anti-ice duct” Air leak in fuselage or wing anti-ice ducts 
“Bleed air duct” Leak in different part of air duct system 
“Brakes” Brake overheat 
“Config Brakes” Parking brake set while airborne 
“Gear disagree” Gear indicator does not match handle position 
“Gear bay overheat” Overheat in main gear bay 
“Node door” Nose gear door open and > 250 knots 
“Engine oil” Oil pressure < 25 psi 
“Config autopilot” Autopilot not configured for takeoff 
“Config flaps” Flaps not configured for takeoff 
“Config spoilers” Spoilers not configured for takeoff 
“Config trim” Trim not configured for takeoff 
“Config brakes” Brakes not configured for takeoff 
“Fire left engine” Fire in left engine 
“Fire right engine” Fire in right engine 
 
 
Table 49. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) 
audible alerts.  
Siren and “pull up”  Excessive rate of descent 
“Pull Up - Sink Rate”  Descending to fast 
“Too low - gear” Low altitude and gear up 
“Too low - terrain” High speed @ low altitude 
“Too Low – Flaps”  No flaps @ low altitude 
“Pull-Up - Terrain”  Terrain closure alert  
“Don’t sink”  Altitude loss after takeoff 
 “Windshear” Windshear alert 
“Glide slope”  Below glide slope 
“Bank angle”  Bank angle > 35° 
 
 
Table 50. Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) audible alerts.  
“Clear of conflict” Conflict resolved 
“Traffic, Traffic”  Conflicting traffic approaching 
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“Climb, Climb”  Climb immediately 
“Descend, Descend”  Descend immediately 
“Increase Climb”  Climb immediately at a faster rate 
“Increase Descent”  Descend immediately at a faster rate 
“Climb, Climb – Now”  Climb immediately 
“Descend, Descend – Now”  Descend immediately 




Finally, Begault and Pittman (1996) have proposed that stereo audible alerts be used to cue the pilot to look 
in a specific direction.  The results look promising, but the pilots would have to wear stereo headsets. 
 
3.5.2.2.2 Tactile 
Larkin (1983) indicated that a tactile device produced the lowest reaction times to alerts/warnings and 
modern commercial aircraft use tactile warnings for a variety of alerts.  Perhaps the most common and best 
known is the Stick Shaker, which is a mechanical device that rapidly and noisily vibrates the control yoke 
(the "stick") of an aircraft to warn the pilot of an imminent stall.  Another tactile warning device is the Stick 
Pusher/Nudger (Bateman 2011), which is also a mechanical device installed in fixed-wing aircraft to 
prevent the aircraft from entering an aerodynamic stall.  The Stick Pusher pushes back on the yoke making 
it more difficult to raise the nose beyond the stall limit.  Rotary wing aircraft may have at least two additional 
tactile devices, the Collective Shaker and the Pedal Shaker.  The Collective Shaker (Rosenberg 2017) 
provides two noticeably different levels of warning.  A low-speed shake warns that a pre-determined 
operational level is being approached.  A high-speed shake provides a more urgent alert as the limit is 
reached or exceeded.  The shake continues only as long as the exceedance exists.  When the shaking stops 
the pilot knows immediately that he is once again operating within the helicopter’s normal limits.  Safe 
Flight’s Pedal Shaker (Greene and Greene 1999) warns the pilot when approaching the pedal limit.  The 
Pedal Shaker enhances the pilot’s situational awareness during out-of-ground-effect hover situations, high 
crosswind operations, or high-density altitude situations, where power required may exceed power 
available.  The shaker activates at a predetermined limit, giving the pilot time to maintain control.  Finally, 




According to Bahrami (2010), systems should present the alerts according to the urgency and the 
prioritization philosophy (warning, caution, and advisory categories).  Normally, this means time-critical 
warnings are first, other warnings are second, cautions are third, and advisories are last.  Depending on the 
phase of flight, there may be a need to re-categorize certain alerts from a lower urgency level to a higher 
urgency level.  Furthermore, prioritization within alert categories may be necessary.  For example, when 
near threatening terrain, time-critical aural warnings must be prioritized before other warnings within the 
warning-alert category.  The advisory also recommends that if using aural alerts with multiple meanings, a 
corresponding visual, tactile, or haptic alert should be provided to resolve any potential uncertainty relating 
to the aural alert and clearly identify the specific alert condition. 
 
Of particular interest here is that visual alert indications must conform to the following color convention: 
1. Red for warning-alert indications.  And, the color displayed for the visual master warning alert 
must be the same color used for the associated warning alerts. 
2. Amber or yellow for caution-alert indications.  And, the color displayed for the master caution alert 
must be the same color used for the associated caution alerts. 
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3. A separate and distinct color should be used to distinguish between caution and advisory alerts.  If 
a distinctive color is not used to distinguish between caution and advisory alerts, other distinctive 
coding techniques must be used to meet the general requirements. 
4. Any color except red or green can be used for advisory alert indications.  Green is usually used to 
indicate “normal” conditions; therefore, it is not an appropriate color for an advisory alert.  An 
advisory alert is used to indicate a “non-normal” condition. 
5. The colors red, amber, and yellow must be used consistently.  This includes alert color consistency 
among propulsion, flight, navigation, and other displays and indications used on the flight deck. 
 
Yiu (2017) found that the correct use of color schemes can aid in alerting the crew if something needs to 
be bought to their attention.  Using too many different colors, however, may clutter the screen and cause 
confusion.  The main colors used for system monitoring are green (normal), amber (caution) and red (alert 
or emergency).  The colors that are typically used on the Horizontal Situational Indicator (HSI) are shown 
in Table 51. 
 
 
Table 51. Colors typically used in the HSI.  
Green Active or selected mode and/or dynamic conditions 
White Present status situation and scales 
Magenta 
Command information, pointers, symbols and fly to tracks. 
Magenta is also used on the weather radar to indicate areas of 
strong return (ie: possible turbulence/wind shear) 
Cyan Non active and background information 
Red Warnings 
Yellow/Amber Cautions, flags and faults 
Black Blank areas or system off 
 
 
Another item to consider when designing a visual display is the concept of a “quiet/dark” design (Novacek 
2003).  This design philosophy states that information is not displayed until something goes wrong.  The 
screen or annunciator stays black until a system condition warrants notifying the pilot. 
 
One must also be aware of the differences between Western designs and Eastern designs.  For example, the 
Artificial Horizon (AH) is a key instrument for manual flight control and for monitoring automatic flight 
control.  An unfamiliar AH display can cause or contribute to confusion, uncertainty, and/or delay when 
trying to recover from an unusual attitude.  Using a Western design (being an “inside looking out” display), 
the artificial horizon line tilts in alignment with the outside horizon and the airplane symbol remains fixed 
horizontally.  Using an Eastern design (an “outside looking in” display), the artificial horizon line remains 
horizontal and the airplane symbol tilts to show the airplane’s bank angle.  Military pilots often claim the 
Eastern design is a better display when maneuvering in fast combat. 
 
Finally, The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has repeatedly recommended installation 
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Use Case Definitions 
Where possible, these general uses were broken down further into more specific sub-categories of their 
respective general uses.  This allowed for the collection of a greater amount of information.  The definition 
of each general use and their respective sub-categories is considered as follows: 
Aerial Data Collection: Use cases that are either described simply as “Aerial Data Collection” (or having 
a very similar description), or can most accurately be described as a use involving the collection of data by 
means of sensors or cameras on-board of the sUAS.  Separate from the definitions of “Aerial Surveying / 
Mapping,” “Agriculture,” “Inspection,” and “Research,” the description given of the use case is not 
necessarily specific as to what data is collected, and what purposes the data will be used for. 
Aerial Data Collection – Construction/Mining:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 
333 exemption request for the collection of non-specified data from construction and/or mining-
related sites. 
Aerial Data Collection – Environmental:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 333 
exemption request for the collection of data from the environment for non-specified reasons. 
Aerial Data Collection – General:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 333 exemption 
request for the collection of non-specified data from non-specified areas, or is simply listed as 
“Aerial Data Collection,” “Aerial Acquisitions,” etc. 
Aerial Data Collection – Insurance:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 333 
exemption request for the collection of non-specified data for insurance purposes that does not 
indicate that it is being used for inspection. 
Aerial Photography/Videography: Use cases that are either described simply as “Aerial 
Photography/Videography” (or having a very similar description), or can most accurately be described as 
a use involving the collection of pictures and videos for no other obvious or implied reason than to have 
the pictures or videos taken in the applications listed below. 
Aerial Photography/Videography – Closed-set filming:  A use case that was approved by the 
FAA in the 333 exemption request for the collection of aerial images and videos taken for films, 
web videos, music videos, etc. from a closed-set. 
Aerial Photography/Videography – Construction:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in 
the 333 exemption request for the collection of aerial images and videos of construction sites, where 
the use case does not indicate that it is collecting data for analysis, surveying, mapping, inspection, 
research, or surveillance. 
Aerial Photography/Videography – General:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 
333 exemption request for the collection of aerial videos and images for when the use case cleared 
is simply listed as “Aerial Photography/Videography,” “Aerial Photography,” “Aerial 
Videography,” etc. 
Aerial Photography/Videography – News-Gathering:  A use case that was approved by the FAA 
in the 333 exemption request for the collection of aerial images and videos to be used in the news-
reporting media, whether it be newspaper, magazine, web content, mobile news, etc. 
Aerial Photography/Videography – Outdoor Activities:  A use case that was approved by the 
FAA in the 333 exemption request for the collection of aerial images and videos that show uses in 
outdoor activities such as golf, hiking, climbing, rafting, team sports, etc. 
Aerial Photography/Videography – Real Estate: A use case that was approved by the FAA in 
the 333 exemption request for the collection of aerial images and videos that show structures and 
properties for the promotion and sale of real estate. 
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Aerial Photography/Videography – Wedding:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 
333 exemption request and is listed as “Wedding Photography,” or describes the collection of aerial 
images and videos from weddings. 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping: Use cases that are either described simply as “Aerial Surveying/Mapping” 
(or having a very similar description), or can most accurately be described as a mapping or surveying 
operation for various purposes. 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping – Agriculture/Mining:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in 
the 333 exemption request for the collection of aerial surveying and mapping for agricultural and/or 
mining purposes that does not fit the description or specificity of the general, or precision 
agricultural use case parameters. 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping – Construction:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 
333 exemption request for the collection of aerial surveying and mapping of construction sites or 
structures. 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping – Engineering:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 333 
exemption request for the collection of aerial surveying and mapping of generally listed sites for 
engineering purposes. 
Aerial Surveying/Mapping – General:  A use case that was approved by the FAA in the 333 
exemption request for the collection of general aerial surveying and mapping purposes, or when 
the use case is simply listed as “Aerial Surveying and Mapping,” “Aerial Surveying,” “Aerial 
Mapping,” etc. 
Agriculture: Use cases that are either described simply as “Agriculture” (or having a very similar 
description), or can most accurately be described as a use involving the collection of data for agricultural 
purposes. 
Agriculture – Crop Monitoring:  A use case that is listed as “Crop monitoring,” or was approved 
by the FAA in the 333 exemption request to fly over crop fields, collecting data on various measures 
of crop status. 
Agriculture – General:  A use case that is listed simply as “Agriculture,” or was approved by the 
FAA in the 333 exemption request for sub-types of agricultural data collection that does not meet 
the definition of “Agriculture – Crop Monitoring” or of “Agriculture – Precision Agriculture.” 
Agriculture – Precision Agriculture:  A use case that is listed as “Precision Agriculture,” or was 
approved by the FAA in the 333 exemption request to scout agricultural regions for the use of 
precision agriculture, or describes uses that fall under the definition of precision agriculture.  These 
include soil collection, aerial imaging through various sensors, GPS-guidance of agricultural 
technologies, etc. 
Emergency Services: Use cases which are either described simply as “Emergency Services” (or having a 
very similar description), or describe a use case that can be described as aiding police officers, firefighters, 
medical services, etc. or in the investigation of areas that are too dangerous to put a human being in for 
investigative purposes. 
Emergency Services – Crisis Response:  A use case that is listed as “Crisis Response” or was 
approved by the FAA in the 333 exemption request that was approved by the FAA in the 333 
exemption request for aiding law enforcement in various purposes, are able to relay messages in a 
crisis scenario, in considering emergency preparedness, etc. 
Emergency Services – General: A use case that is listed as “Emergency Services” or with similar 
wording, is described with ambiguous enough wording that it was not clear whether the use was 
for either crisis response, the investigation of hazardous regions specifically, or described the use 
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of sUAS for a form of emergency services covered by neither the definitions of crisis response nor 
investigate hazardous regions. 
Emergency Services – Investigate Hazardous Regions:  A use case that is listed as “Investigation 
of Hazardous Regions” or was approved by the FAA in the 333 exemption request to investigate 
an area that is too dangerous for a human to investigate directly.  These include regions that are on 
fire, involve radiation, where footing is weak, etc. 
Flight Training/Education: Use cases which are either described simply as “Flight Training,” “Education” 
(or having a very similar description), or describe a use case involving the training employees, students, or 
other users in the operation of sUAS technology, and/or procedures.  Use cases involved in educating 
individuals on sUAS principles, or in demonstrating concepts in mathematics and sciences which can 
demonstrated by sUAS technology. 
Flight Training/Education – Education:  A use case that is listed as “Education,” or describes 
the teaching of mathematical, science, etc. concepts through the use of sUAS technology. 
Flight Training/Education – General: A use case that was described with ambiguous enough 
wording that it was not clear whether the use was for either flight training or education specifically. 
Flight Training/Education – sUAS Training:  A use case that is listed as “Training,” or describes 
the training of users in operating sUAS. 
Inspection: Use cases that are either described simply as “Inspection” (or having a very similar 
description), or that describe a use case involving the inspection of different kinds of structures or areas for 
safety, upkeep, maintaining of, etc.  
Inspection – Communications Structures: A use case that describes the inspection of 
communication structures including, but not limited to, cell towers, satellite dishes, etc.  
Inspection – Construction:  A use case that describes the inspection of construction sites and 
structures under construction through the use of sUAS. 
Inspection – General:  A use case that includes multiple sub-types of inspection through the use 
of sUAS, or is simply listed as “Inspection.” 
Inspection – Insurance:  A use case that includes descriptions of inspection for insurance purposes 
through the use of sUAS. 
Inspection – Oil/Pipeline:  A use case that includes descriptions of inspection for the oil industry, 
including drilling structures, and oil transportation pipelines through the use of sUAS. 
Inspection – Power plants:  A use case that includes descriptions of inspection of power plant 
structures (such as powerlines), resources, and operations through the use of sUAS. 
Inspection – Real Estate:  A use case that includes descriptions of inspection of real estate 
structures and properties (including roofs) through the use of sUAS. 
Inspection – Structure:  A use case that includes descriptions of inspection of structures including 
non-real-estate-buildings (for architectural and integrity inspections) and infrastructure including 
roads, bridges, etc. through the use of sUAS. 
Inspection – Wind power:  A use case that includes descriptions of the inspection specifically of 
wind power turbines through the use of sUAS. 
Marketing: Use cases that are either described simply as “Marketing” (or having a very similar 
description), or describe the capture of aerial images and videos for the express purpose of using these 
images and videos for the marketing of a business, product, or service. 
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Marketing – Aerial Images:  A use case that specifically mentions marketing through the use of 
aerial image / video capture through the use of sUAS. 
Marketing – General:  A use case that is listed simply as “Marketing” or describes sUAS 
applications other than aerial image/video capture for marketing purposes (such as demonstrations). 
Multiple Applications: Use cases which are either described simply as “Multiple Applications” (or having 
a very similar description), or have been cleared for more than one general use case. 
Research: Use cases which are either described simply as “Research” (or having a very similar 
description), or describe a use involving imaging and data collection distinctly for scientific research 
purposes. 
Research – Academics:  A use case that describes academic research.  Examples include 
archaeological, ecological, architectural, and engineering data collection for academic research. 
Research – Development: A use case that describes a clearance for the use of research in the 
development of sUAS technology, or for the development of sUAS use protocol. 
Research – General:  A use case that describes a clearance for sUAS usage in general research, 
or is listed simply as “Research.” 
Research – Market: A use case that describes a clearance for sUAS usage involved in Market 
research. 
Research – Operations:  A use case that describes the research of operational applications of a 
drone.  Examples include the study of flight techniques for different applications – such as 
search/rescue, emergency services, agricultural scouting, etc. 
Research – Product Testing:  A use case that describes the testing of sUAS platforms and 
components. 
Research – Transportation:  A use case that includes descriptions of the inspection of traffic 
patterns through the use of sUAS. 
Search/Rescue: Use cases that are either described simply as “Search / Rescue,” or describe a scenario 
where a sUAS platform would be used to aid in various search and rescue operations. 
Surveillance, Monitoring, etc.: Use cases that are either described simply as “Surveillance,” “Monitoring” 
or having a description that can be categorized in a similar fashion.   
Monitoring – Environmental: Use cases that involve wildlife and environmental monitoring over 
different timeframes. 
Monitoring – General:  Use cases that are either simply stated as “Monitoring,” or something 
similar. 
Monitoring – Legal:  Use cases that include applications for legal purposes, including the 
gathering of evidence. 
Monitoring – Safety:  Use cases that include applications for safety purposes. 
Monitoring – Security:  Use cases that include applications for security purposes. 
From the data collected, Aerial Photography/Videography had the most use cases by 333-exemption 
holders, with 13,262 use cases granted between September 2014 and June 29, 2016.  The other most 
common general use cases included Inspection (7596), Aerial Surveying/Mapping (4116), Flight 





















Table B1. Manufacturer metrics.  
List of Manufacturers 
# of Categorized 
Platforms 
Fixed-













3D Robotics Inc. 11 2 0 0 5 0 1 3 0 0 0 
Adaptive Flight, Inc. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Advanced Robotics Corporation 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
AEE Technologies 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aerial MOB Drone Services & 
Aerial Cinematography 7 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Aerial Technology International 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Aerialtronics 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AeriCam 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Aeritech 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aerobo 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Aerologix GIS 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aeromao Inc. 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aeronavics Ltd. 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Aerosky 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
AeroTestra Inc. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AeroVironment 5 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aeryon Labs, Inc. 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AgEagle Aerial Systems Inc. 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agribotix LLC 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aibotix 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Airborne Mechatronics OÜ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
AirCover Integrated Solutions 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Airphrame Inc. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
AirRobot GmBH & Co. KG 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
AirStar International 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALIGN Corp Ltd. 4 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Alpha Drone SIA 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Altavain, Inc. 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Altus UAS Ltd. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Alware 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 




Table B1 continued. 
List of Manufacturers 
# of Categorized 
Platforms 
Fixed-













Applied Aeronautics 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arch Aerial 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Aries 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ascending Technologies GmBH 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Ascent AeroSystems 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Auburn University 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Aurora Flight Sciences 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Autocopter Corp. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avigators 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avyon 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bergen  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
BirdsEyeView Aerobotics 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Bormatec 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bruce Tharpe Engineering 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CarbonCore Ltd. 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
C-Astral d.o.o. 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Century Helicopter Products 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Cheerson  2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cloud 9 Drones 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CropCopter 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CyberQuad 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyphy Works Inc. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DJI 23 0 0 0 15 0 4 4 0 0 0 
DraganFly Innovations Inc. 4 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DreamQii, Inc. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Drone America 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Drone Aviation Corp. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Drone2GIS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
DroneFleet Aerospace Management 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
DRONESTHATWORK, LLC 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
DroneX BV 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECA Group 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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EHANG 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emmen Aerospace 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EMT Penzburg 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Event 38 Unmanned Systems 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FiNWing Hobby 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Flite Evolution  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FlyAbility 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
flying-cam 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FlyingCinema 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FlyPro 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foxtech 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
FPV Manuals LLC 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freefly 4 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 
GeoBlu Services 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
goFarm 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Grand Wing System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Gryphon Dynamics 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Guangzhou Walkera Technology Co Ltd. 7 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Harris Aerial 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Height Tech GmbH & CO. KH 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
HeliVideo 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hexacrafter Ltd. 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
HiSystems GmBH 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Hobbico 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hobby King 9 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Honeycomb Corp. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Horizon Hobby Inc. 9 1 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hoverfly 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Hubsan 4 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ICR Service Inc. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
ImmersionRC Limited 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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ING Robotic Aviation 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Innovative Machines LLC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Intuitive Aerial, Inc. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Jason A. Gadrim 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Javad 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kespry Inc. 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Krossblade Aerospace Systems LLC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Latitude Engineering 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lehmann Aviation 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Leptron Unmanned Aircraft Systems Inc. 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lily Robotics, Inc. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Littlebirds View  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lockheed Martin Corporation 5 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marcus UAV Corp. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Martin UAV 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MAVinci GmbH 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Microdrones GmbH 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MicroUAV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Minicopter 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Monarch Inc. 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mozi Robotics 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Multirotor GmbH 5 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Multiworks UAV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
MyFlyDream 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio State University 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma State University 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Only Flying Machines 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parrot SA. 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Perspective Robotics AG 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Pictorvision 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Pinnacl X 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PMG Multirotors 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PowerUp Toys 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Precision Drone 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
PrecisionHawk 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Price Aviation Group 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prioria Robotics 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PSI Tactical Robotics 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pulse Aerospace Inc. 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
QuestUAV Ltd. 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RangeVideo 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
RCTimer Power Model Co. Ltd. 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
ReadyMade RC LLC 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
RIEGL Laser Measurement Systems 
Group GmbH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Rocketship Systems Inc. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Salamati Productions Inc. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Seahawk AP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SelectTech GeoSpatial 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SenseFly 6 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sensurion Aerospace 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shenzhen Idea-Fly Technology Co. Ltd. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIG Manufacturing 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sky Flight Robotics 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Skycatch Inc. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sky-Hero 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Skylark 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SkyView Aerial Solutions 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Skyward.io 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Smartplanes 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Steadidrone 5 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 
SwellPro 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Swift Radioplanes LLC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syma Toys Co. Ltd. 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tarot RC 11 0 0 0 2 0 5 3 0 0 1 
Tayzu Robotics 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Topcon 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trigger Composites 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trimble Navigation, Ltd. 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Troy Built Models 5 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TURBO ACE 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
UAS Academy 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
UAS USA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UAV America 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
UAV Factory 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UAV Solutions, Inc. 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
UDI RC 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unmanned Sensing Systems LLC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unmanned Systems, Incorporated 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Viking UAS 8 1 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 1 
Volt Aerial Robotics LLC 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vulcan UAV 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Waterproof Drones 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
X_UAV 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
X12 Production Services 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
XactSense 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Xcam Aerials 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Xcellent Drones 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Xfold 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 
X-UAV 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yamaha 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YiZahan 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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YUNEEC 7 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Zerouav 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Zeta Science Limited 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 























Section 333 Use Case/DAA Data Call 
 
Approximately 4,500 333 exemption-holders were contacted by email with a similar message to that sent 
out in the FEDBIZOPS data call.  The following are re-structured but otherwise unedited responses from 
the exemption holders.  Some of the responses included information in all the categories requested (very 
detailed responses) while others included information but not in all categories requested (less detailed 
responses). 
 
Very Detailed Responses 
 
A & R Video.  POC: Andrew Sommer, asommer@arvideo.com  
- Use Case: “We use sUAV 5-10 lbs for monthly construction photography on primarily linear 
construction projects such as road widening, drainage improvements, water and sewer line 
installations.  All flights are over designated construction zones with appropriate “Maintenance of 
Traffic” 
MOT warnings rather than traditional manned aircraft giving clients 2-4 aerial photos per mile 
taken at 1000 feet AGL, we produce 60-120 photos per mile taken at 100 feet AGL with much 
more detail.  This allows interested parties to review construction progress in great detail down to 
individual culverts and utility installs.  Presently, all missions are flown manually with GPS assist 
with no recorded data or telemetry other than captured imagery which I'm not authorized to 
release.  Future plans call for full automation with telemetry to monitor by Pilot.” 
- Location: Florida 
- Platform: Tarot 650 Quad; Tarot 690 Hexa 
- Takeoff Time: Depends on weather and sun angle; usually mid-late afternoon 
- Flight Duration: Typically 1-6 flights (depends on distance needed) @ 4-12 minutes each. 
Potentially up to 20 minutes. 
- Airspeeds: Range from hover to 30 mph 
- Climb / Descent Rates: Unknown, but mission starts once the desired height is obtained, which is 
typically in under 10 seconds. 
- Flight Pattern: linear out then back 
- Desired Modifications to Existing FAA Limits: “We have tested our system in unimproved open 
areas out to 1 mile+, approximately 5500 feet, and can still maintain Line of Sight.  It is tiny but 
visible unaided LOS.  Industry norms are LOS meaning no further than 1500 linear feet from 
pilot.  This forces us to take off fly back 1500' start run go past pilot another 1500' and return.  
Then move 3000 feet down range and repeat.  We would like to operate out to BLOS using First 
Person View and missions guided by on board GPS/Controller with pilot monitoring via FPV and 
telemetry fully utilizing the range capabilities of the aircraft to go down range out to 1 or more 
miles using a minimum number of flights.  Instead of two flights per mile.  Thus cutting the most 
risky portions, take off and landings, in half maybe more give the three mile round trip range of 
the aircraft.  More efficient overall and given the technology capabilities safer with less takeoffs 
and landings from the public right-of-way. 




1159 N Atlas Road 
Hayden, ID 83835 
sUAS BVLOS Team 
New Mexico State University 
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sUAS BVLOS Team, 
My name is Joseph Swart, and I’m an instructor pilot for Empire Unmanned based in Hayden, ID.  Thanks 
for reaching out to us.  I apologize for the delayed participation since we were involved with other projects 
regarding our business.  As of right now, our flight operations for sUAS are limited to 400 feet AGL outside 
of 5 nautical miles from towered airports.  Moreover, we are limited to fly no closer than 500 feet from any 
nonparticipating persons, structures, and vehicles.  Lastly, our pilots are required to maintain visual line of 
sight of our sUAS and must have a separate visual observer present to keep an eye on the sUAS.  Due to 
our expanding operations and market potential, we feel that current regulations are restrictive to our 
business.  We prefer to have more flexibility.  BVLOS flexibility will greatly enhance our sUAS operations 
and create much needed efficiency.  Currently, we use two types of UA systems to cover our sUAS 
operations.  Below is a list of flight profiles for each application as requested. 
Application: Agriculture 
- Description: We fly the sUAS over farmers’ fields to take pictures.  We combine all the pictures 
for each field in order to provide imagery analysis of those fields for farmers’ consumption.  
Those analytical products can help farmers improve their farming practices. 
- Location: We flew in various locations within Washington state and Idaho over farm fields.  
We’re expanding operations in the western U.S. and, hopefully, nationwide. 
- Type Aircraft: Sensefly eBee Ag 
- Takeoff time: Varies based on client’s needs and schedule.  We usually have multiple flights per 
day, so takeoff times can occur anytime during daylight hours. 
- Flight Duration: 15 to 30 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 200 to 400 ft AGL. Altitudes limited due to various COAs that were approved for 
us. Higher altitudes will offer better flexibility and capability for our operations. 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 48 knots, min cruise 21 knots, approach speed 24 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1575 ft/min, descent 1575 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: elongated “S” pattern, cross pattern (overlapping perpendicular “S” patterns) 
Application: Mining 
- Description: We fly the sUAS over open mine fields to take pictures.  We combine all the 
pictures for each field in order to provide gravel mound volume calculation, terrain mapping, and 
area surveying. 
- Location: We flew in various locations within Washington state and Idaho over open mine fields.  
We’re expanding operations in the western US and, hopefully, nationwide. 
- Type Aircraft: Sensefly eBee Ag 
- Takeoff time: Varies based on client’s needs and schedule.  We usually have multiple flights per 
day, so takeoff times can occur anytime during daylight hours. 
- Flight Duration: 15 to 30 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 200 to 400 ft AGL.  Altitudes limited due to various COAs that were approved for 
us. Higher altitudes will offer better flexibility and capability for our operations. 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 48 knots, min cruise 21 knots, approach speed 24 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1575 ft/min, descent 1575 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: elongated “S” pattern or cross pattern (overlapping perpendicular “S” patterns) 
Application: Aerial Surveying 
- Description: We fly the sUAS over installations of engineering firms.  We provide a 3D 
representation of their installation to give clients a to-scale view of their sites in order to aid in 
construction or site planning. 
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- Location: We flew in various locations within Washington state and Idaho over their installations.  
We’re expanding operations in the western U.S. and, hopefully, nationwide. 
- Type Aircraft: Sensefly eBee Ag 
- Takeoff time: Varies based on client’s needs and schedule.  We usually have multiple flights per 
day, so takeoff times can occur anytime during daylight hours. 
- Flight Duration: 15 to 30 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 200 to 400 ft AGL.  Altitudes limited due to various COAs that were approved for 
us.  Higher altitudes will offer better flexibility and capability for our operations. 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 48 knots, min cruise 21 knots, approach speed 24 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1575 ft/min, descent 1575 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: elongated “S” pattern or cross pattern (overlapping perpendicular “S” patterns) 
Application: Classification and Species Identification 
- Description: We flew for the Kootenai/Shoshone County Water Conservation District to see if the 
spectral filtered imagery from our sUAS would provide information regarding the classification 
of species of plants. 
- Location: Coeur d’Alene River in Idaho 
- Type Aircraft: Sensefly eBee Ag 
- Takeoff time: We had multiple flights that day, so takeoff times occurred between 0900 and 1500 
PST. 
- Flight Duration: 15 to 30 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 400 ft AGL.  Altitudes limited due to various COAs that were approved for us.  
Higher altitudes will offer better flexibility and capability for our operations. 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 48 knots, min cruise 21 knots, approach speed 24 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1575 ft/min, descent 1575 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: elongated “S” pattern 
Application: Sawmill Inventory 
- Description: We flew for a Sawmill to provide volume calculation for their log stockpiles. 
- Location: Northern Idaho 
- Type Aircraft: Sensefly eBee Ag 
- o Takeoff time: We had multiple flights that day, so takeoff times occurred between 0900 and 
1600 PST. 
- Flight Duration: 15 to 30 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 200 ft AGL. 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 48 knots, min cruise 21 knots, approach speed 24 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1575 ft/min, descent 1575 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: cross pattern (overlapping perpendicular “S” patterns) 
Application: Fire Fighting 
- Description: We flew for the Idaho Department of Land to help with post fire damage assessment 
of a forest fire.  We were escorted by a fire fighter and used hand radios to clear for other 
firefighting aircraft.  We recorded full motion video and provided real-time video feed on the 
ground for firefighters to view. 
- Location: Bayview, ID 
- Type Aircraft: DJI Phantom 2 
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- Takeoff time: We had multiple flights that day, so takeoff times occurred between 0900 and 1600 
PST. 
- Flight Duration: 10 to 20 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 0 to 200 ft AGL.  Altitudes limited due to various COAs that were approved for 
us. 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 29 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1181 ft/min, descent 394 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: nothing specific. Pilot defined. 
Application: Real Estate 
- Description: We flew for several ranches and estates with large acres of surrounding land.  Due to 
our COA limiting us to stay beyond 500 ft from nonparticipating persons, buildings, or vehicles, 
we focused on large estates that were secluded.  We flew the sUAS to capture full motion video 
of residential estates to provide aerial view for the purposes of real estate promotion. 
- Location: Various locations in Spokane County, WA and northern Idaho. 
- Type Aircraft: DJI Phantom 2 
- Takeoff time: We had multiple flights for each day, so takeoff times occurred during daylight 
hours. 
- Flight Duration: 10 to 20 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 0 to 200 ft AGL 
- Airspeeds: max cruise 29 knots 
- Climb/Descent Rates: climb 1181 ft/min, descent 394 ft/min 
- Flight Pattern: nothing specific. Pilot defined. 
That covers the bulk of our operations within our company.  However, we are always looking for new 
applications that can be covered by our sUAS capabilities, and we are always looking to expand our 
business regionally as well.  Since we can keep situational awareness on our sUAS using GPS information 
displayed on our mobile devices and using our radio and eyes to clear for manned traffic, we believe that 
having BVLOS flexibility will greatly improve our operations without a sacrifice of safety.  Moreover, 
given the weights and sizes of our sUAS and the parameters of our operations, we believe the risk and 
damage of a sUAS accident to bystanders and structures is extremely low (basically nonexistent).  
Therefore, we believe our FAA-required 500 ft buffer from nonparticipating persons, structures, and 
vehicles is overly cautious and unnecessary, especially considering hobby and recreational users don’t have 
this restriction even when flying the exact same sUAS.  Nevertheless, we still comply with FAA regulations 
despite the restriction and limitation to our operations.  
Thank you for your invitation to include our company to this study, and I hope that our data will provide 
the needed information to help the cause.  I will be your point of contact, so if you have any questions or 
require more information, please don’t hesitate to contact me via email or phone listed on the signature 
block. 
 
Boulder Emergency Services, POC: Steve Lanaghen, stevelanaghen@boulderrescue.org  
 
“Per your request for flight information in furtherance of building a case for BVLOS flight authorization 
with the FAA, below is the information for the Boulder Emergency Squad (BES), a search and rescue 
organization operating in Boulder, Colorado.   
 
192 
BES strongly supports your efforts.  In actual search and rescue missions over wilderness terrain, we have 
found that it our capabilities are most valuable in searching areas which are remote or difficult to access on 
foot.  Operating within VLOS conditions, our range is not significantly longer than what can be done with 
a ground search team, although it can be done faster and safer.  However, if we were allowed to operate in 
XVLOS or BVLOS conditions, our search capabilities would be far more effective in searching areas which 
are far more difficult and time consuming for ground crews to reach.  We are interested in obtaining a 
waiver from Part 107 and/or our Section 333 exemption for XVLOS or BVLOS operations and would 
appreciate any precedent or supporting data you might be able to share.” 
- Use Case: “The Boulder Emergency Squad has begun using UAS for search and rescue 
operations, and intends to begin using them for fire and law support functions as well.  Most of 
the flights in the attached data set are training flights.   
Attached is a spreadsheet containing flight information for the flights we have made over the past 
year or so.  Mission Notes, Pilot, Payload Operator and Visual Observer fields have been redacted 
for privacy reasons and other fields not pertinent to your research (i.e., battery ID, UAS ID, etc.) 
have also been removed.  Weather conditions have been included in many cases and any damage 
or malfunctions encountered during the flight have been included as they seem very pertinent to 
your research even though there were not requested.” 
- Location: All operations have been conducted in Boulder County, Colorado. 
- Platform: DJI Phantom 2, DJI Phantom 3, DJI Inspire and DJI S1000 
- Takeoff Time: Takeoff time and landing time are all included in the attached flight data. 
- Flight Duration: Flight durations are typically in the 10-16 minute range.  Flight duration is 
included in the attached flight data. 
- Key Altitudes: Both maximum AGL altitude and MSL altitude of the home point are included in 
the attached flight data. 
- Airspeeds: We do not track airspeed, but speeds vary from 0-15 knots.  Higher airspeeds are 
typical of transit between target locations or autonomous flight patterns at higher altitudes with 
clear skies, with lower airspeeds at lower altitudes, over rough terrain and near obstacles. 
- Climb / Descent Rates: We do not track ascent and descent rates, but I would estimate rates to be 
typically 1-5 fps on descent and 1-10 fps on ascent.   
- Flight Patterns: We do not track flight patterns, but we typically operate in one of three modes:  
o a box grid pattern in which we take overlapping orthographic photos for subsequent analysis 
for a search operation. 
o a point of interest loiter in which we would circle or hover in a specific location to gain 
situational awareness using a live feed, or to document a scene for documentation purposes 
o free flight for training and evaluation of pilots and/or hardware/software. 
Kansas State University.  POC: Travis Balthazor, travisb@ksu.edu  
Mr. Hottman, 
Please find the attached document containing the KSU UAS you requested.  Should you have any 
questions regarding the data please let me know.  Thanks! 
Travis Balthazor 
UAS Chief Pilot 
Kansas State University-Polytechnic Campus 




Less Detailed Reponses 
Delta Southern UAS.  POC: Preston White, preston@deltasouthernuas.com  
-Use Case: “We currently use our UAS in agriculture to determine plant health, in law enforcement to get 
a usable image for planning purposes, for disaster relief and search and rescue by providing EMS with an 
up to date image of the affected area” 
- Location: The Mississippi Delta 
- Platform: Sensefly eBee and DJI S900 
- Flight Duration: Usually roughly 10 minutes, but flight duration can last up to 40 minutes 
depending on wind 
- Airspeeds: 20-40 kts. 
- Climb / Descent Rates: Relatively fast for the DJI S900 and the eBee can clear 200 ft of altitude 
in about the same distance across the ground 
- Flight Patterns: Typically a grid 
Mike Knudsen Photography.  POC: Mike Knudsen, mike@mikeknudsenphotography.com  
- Use Case: “Primarily for real estate work.  An important element of this use case is it is always low 
altitude, line of sight, daylight hour flying, typically not near crowds or restricted airspace, and well 
within the limits imposed by even the strictest interpretation of the proposed guidelines.  Some of 
the test questions I’ve seen for the part 104 certification are manned aircraft pilot level in nature, 
and, in my opinion, inappropriate for this use case.” 
- Location: Residential and commercial neighborhoods, business complexes, etc. 
- Platform: DJI Phantom 2+ V3 
- Takeoff time: Daylight hours, typically between 9am and 7pm 
- Flight Duration: Less than 20 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: Generally less than 200 feet 
- Airspeeds: Hover 
- Climb / Descent Rates: Moderate – typically well below the aircraft capability 
- Flight Patterns: mostly vertical ascent to appropriate photo height, with some circling to get varied 
vantage points 
SurvTech Solutions.  POC: Jordan Kowenski, jkowenski@survtechsolutions.com  
- Use Case: Surveying, Photogrammetry, Mapping 
- Location: Southeast US 
- Platform: Quad-copter and fixed wing 
- Flight Duration: 15 – 100 minutes 
- Airspeeds: 5 – 20 mph 
- Key Altitudes: Shallow, 100 – 400 ft. AGL 
- Climb / Descent Rates: Shallow, 200 – 300 FPM 
- Flight Patterns: Linear 
Rapid Aerial LLC.  POC: Matt Roderick, matt@rapid-aerial.com  
“I own and operate a general UAV service business, for many of my operations I’m not interested in adding 
BVLOS capability but for those operations where it could be useful, I’ve included the requested 
information.” 
Use Application Rural utility line and substation inspections  
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- Location: Southwest Idaho    
- Platform: DJI Phantom 3 Pro and DJI Inspire 1 Pro    
- Takeoff Time: typically around 10AM local 
- Flight Duration: 10-20 minutes    
- Key Altitudes: 40-200' AGL 
- Airspeeds: less than 20MPH 
- Climb/Descent Rates: 900FPM climb, 600'FPM descent 
- Flight Patterns: A long circuit, “down and back” of several consecutive utility structures.  BVLOS 
would allow me to cover more structures at a time, increasing my efficiency 
Use Application Photogrammetric Surveys  
- Location: Southwest Idaho 
- Type of Aircraft: DJI Phantom 3 Pro and DJI Inspire 1 Pro 
- Takeoff Time: typically around 11AM-noon local 
- Flight Duration: 10-20 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 150-400' AGL 
- Airspeeds: less than 30 MPH 
- Climb/Descent Rates: 900 FPM climb, 600 FPM descent 
- Flight Patterns:  Serpentine or grid pattern of flight lines over an area of interest.  BVLOS 
capabilities would allow me to cover larger areas in single "set ups" saving time and money. 
DuPage County, Illinois.  POC: Lucy Chang, lucy.chang@dupageco.org  
“I am responding to your request for information, which was originally sent to my colleague John 
Blickem.  I am a water resources engineer for DuPage County, Illinois.  There are three of us on staff here 
who have passed the private pilot license exam and are authorized to fly the County’s drone.  We are 
looking to expand the use of our drone and possibly upgrade to a more sophisticated UAS. 
I would like to participate in your study, and I would also appreciate any information or research results 
you can share.  Here us our information: 
- Name of Organization: DuPage County Stormwater Management 
- Use Case: Currently, the UAS is primarily used to inspect County flood control facilities and 
capture photographs and video footage from high elevations for use in County publications, 
presentations, and technical reports.  We will soon expand the use of the UAS to include the 
monitoring of wetlands in locations that are difficult to access on foot, and monitor water quality 
at storm sewer outfalls. 
- Location: DuPage County, Illinois (approximately 30 miles west of Chicago) 
- Type of Aircraft: DJI Phantom 3 
- Takeoff Time: Varies 
- Flight Duration: 4 x 15 minutes (battery life is approximately 15 minutes, and we have four 
batteries) 
- Key Altitudes: 100-200 feet 
- Flight Patterns: No established flight pattern.  We often follow the flow path of waterways 
SelectTech GeoSpatial.  POC: Frank J. Beafore, fbeafore@sgamf.com  
Sirs, 
We do have active 333’s and COA’s. 
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What you want will require some work on our part.  Currently, I do not have anyone I can afford to assign 
this to.  However, you can visit our web site http://www.sgamf.com/suas/ and get most of the answers you 
need from reading the material and attachments.  If you need further information, e-mail me. 
Frank B.” 
Forza RPV.  POC: Gil, gil@forzarpv.com  
Dr. Hottman, 
I was contacted through my gmail account for possible participation in your study.  I may be interested 
but have a few questions. 
My background is nearly a dozen years in the electric utility industry conducting helicopter flights 
operations where a primary activity was powerline inspection.  I was responsible for flight operations and 
developed the company's HD/IR gyro-stabilized camera program. 
While I no longer work for that company (I now live in Silicon Valley), I am actively involved in 
commercial drone flight operations on a daily basis.  An area of interest and current discussion is 
developing an sUAS powerline inspection program based on my previous experience in the utility trade - 
my assessment is that such a program is complex to implement because of the required flight profiles and 
the structure geometries. 
Would you be interested in scheduling a telephone conversation to discuss some concepts?  
Sincerely, 
Gil 
Atlanta Drone Operations.  POC: Pete Wambolt, pete@atldrone.com  
- Use Application: A Variety of different operations are conducted here at Atlanta Drone 
Consultants.  Most of our uses are for aerial photography/ videography.  We also have done work 
with 3D mapping and have worked on a few shoots for up and coming TV shows. 
- Location: The majority of our flights happen in and around Atlanta, GA 
- Platform: We mainly operate DJI Inspire 1 but also operate the Phantom 3 professional 
- Takeoff Time: Most of our flight will happen between 10 am and 4 pm although sometimes we 
run later to get a more artistic view 
- Flight Duration: Our flights will normally be around 15 min each with 5-10 flights in total 
- Key Altitudes: Our type of work demands that we fly at different altitudes everyday remaining 
between 50-400 ft AGL 
- Airspeeds: Our airspeed never exceeded 35 mph 
- Climb / Descent Rates: Climb and descent rates do not exceed 9 mph 
- Flight Patterns: Flight patterns change on a daily basis depending on what the job details.  More 
often than not we have a few basic patterns.  Including point of interest (where we do a circle 
around something with the camera pointed at it the entire time), also we do a lot of reveal shots 
where we start very low and close and fade out to high and far.  Most of the time we have two 
operators so that one is controlling the camera while the other is flying the UA. 
JimmyC LTD.  POC: Jimmy Clark, jimmyclark@usa.com  
- Use Case: Our application/use of the UAV is for insurance building damage assessment post 
catastrophic event such as earthquake, hurricane, tornado, explosion and flood. 
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- Location: We can deploy anywhere in the US and typically fly within 80’ of building and other 
structures.  With some flights at altitude of 100’ for overall photo of structure. 
- Platform: Primary UAV are the quadcopter, i.e. DJI Phantom 2, DJI Phantom 3 
- Takeoff Time: Daytime business hours 
- Flight Duration: 15 – 60 minutes 
- Key Altitudes: 20 to 200 ft AGL, but typical 60 ft AGL 
- Airspeeds: 1-3 mph 
- Flight Patterns: Circular over damaged structures 
Trans-Global Production.  POC: Bob Bailey, bbailey@cableone.net  
- Use Case: Video of an auto dealership showing aerial view of dealership buildings and inventory.  
An occasional shot went almost beyond line of sight but was still able to be monitored with the 
iPad. 
- Use Case: Video of golf course property showing buildings, water hazards and fairways along with 
greens.  Occasionally, a shot was just beyond Line of sight. But the shot could still be monitored 
on the iPad. 
- Use Case: Video of a tennis tournament in progress.  Shots were from outside the perimeters of the 
fans in the stands and the court itself.  No flights were made over the top of the stands or over the 
court.  A maximum height above ground was around 60 feet at an angle of approximately 45 
degrees.  Line of sight was always maintained. 
- Use Case: Most important was the job we did not take, which was ordered by the City of Odessa 
to shoot aerials of the Christmas parade.  Because the shoot time was after dark and because the 
close vicinity of the onlookers may have been too dangerous, we did not take the job.  The use of 
the Phantom 3 for these aerials would have provided for some very nice video.  I feel that with 
extra care, keeping the Phantom away from the crowds of onlookers would have been possible, 
perhaps with a second observer, but the real problem was and still is the fact that the drones are not 
to be flown after sunset.  In this case, the streets were well lit and line of sight would not have been 
a problem. 
- Use Case: We produce a video each year at our local football stadium, of the high school 
graduations.  But, again, in order to use the drone we would have to be able to fly after sunset.  It 
would be easy to fly at the stadium and still keep the drone away from the audience in the stands 
as well as the students who are graduating.  Line of sight should be no problem.  I personally feel 
that the ability to shoot in well-lit areas after dark should be allowed. 
- Location: In the Midland and Odessa, TX area with possible travel out of market 
- Platform: DJI Phantom 3 Professional 
- Takeoff Time: NA 
- Flight Duration: Up to 20 min 
- Key Altitudes: 35 to 50 feet AGL 
- Airspeeds: 5 – 25 mph 
- Climb / Descent Rates: Ease in and out 





















The following provide justifications for metric values and corresponding scores that are used to evaluate off board DAA approaches.  It is noted that 
explanations are not provided for all metric values as justifications for some are readily apparent. 
 




Table D1. Explanation of off board horizontal range metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 




presented at TAAC 
2016, VLOS is ~1 
mile and EVLOS is 
~ 2 miles.  Here, 
BVLOS is expected 
to, at the minimum, 
extend the VLOS 
distance by 1 mile. 
 
Also, from the 
ABSAA metrics, 
one needs to see 
0.66 nmi (0.76 mi) 
out to avoid an 
NMAC.  Thus, if 
one is flying at the 
edge of VLOS and 
out to 1.25 miles 
(0.25 miles beyond 
VLOS), then a 
system that can scan 
out to 2 mi would 
enable avoidance of 
an NMAC, but 
would not enable 




between 1 and 5. 
Linearly distributed 
between 1 and 5. 
Linearly distributed 
between 1 and 5. 
Because radar is a leading technology in this 
area, its performance is used to establish an upper 
bound for what might be possible.  The limiting 
factor is EM propagation, which is assumed here 
to occur under standard propagational conditions, 
which result in the radar beam rising relative to 
the Earth with increasing range from a radar.  A 
maximum UAS altitude of 450 ft is assumed 
given that a 50 ft buffer is used to separate from 
traffic flying at 500 ft and above.  Given this and 
the 335 ft buffer required to avoid an NMAC 
(from the ABSAA metrics), the radar would have 
to see down to 115 ft off the ground to avoid an 
NMAC with a pop-up.  Now, in reality this is an 
exaggeration, as the 335 ft value assumes the 
worst case (one descending and the other 
climbing at the maxium rate).  Regardless, this 
works as it is larger than the 250 ft well-clear 
distance and provides an 85 ft buffer (~5 s buffer 
to the well clear boundary if the intruder is 
climing at 1000 ft/min) beyond well clear that 
may enable maintenance of well clear if one can 
see 335 ft below the UA.  It is noted that 
verification of maintenance of well clear using 
these numbers and for this scenario would have 
to be verified through simulation. 
 
Given this, a 0.0° elevation radar beam from a 
radar at a height of 3 m off the ground at MSL 
reaches the above-radar-ground-level height of 
115 ft at a range of ~23 km (23.325 km).  These 
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Finally, a scan range 
of 2 miles would 
enable one to scan a 
section, which is 1 
mi by 1 mi, and 
avoid an NMAC 
owing to pop-ins 
from the lateral 
boundary. 
settings are fairly representative, as if one put the 
radar on the top of Mt. Everest with the other 
settings the same the range is 23.35 km.  Also, if 
the radar were 10 m (0.0 m) off the ground with 
all of the other settings the same the range is 
20.625 km (24.4 km).  It is noted that 0.0° is 
commonly the lowest elevation angle that is used 
owing to ground clutter impacts, although 
systems with excellent ground clutter suppression 
could utilize negative elevation angles. 
 
To enable flights out to this distance the radar 
would have to be able to scan a little beyond 23 




The same numbers that are used for ABDAA are used here.  In applying these to GBDAA systems, the idea is that the ground based system would 





Table D2. Explanation of off board vertical range metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft/km/nmi): 235/0.072/0.039 285/0.087/0.047 335/0.1/0.055 850/0.26/0.14 1450/0.44/0.24 
Explanation: 
Based on the 
expectation that it 
would take 3 
seconds to 
determine what to 
do (3 detections at 
an update rate of 1 
Hz), 1 second to 
enact, and 3 seconds 




rates of 1000 ft/min 
for the MA and UA 





A vertical avoidance 
maneuver is 
assumed here. 
1/2 the distance from 
category 1 to 3. 
Distance to avoid an 
NMAC (100 ft 
vertically) uses logic 
similar to category 1: 
3 seconds to 
determine what to do, 
1 second to enact, and 
3 seconds to achieve 
required 
climb/descent rate or 
horizontal maneuver. 
 
A vertical avoidance 
maneuver is assumed. 
Estimated vertical distance to maintain 
well clear. 
 
This follows logic similar to that used 
in categories 1 and 3.  However, it is 
assumed that the update rate is worst 
case (5 s) and that it takes 3 detections 
to determine what to do.  With this, the 
expectation that it takes 3 seconds to 
decide on and enact a maneuver, one 
has 18 seconds of possible closure until 
the maneuver is enacted.  With 
maximum ascent/descent rates of 1000 
ft/min for both the MA and UA, this 
corresponds to 600 ft, which must be 
added to the 250 ft for well clear. 
 
It is not known, however, if this ~26 
second tau (18 + 7.5) truly provides 
enough time to maintain well clear as 
the simulations were not as conclusive 
here. 
 
Applies the same logic as in 
category 4, but is the distance 
needed to enact a maneuver 
by the time one reaches the 
distance in category 4.  Thus, 
this is the equivalent to the 
horizontal case wherein the 






Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D3. Explanation of off board horizontal resolution/accuracy metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft): ≥ 1000 500 < hr < 1000 250 < hr ≤ 500 100 < hr ≤ 250 ≤ 100 




Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D4. Explanation of off board vertical resolution/accuracy metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft): ≥ 200 100 < vr < 200 50 < vr ≤ 100 20 < vr ≤ 50 ≤ 20 




Scan Time/Update Rate 
Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D5. Explanation of off board scan time/update rate metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (s): ≥ 8 2 ≤ st < 8 1.5 < st ≤ 2 1 < st ≤ 1.5 ≤ 1 
Explanation: 
At an 8 second update 
rate, if one detected an 
aircraft 55 seconds from 
the tau-based well clear 
boundary and needed 7 
points to establish a 
track, one would do so 
at about the time the 
well-clear boundary 
would be violated. 




Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D6. Explanation of off board sensor latency metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (s): ≥ 5 2.0 < sl < 5.0 1.0 < sl ≤ 2.0 0.1 < sl ≤ 1.0 ≤ 0.1 
Explanation: 
This would 
correspond to the 
common scan rate of 
radars and could 
occur if the data are 
provided only after a 
scan is completed. 
 












Table D7. Explanation of off board sensitivity metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value in terms of 
RCS (m2): 
≥ 20 (CRJ) 
5 < sens < 20 (King 
Air) 
1 < sens ≤ 5 
(Cessna 172) 
0.05 < sens ≤ 1 
(human) 
≤ 0.05 (small UAS/birds) 
Explanation: 




%201.pdf.  They list the RCS for a 
medium jet airliner to be 40 m2. 
 





Source is ARL 
document (Computer 
Models of the Human 
Body Signature for 







Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D8. Explanation of off board aircraft classification/type metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: None Big v small 
Big v small and fixed 
v rotary wing 
MA intruder aircraft 
type 
All intruder (MA, UA, and 
bird) intruder type 
Explanation:    
ADS-B is the example 
here…one could figure 
out what kind of 
aircraft it is from its 
identifier. 
If it can indicate MA intruder 
type but cannot distinguish 
between birds and small UA, it 
may still be scored as a 5. 
 
 
Probability of Detection 
Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D9. Explanation of off board probability of detection metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: < 70% 70-85% 85-95% 95-99% > 99% 
Explanation: 
The round reliability for 
FAA radars is ~75%. 





False Alarm Rate 
Same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D10. Explanation of off board false alarm rate metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: > 10% 5-10% 2.5-5% 1-2.5% < 1% 




These values were developed by considering existing standards, including DO-160B (RTCA 1984) and MIL-STD-1472F (DoD 1999), and 
conditions sUAS are expected to experience given climatological information.  These are the same as the Operational Environment Based on Ranges 
values for ABSAA systems, with the addition of the wind loading category. 
 
Range of Winds 
 
 
Table D11. Explanation of off board range of winds metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (mph): < 70 70-93.3 93.3-116.6 116.6-140 > 140 
Explanation: 
The definitive standard for wind loading for towers appears to be spelt out in 
TIA-222-G.  Information regarding the wind load ranges indicate that the 
winds are distributed from 70-140 mph (e.g., 
http://www.eham.net/ehamforum/smf/index.php?topic=61530.0;wap2).  Thus, 
these extremes are used, with an even distribution between the end points. 










Table D12. Explanation of off board acquisition cost metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: > $500,000 $100,000-$500,000 $10,000-$100,000 $1000-$10,000 < $1000 
Explanation:      
 
 
Resources Needed for Installation 
 
 
Table D13. Explanation of off board resources needed for installation metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: 
> 24 hours or 
establishment of new 
permanent infrastructure 




8-16 hours 1-8 hours < 1 hour (plug and play) 
Explanation: 
More than 3 days or 
requires establishment 
of new, permanent 
infrastructure. 
2-3 days to set up or 
requiring infrastructure 
that is relocatable but 
not portable.  An 
example is a 
relocatable radar 
installation that can be 
moved, but doing so 
requires significant 
effort (beyond simply 
hooking onto a truck 
and pulling it). 
1-2 days to add the 
DAA system.  This 
may include portable 
infrastructure (e.g., a 
trailer). 
Less than a day to add 
the DAA system.  This 
may include portable 
infrastructure (e.g., a 
trailer). 
Plug and play.  This may 
include portable infrastructure 
(e.g., a trailer). 
 
 
Reliability/Mean Time to Failure 
The following was used as a reference: https://src.alionscience.com/pdf/TypicalEquipmentMTBFValues.pdf.  These are the same as with ABDAA. 
 
 
Table D14. Explanation of off board reliability/mean time to failure metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (hrs): < 10 10-100 100-1000 1000-5000 > 5000 
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The following provide justifications for metric values and corresponding scores that are used to evaluate on board DAA approaches.  It is noted that 
explanations are not provided for all metric values as justifications for some are readily apparent. 
 




Table E1. Explanation of on board horizontal range metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft/km/nmi): 1850/0.56/0.3 3000/0.9/0.5 4000/1.22/0.66 10650/3.25/1.75 14600/4.45/2.4 
Explanation: 
Based on the 
expectation that it 
would take 3 seconds 
to determine what to 
do, 1 second to enact 
maneuver, and 3 
seconds to maneuver 
away from a collision.  
Uses UAS speeds of 50 
m/s (MA) and 30 m/s 
(UA). 
 
At a minimal 300 
ft/min ascent or 
descent rate, 3 seconds 
would enable one to 
move 15 ft vertically, 
which would avoid the 
collision (barely). 
~1/2 the distance 
from category 1 to 
category 3. 
Simulations indicate 
that avoiding an 
NMAC (500 ft 
horizontally) requires 
detection at ~4000 ft. 
Distance that simulations indicate is 
needed to maintain well clear with a 
horizontal well clear boundary of 2000 
ft. 
 
In terms of tau and an intruder speed of 
100 kts (50 m/s) and UA speed of 20 kts 
(10 m/s) (values used by SARP), this 
corresponds to a beyond-the-well-clear-
boundary tau of 43 s.  This tau is on the 
order of 33 s when one assumes that the 
UA speed can be up to 60 kts, which is 
the value used in the simulations for the 
fixed wing (30 kts was used for the 
rotary wing).  This does not perfectly 
align with SC-228 in that in SC-228 one 
has knowledge of intruder track by 33 s.  
Here, the first detection of the intruder is 
~33 s out.  With a 1 Hz sampling rate, 
this means that the track is established 
after 3 seconds and with recognition 
occurring a couple of seconds after that, 
one obtains a warning tau in this case of 
~28 s. 
Assuming a head on 
approach with a closing 
speed of 80 m/s (50 m/s for 
MA and 30 m/s for UA), one 
needs ~4000 feet to establish 
a track over 3 detections that 
are separated 5 s apart 
(worst case scenario). 
 
This is 4000 ft beyond the 
"warning" boundary 
associated with category 4.  
Thus, this enables action by 
the time one reaches the 
warning boundary. 
 
This corresponds to a 
beyond the well clear 




This is only relevant for certain types of instruments.  For instance, this is not relevant for a radar, as the ability to detect an intruder vertically is 
driven by range and field of view.  For a radar, then, one would not score this category.  This category is being retained, however, because conceivably 
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Table E2. Explanation of on board vertical range metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft/km/nmi): 235/0.072/0.039 285/0.087/0.047 335/0.1/0.055 850/0.26/0.14 1450/0.44/0.24 
Explanation: 
Based on the 
expectation that it 
would take 3 
seconds to 
determine what to 
do (3 detections at 
an update rate of 1 
Hz), 1 second to 
enact, and 3 seconds 




rates of 1000 ft/min 
for the MA and UA 





A vertical avoidance 
maneuver is 
assumed here. 
1/2 the distance from 
category 1 to 3. 
Distance to avoid an 
NMAC (100 ft 
vertically) uses logic 
similar to category 1: 
3 seconds to 
determine what to do, 
1 second to enact, and 
3 seconds to achieve 
required 
climb/descent rate or 
horizontal maneuver. 
 
A vertical avoidance 
maneuver is assumed. 
Estimated vertical distance to maintain 
well clear. 
 
This follows logic similar to that used 
in categories 1 and 3.  However, it is 
assumed that the update rate is worst 
case (5 s) and that it takes 3 detections 
to determine what to do.  With this, the 
expectation that it takes 3 seconds to 
decide on and enact a maneuver, one 
has 18 seconds of possible closure until 
the maneuver is enacted.  With 
maximum ascent/descent rates of 1000 
ft/min for both the MA and UA, this 
corresponds to 600 ft, which must be 
added to the 250 ft for well clear. 
 
It is not known, however, if this ~26 
second tau (18 + 7.5) truly provides 
enough time to maintain well clear as 
the simulations were not as conclusive 
here. 
 
Applies the same logic as in 
category 4, but is the distance 
needed to enact a maneuver 
by the time one reaches the 
distance in category 4.  Thus, 
this is the equivalent to the 
horizontal case wherein the 





At this time, horizontal and vertical resolutions are not tied to range capabilities from a scoring standpoint.  Thus, the uncertainty in the sensor is not 
considered in the distances used in the range capability sections.  Presumably, in operations, one would have to extend the detection ranges by the 





Table E3. Explanation of on board horizontal resolution/accuracy metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft): ≥ 1000 500 < hr < 1000 250 < hr ≤ 500 100 < hr ≤ 250 ≤ 100 




At this time, horizontal and vertical resolutions are not tied to range capabilities from a scoring standpoint.  Thus, the uncertainty in the sensor is not 
considered in the distances used in the range capability sections.  Presumably, in operations, one would have to extend the detection ranges by the 
uncertainties in order to ensure that, for instance, the well clear or NMAC boundaries are not violated. 
 
 
Table E4. Explanation of on board vertical resolution/accuracy metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (ft): ≥ 200 100 < vr < 200 50 < vr ≤ 100 20 < vr ≤ 50 ≤ 20 
Explanation: 200 ft is NMAC v x 2 200 ft is NMAC v x 2 100 ft is NMAC v 50 ft is (NMAC v)/2 20 ft is (NMAC v)/5 
 
 
Scan Time/Update Rate 
 
 
Table E5. Explanation of on board scan time/update rate metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (s): ≥ 8 2 ≤ st < 8 1.5 < st ≤ 2 1 < st ≤ 1.5 ≤ 1 
Explanation: 
At an 8 second update 
rate, if one detected an 
aircraft 55 seconds from 
the tau-based well clear 
boundary and needed 7 
points to establish a 
track, one would do so 
at about the time the 
well-clear boundary 
would be violated. 





Field of View 
The nomenclature is horizontal x vertical. 
 
 
Table E6. Explanation of on board field of view metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 





360° x 180° 
Explanation:   
Roughly the field of 
view out of a GA 
cockpit is (100-
130)x(65-85). 
Human eye range is 
roughly 200x135. 






Table E7. Explanation of on board sensor latency metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (s): ≥ 5 2.0 < sl < 5.0 1.0 < sl ≤ 2.0 0.1 < sl ≤ 1.0 ≤ 0.1 
Explanation: 
This would 
correspond to the 
common scan rate of 
radars and could 
occur if the data are 
provided only after a 
scan is completed. 
 









Table E8. Explanation of on board sensitivity metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value in terms of 
RCS (m2): 
≥ 20 (CRJ) 
5 < sens < 20 (King 
Air) 
1 < sens ≤ 5 
(Cessna 172) 
0.05 < sens ≤ 1 
(human) 
≤ 0.05 (small UAS/birds) 
Explanation: 
Source is slide 10 of http://ece.wpi.edu/ 
radarcourse/Radar%202010%20PDFs/ 
 
Source is p. 31 of 
Radar 







%201.pdf.  They list the RCS for a 




Models of the Human 
Body Signature for 








Table E9. Explanation of on board aircraft classification/type metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: None Big v small 
Big v small and fixed 
v rotary wing 
MA intruder aircraft 
type 
All intruder (MA, UA, and 
bird) intruder type 
Explanation:    
ADS-B is the example 
here…one could figure 
out what kind of 
aircraft it is from its 
identifier. 
If it can indicate MA intruder 
type but cannot distinguish 
between birds and small UA, it 
may still be scored as a 5. 
 
 
Probability of Detection 
 
 
Table E10. Explanation of on board probability of detection metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: < 70% 70-85% 85-95% 95-99% > 99% 
Explanation: 
The round reliability for 
FAA radars is ~75%. 
    
 
 





Table E11. Explanation of on board false alarm rate metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: > 10% 5-10% 2.5-5% 1-2.5% < 1% 
Explanation:      
 
 
SWaP (Size, Weight, and Power) 
Size 
The sizes were based upon currently-used sUAS as described below.  The overall dimensions were collapsed into volumes, however, because of the 
unknowns regarding form factor and mounting options.  For instance, one could mount a system on a wing or even on top of a rotor-based system.  
While these are non-traditional mounting locations, they are possible.  Because of these unknowns, a simpler volumetric metric is utilized. 
 
 
Table E12. Explanation of on board size metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (cm3): > 101,614 4500-101,614 2700-4500 168.75-2700.00 < 168.75 
Explanation:  
A DJI S1000 "like" 
was chosen as this UA 




Size calculated was 
based on the size of a 
payload not 
overlapping or 
interfering into the 
propeller downwash 
such that lift would be 
affected.  Measured as 
the rotor arms extent 
minus propeller radius.  
Since most copters do 
not have "payload 
bays" no dimensions 
are given for depth and 
a volumetric value is 
used. 
A Senior Telemaster 
Plus "like" was 
chosen as this fixed 
wing aircraft's 
payload was between 
the S1000 and the 
Phantom. 
 
Size of payload 
calculated is 
representative of this 
type of platform with 
no modifications to 
the aircraft. 
A DJI Phantom "like" 
was chosen as this 
represents a common 
quad copter that has 
been popular with the 
hobbyist. 
 
Size calculated was 
based on the size of a 
payload not 
overlapping or 
interfering into the 
propeller downwash 
such that lift would be 
affected.  Measured as 
the rotor arms extent 
minus propeller radius.  
Since most copters do 
not have "payload 
bays" no dimensions 
are given for depth and 
a volumetric value is 
used. 
These numbers are a scaled 
down from 4. 
 
It is assumed that UA this 
small are not designed to carry 
payloads but rather have 








Table E13. Explanation of on board weight metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (kg): > 3.3 (7.25 lbs) > 1.13 to ≤ 3.3 (7.25 lbs) > 0.15 to ≤ 1.13 (2.5 lbs) > 0.050 to ≤ 0.15 (0.33 lbs) ≤ 0.050 (0.11 lbs) 
Explanation: 
If DAA payload is 
greater than 3.3 kg 
(7.25 lbs.) a score 
of one will be 
assessed. 
A DJI S1000 "like" was 
chosen as this UA had the 
greatest lift specifications 
within this group. 
 
Payload weight selected is 
one half the maximum 
payload weight calculated 
by manufactures 
specifications.  This 
allows for carrying of 
sensors. 
A Senior Telemaster Plus 
"like" was chosen as this 
fixed wing aircraft's 
payload was between the 
S1000 and the Phantom. 
 
Payload weight selected 
is one half the maximum 
payload specified by the 
manufacturer. 
A DJI Phantom "like" was 
chosen as this represents a 
common quad copter that 
has been popular with the 
hobbyist. 
 
Payload weight selected is 
one half the camera weight 
similar to what is flown on 
this system.  No payload 
weight is given by the 
manufacturer. 
These numbers are a 
scaled down from 4. 
 
It is assumed that 
UA this small are 
not designed to carry 
payloads but rather 







Table E14. Explanation of on board power metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (W): 
> 12 - 28 V @ 25 W or 
requires auxiliary or self-
contained power supply. 
12 - 28 V @ 8 - 25 W 5 to 12 V @ 1 -  8 W 0.5 - 5 v @  0.5 - 1 W 0 - 0.5 V @ < 0.5 W 
Explanation:  
A DJI S1000 "like" 
was chosen as this UA 




Power listed equates to 
a typical small 
synthetic aperture 
radar. 
A Senior Telemaster 
Plus "like" was 
chosen as this fixed 
wing aircraft's 
payload was between 
the S1000 and the 
Phantom. 
 
Power listed equates 
to the requirement of 
A DJI Phantom "like" 
was chosen as this 
represents a common 
quad copter that has 
been popular with the 
hobbyist. 
 
Power requirement of 5 
V @ ≤ 500 mW 
These numbers are a 
scaled down from 4. 
 
It is assumed that UA 
this small are not 
designed to carry 
payloads but rather 




a small LIDAR 
system. 




Operational Standards Based on Established Standards 
These are generally based on tests in DO-160 B (RTCA 1984).  For temperature tests, aircraft category B2—equipment installed within 
nonpressurized and noncontrolled temperature locations on an aircraft that is operated at altitudes up to 25,000 ft—seems to provide the best general 
fit.  However, since the high temperatures for this category seem to be excessive, it is not used for all metrics for all operational environments based 
on existing standards. 
 
Low Operating Temperature 
Classifiers in parentheses (e.g., B1) indicate category as specified in RTCA (1984). 
 
 
Table E15. Explanation of on board low operating temperature metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (°C): 0 -5 -15 (A1-A3) -20 (B1) -45 (B2) 




These are generally based on tests in DO-160B (RTCA 1984).  For temperature variation, category A—equipment external to the aircraft—seems 
to be the most appropriate category.  Classifiers in parentheses (e.g., B1) indicate category as specified in RTCA (1984). 
 
 
Table E16. Explanation of on board temperature variation metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (°C): 0 -5 -15 (A1-A3) -20 (B1) -45 (B2) 




These values were developed by considering existing standards, including DO-160B (RTCA 1984) and MIL-STD-1472F (DoD 1999), and 





Resources Needed for Installation 
 
 
Table E17. Explanation of on board resources needed for installation metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value: 
OEM factory installed 
only 
8-16 hours, OEM site 
1-8 hours OEM, user 
site 
1-8 hours user, some 
customization 
< 1 hour user (plug and play) 
Explanation: 
Cannot add in the DAA 
system after the fact.  
The aircraft OEM must 
build it in during 
original assembly. 
You can add in a DAA 
system after the fact, 
but must take your 
aircraft to the aircraft 
(or the DAA vendor’s) 
facility to do so, and 
it’s 1-2 days. 
Less than a day to add 
the DAA system.  Can 
be done at user site, 
with OEM help. 
Less than a day to add 
the DAA system, and 
can be done completely 
by user. 
Plug and play. 
 
 
Reliability/Mean Time to Failure 
The following was used as a reference: https://src.alionscience.com/pdf/TypicalEquipmentMTBFValues.pdf 
 
 
Table E18. Explanation of on board reliability/mean time to failure metric values and scores.  
Score: 1 2 3 4 5 
Value (hrs): < 10 10-100 100-1000 1000-5000 > 5000 




















GBDAA HOTL Human Management Error 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 
Hazard  User takes no action to resolve hardware issues 
Description 
 
An indication of a hardware issue is presented by the system, but the human does 









Significant system failure that could result in not having situational awareness of a 






SME estimates indicate a DTEM hardware failure would occur once a year, and 
the user may take no action once out of 10 times conservatively. SC-228 standards 
may push this to an E 














System design should include audio and visual alarms. 
AND Training Emphasis on most common critical failures 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 
Hazard  User takes no action to resolve DTEM software issues 
Description 
 
An indication of a software issue is presented by the system, but the human does 









Significant system failure that could result in not having situational awareness of a 






SME estimates indicate a DTEM software failure would occur once a month, and 
the user may take no action once out of 10 times conservatively. It is credible that 
COTs Windows and Unix Oss that have not been developed for safety critical will 
be utilized in HD used for the management function. Thus software issues 
associated with the management function and OSs will impact the overall 
management systems. Assumed that onboard systems adhere to a DO178 or ASTM 
F38 F3201-16 Standards 














System design should include audio and visual alarms. 
AND Training Emphasis on most common critical failures 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 



















SME estimates indicate a DTEM hardware (most likely) failure would occur once 
a year, and the user may make a decisional error once out of 10 times 
conservatively. 














System design should include audio and visual alarms. 
AND Training Emphasis on ADM 
AND Command of execution override is available, but message includes reasoning 






Additional time required for user to process the automated challenge maintains an 
NMAC as credible 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 
Hazard  User lacks experience to troubleshoot abnormalities 
Description 
 
Literature indicates that user with less than 100 hour (or equivalent for UAS) 
operate at an elevated risk for incidents and accidents resulting in the User 
improperly taking no action or executing the incorrect procedure 
Existing  
Controls 












Compounded probability of 1) abnormality or failure with 2) User condition (i.e. 
lack of experience). Mark paranoid: Precedence set with HD failure rate above 














Appropriate crew supervision following initial qualification 
AND 
Audible warnings and alarms 
OR 


















GBDAA HITL Human Execution Error 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Task saturation 
Description 
 
Human is over saturated with tasks and has degraded performance. This can result 




- Utilize geofencing capabilities within Ground Control Station software. 
- GCS design proper to ensure no task saturation. 
- Flight occurs in low density airspace. 







Separation Criteria - Uncontrolled loss of separation, to an unknown degree, which 
means there could be a complete loss of separation resulting in an MAC. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (Extremely Remote) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Low density traffic below 1000' AGL; Low likelihood of task saturation duration 
that is large enough such that you are unable to resolve the conflict. 






























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User(s) is poorly trained on the man-machine interface 
Description 
 
Wrong action taken by crewmember 
Existing  
Controls 



























Utilizing a second qualified 
crewmember at the Ground Control 
Station to help operate the system. 
OR Practical performance evaluation 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  misinterpretation of target data 
Description 
 
Crewmember didn't understand target data relative to ownship 
Existing  
Controls 
- Visualization system uses design standards 






If the paths of intruding aircraft are misinterpreted by the PIC, a corrective action 
















The likelihood that an intruder is close enough, such that this hazard could result in 
an NMAC is estimated at 0.1 or less. Starting at the edge of well clear, the 






Practical performance evaluation added to training  
AND visual cues (e.g. trail information of intruders)  



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User is colorblind when the Man-Machine interface uses color 
Description 
 
Crewmember does not distinguish target information or alerts (e.g information may 
wash into the background) 
Existing  
Controls 












Approx 10% of the population experience colorblindness, this must be 
compounded with the likelihood of target information being affected by this 
limitation in the MMI 














Practical performance evaluation added to training. 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Unclear communication between RPIC and individual providing DAA guidance 
Description 
 
A communication protocol absent the confirmation of command from the RPIC, 
results in the DAA guidance individual needing to issue a new command based 
upon UA maneuvering. 
Existing  
Controls 












Communication issues are common during 2 way radio communications 














Develop and validate UAS DAA centric phraseology 
AND Practical performance evaluation 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  over congestion leads to target vector ambiguity 
Description 
 









































   
Residual Risk 
(Worst Credible) 





Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User is deaf when the Man-Machine interface uses aural alerts 
Description 
 
Crewmember is unable to hear aural alerts. 
Existing  
Controls 
- Visualization system uses design standards 






If aural alerts are used to provide warnings about collisions then the inability to 






Approximately 2-3 percent of the population has significant hearing loss. 








0.005 Likelihood of MAC if flying at the edge of well clear and the user would 
have to be task saturated to not visually recognize the conflict (assumes a visual 






Practical performance evaluation added to training. 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User has low proficiency in recognizing conflict 
Description 
 
For whatever reason, the user has difficulty recognizing conflicts. 
Existing  
Controls 












It is not known exactly how many people would suffer from this, but it is expected 
that this would be quite rare. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User misinterprets scale of the visualization system 
Description 
 
The user misinterprets the scale of the visualization system, resulting in intruder 
aircraft being closer or further away than believed. 
Existing  
Controls 






If the user believes aircraft are further away than they really are, then an aircraft 






This seems to be quite unlikely given the user has received training and testing. 














Use of "bubbles" to illustrate well-clear boundaries relative to either intruders or 
ownship 
OR 




















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User does not recognize a conflict 
Description 
 
For whatever reason, the user does not recognize a conflict. 
Existing  
Controls 












This seems to be quite unlikely given the user has received training and testing. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  User has low proficiency in identifying conflict resolutions 
Description 
 
















It is not known exactly how many people would suffer from this, but it is expected 
that this would be quite rare. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Pilot is given or chooses an improper maneuver for avoiding conflict 
Description 
 
An improper maneuver is applied. 
Existing  
Controls 
-Crewmember received training and testing 







The fact that a maneuver is improper will become apparent, at which point the pilot 







A conservative estimate is that this could happen once a month. 


































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Maneuver information provided to pilot (if pilot is not VO) is bad 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Pilot executes intended maneuver incorrectly 
Description 
 
The pilot does not execute the intended maneuver. 
Existing  
Controls 






If the pilot is properly qualified, then the improper execution of the maneuver 
would consist of a relatively small deviation relative to the intended maneuver.  






This is hard to estimate since what constitutes an incorrect maneuver is not 
defined.  However, it is expected that a "significant" deviation from the intended 
maneuver could occur, conservatively, once/month. 








If flying at the edge of well-clear, the likelihood of an NMAC, given no 
maneuvering, is 0.1.  Since maneuvering is occurring, the likelihood of an NMAC 


























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Pilot fails to execute maneuver 
Description 
 
The pilot does not execute a maneuver when one is needed. 
Existing  
Controls 












If the pilot is properly qualified, then the likelihood of the pilot not executing a 
maneuver when needed is remote. 








If flying at the edge of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Have a backup VO or PIC present 
OR 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Pilot maneuvers aircraft outside of its performance envelope 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Pilot becomes complacent failing to maneuver from an actual intruder believing it 
is a false target 
Description 
 
Pilot becomes complacent failing to maneuver from an actual intruder believing it 















Experience indicates that ghost targets can be quite common (e.g., they have arisen 
with ADS-B data). 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
HITL, Human Execution Error 
Hazard  Pilot becomes fixated during maneuvers from a ghost target of ownship resulting in 
diminished Situational Awareness 
Description 
 
















Likelihood may be greater than B if both ADS-B and mode S are used. Industry 
has not yet incorporated technology which would create this issue every day. 
































GBDAA Hardware for Supporting Systems 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Latency exceeds threshold rendering target data unusable 
Description 
 















Systems are expected to be designed to handle the expected workload 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probablity of NMAC, .05 






User indication of target latency (e.g. timestamp or color status)  





















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Power outage 
Description 
 
Supporting systems lose power requiring a reboot (once power is restored). 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Complete loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue, environmental impacts, or improper use 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates mean time to failure is greater than once per year 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probablity of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan  
AND Supporting system redundancy 
Replacement parts (can include PC)  







E (UAO C1) E (UAO C1) 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Fusion box failures 
Description 
 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates mean time to failure is greater than once per year 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probablity of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan AND 
fusion box system redundancy 
Health monitoring and replacement 
parts (can include PC) AND procedure 






E (UAO C1) E (UAO C1) 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Data communication failure within DAA supporting systems 
Description 
 
















Understanding the entire network as a single point of failure, SME estimates place 
this hazard as once every decade. 















Ping across LAN components (i.e. 
health monitoring) to identify issues 
AND Procedural action (e.g. RTB, 




















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  unknown amount of data Comms from sensor is corrupted for less than, or equal 
to, 3 seconds, and is nonrecurring 
Description 
 
















absent TCP or check sum procedures, minor corruptions are known to exist in 
networking applications 








In low airspace density environments the likelihood of being close enough to an 



























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 




Corrupt data pass systems' internal checks and are presented on the display 
Existing  
Controls 












SME estimates place this hazard as plausible more than once every century (i.e. 
rare) 















Redundant communication AND logical 
checks (e.g. filtering impossible aircraft 
motion) 
Logical checks (e.g. filtering impossible 






E   E 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Data Comms to evaluation system fails 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  Unknown amount of data Comms to evaluation system is corrupted 
Description 
 
See “unknown amount of data Comms from sensor is corrupted for less than, or 
equal to, 3 seconds, and is nonrecurring” and “unknown amount of data Comms 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  High autonomy, commanded maneuver data are corrupted for less than 3 seconds 
Description 
 
DAA determines resolution and provides as input to CS, CS sends command for 
maneuver, supporting systems failure results in data corruption lasts for less than 3 
seconds and an incorrect maneuver 
Existing  
Controls 












absent TCP or check sum procedures, minor corruptions are known to exist in 
networking applications 


































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems 
Hazard  High autonomy, commanded maneuver doesn’t reach CS 
Description 
 
Commanded maneuver never reaches CS 
Existing  
Controls 












SME estimates place this hazard as plausible more than once every century (i.e. 
rare) 
































GBDAA Hardware HITL MMI 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HITL MMI 
Hazard  Power outage 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Complete loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HITL MMI 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue, environmental impacts, or improper use 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates mean time to failure is greater than once per year 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan AND MMI 
system redundancy 
Replacement parts (can include PC) 






E (UAO C1) E (UAO C1) 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HITL MMI 
Hazard  Latency exceeds threshold rendering target data unusable 
Description 
 















Systems are expected to be designed to handle the number of anticipated targets. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 






User indication of target latency (e.g. timestamp or color status) AND procedural 


















GBDAA Hardware HOTL MMI 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HOTL Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Power outage 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Complete loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HOTL Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates mean time to failure is greater than once per year 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan AND MMI 
system redundancy 
OR replacement parts (can include PC) 






E (UAO C1) E (UAO C1) 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HOTL Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, HOTL Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to improper use 
Description 
 
















































GBDAA Hardware Algorithm 




GBDAA Software HITL MMI 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Horizontal/Vertical representation of multiple targets has additional uncertainty 
beyond sensor measurement error 
Description 
 
Additional measurement error on position (e.g.  Additional latency in data 
collection, incorrect survey of the well surveilled volume, uncertainty in coordinate 
projections, and CPU processing limitations, etc.) 
Existing  
Controls 
*Standard map transformation techniques. 






Without a display of sensor uncertainty, an error in spacial judgement could still 






Based on experience, something like this can surface once a year during 
operations. 








0.005 going well clear to MAC with minimum of two targets will only drop 2 






Separation standards (for nominal conditions)  plus a buffer are employed as a 
condition of current CONOPs (e.g. 3-5 NM with ASR-11) AND  Alert from health 
monitoring system regarding latency  
OR User is trained on sensor capabilities AND Alert from health monitoring 
system regarding latency 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed for multiple aircraft 
Description 
 
The MMI simply displays the incorrect information. Purely a software issue. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 












DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 














Provide redundant information (e.g., from GCS) 
-OR- 
Apply a procedural mitigation such as checking aircraft altitudes via radio 
communications 
-AND- 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  erroneous aircraft category displayed 
Description 
 
The incorrect aircraft category is displayed owing to MMI software failure. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






If an aircraft category is used to infer aircraft flight characteristics, one could 






DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 














Check categories of known targets (e.g., ownship). 
OR Procedurally preclude PIC from assuming intruders' performance based on 
category 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  False target 
Description 
 
A target that is not present is displayed-this is commonly a target that tails another 
target, but does not have to be.  This could result from faulty sensor information or 
software issues. It is assumed that all targets are being avoided. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






The user would avoid all targets.  Appearance of a ghost target could result in rapid 







Experience indicates that ghost targets can be quite common (e.g., they have arisen 
with ADS-B data). 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Incorrect horizontal  target positions displayed 
Description 
 
The MMI simply displays the incorrect information. Purely a software issue. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 












DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








Probability is compounded by 0.005.  Even with several targets the probability is 






Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed from sensor(s) on a separate 
display] 
Provide health monitoring system that alerts to this issue (e.g. monitor position 
relative to a fixed reference target) 
-AND- 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Latency exceeds threshold rendering target data unusable 
Description 
 
The target data are latent such that uncertainty in position is very large.  This could 















Significant latency resulting from sensor issues are expected to occur roughly 
1/year. 














Provide health monitoring such that the user is alerted that latency has become too 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Sustained loss of multiple targets 
Description 
 
Intruders are not displayed within the MMI owing to MMI software failure 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 












DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








Probability is compounded by 0.005.  Even with several targets the probability is 






Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed from sensor(s) on a separate 
display] 
Provide health monitoring that alerts to loss of targets on display (e.g. inclusion of 
reference to a fixed relative target)  
-AND- 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Multiple targets never displayed, Sustained loss of all targets, No targets displayed 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, MMI 
Hazard  Horizontal representation of ownship incorrect 
Description 
 
The representation of ownship position is incorrect, which is always true owing to 
uncertainty in sensors used to derive ownship position (generally GPS), but can be 
more severe owing to software issues (e.g., within the MMI), issues associated 




Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 
of DO 178C.  Use of ADS-B data or direct links to GCS to obtain ownship position 












DO-178C equivalent software assurance level.  In flight tests, issues with ownship 
position have not been observed. 














Health monitoring system to alert accuracy of ownship position. 
Not sure what this will look like 


















GBDAA Software HOTL MMI 




GBDAA Software Algorithm 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm will always provide imperfect historical and current position (i.e. track) 
for single target 
Description 
 
Target position and tracks will have inherent measurement error. System is 
operating normally, but the user assumes absolute position 
Existing  
Controls 






Without a display of sensor uncertainty, an error in spatial judgement could still 






Measurement error from sensors are always present 














End user is provided a representation of this measurement error and considers for 





















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Multiple aircraft causes ambiguity resulting in errant track(s) 
Description 
 




Track data are presented to the user. Cooperative aircraft ID information is 







With existing controls and the assumed buffer for pop-ups. The user will still be 






multiple crossing targets are relatively uncommon but feasible 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm fails to provide a track 
Description 
 
Software is working correctly. Plot is not displayed on the visualization system, 















With an individual probability of detection of 0.90 the likelihood of missing two 
consecutive targets in the well surveilled volume is 0.01 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm fails to provide tracks for multiple targets 
Description 
 
Software is working correctly. Sensor data is intermittent causing track to not be 















A tenth as likely as a single track not being provided 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides errant track for multiple targets 
Description 
 
Algorithm becomes confused from sensor input being lower quality, resulting in 
errant tracks of multiple targets. 
Existing  
Controls 
Track data are presented to the user. Cooperative aircraft ID information is 







With existing controls and the assumed buffer for pop-ups. The user will still be 






Since track data are still shown, the pilot will try to self-separate from these tracks.  
The distance between the UAS and errant track should still be far enough away that 
a NMAC is not valid, but well-clear violation may be reasonable. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 




Sensor data provided to tracking system may be inaccurate preventing the 
algorithm from properly assessing the situation. 
Existing  
Controls 






Human user being intimately involved in the use of the system could identify 






This will happen for only at extremely low angles of incidence. 


































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 




Sensor data provided to tracking system may be inaccurate preventing the algorithm 















This will happen for only at extremely low angles of incidence. 


































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm fails to ID conflict with multiple intruders  
Description 
 


















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides improper resolution of conflict for single/multiple intruder(s) 
at twice the distance of well-clear 
Description 
 
Uncertainty in track provided to the algorithm may temporarily produces 
convergence rather than divergence in a conflict resolution.  Depends on 









Using radar as a model, heading errors would be at worst 2-3 degrees. If the 
intruder turned heading error would be on the order of 15 deg on a radar system 
with a 5 sec update rate. Assume 5 seconds for operator to react and obtain a new 
heading. Given that, you are still 500 ft from well-clear boundary. Signification 






1 out of 100 resolution with a few conflict resolutions being provided every day. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides proper resolution resulting in CFIT/obstacle 
Description 
 
See Column A (CFIT) 
Existing  
Controls 
Flight Planning, Site visits, operator can input constraints in system for flight area 






If the algorithm doesn't have knowledge of terrain or obstacles, there is a 






If operator performs a proper flight planning and site visit, the likelihood of flying 
in to these objects/terrain would be very unlikely. 














Algorithm utilizes a DTED and Geospatial data regarding obstacles to define no-
fly locations in conjunction with site survey to determine any changes from what is 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  The resolution confuses the manned aircraft 
Description 
 
UAS was not following right-of-way rules and maneuvers by UAS may cause 
manned aircraft pilot to become confused. 
Existing  
Controls 






Well clear may be violated due to the confusion caused by UAS maneuvering.  
Manned aircraft could then maneuver in a way that was unpredictable to UAS 






Manned aircraft may still be able to see UAS (visually or technologically) but may 
be confused at what the intention of the flight path would be. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 




See column A  - Human users identifies maneuver 
Existing  
Controls 






Human will be able to recognize a multi-conflict scenario and appropriately 






The chance that these scenarios occur in the low density airspace are remote. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 













Algorithms that don't take into account multiple conflicts in a resolution may cause 







The chance that these scenarios occur in the low density airspace are remote. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 




Algorithm not designed to take into account limitations of airframe. 
Existing  
Controls 






Airframe will not execute maneuver outside its limits, but will result in the 






User generally takes into account the capabilities of its airframe during operations. 








Given expectation that maneuvers occur twice the distance to well-clear, it is 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides a resolution alien to right of way rules 
Description 
 









Using radar as a model, heading errors would be at worst 2-3 degrees. If the 
intruder turned heading error would be on the order of 15 deg on a radar system 
with a 5 sec update rate. Assume 5 seconds for operator to react and obtain a new 
heading. Given that, you are still 500 ft from well-clear boundary. Signification 






1 out of 100 resolution with a few conflict resolutions being provided every day. 
































GBDAA Active Sensor 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Brief Power Outage (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Power to sensor is lost for ≤ 5 s resulting in complete loss of situational awareness 
during power loss 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor auto-restarts with resumed power 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 


























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Extended Power outage 
Description 
 
Sensor loses power for > 5 s and is the sole sensor providing information to the 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO CI) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Extended power losses are much less common during operations than short-
duration power losses. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that the mean time to failure is greater than 1 month. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 













Sensor system redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) C 













Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 




IEC/IP equipment ratings (standard 60529) or conformance to a standard like 
RTCA DO-160B or MIL-STD-810G. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that failures are only common when equipment is used 
outside OEM limitations. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 












Sensor diversification AND additional 




1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
E (UAO C1)  C 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to improper use 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Software failure 
Description 
 
Software fails, resulting in loss of situational awareness. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 
of DO 178C. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 












Sensor diversification/ redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Brief loss of target(s) due to interference  (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Temporary noise level increases and prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO  
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 



























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sustained loss of target(s) due to Interference (> 5 s) 
Description 
 
Sustained increase in noise level prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 







Monitor natural sources of interference (e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Propagation issues producing detection holes 
Description 
 
Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 




1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Uncertainty in service volume buffers results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based upon approximate knowledge of propagation variation, a buffer is used.  The 
likelihood of that buffer being exceeded is very low. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 






Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using 
observed soundings 
OR 




















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing detection holes 
Description Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 
VFR is a possible mitigation in that the DAA system replaces the "Visual" of VFR.  
However, current manned aviation can be VFR in precipitation and the DAA 
system replacing that see-and-avoid function may not work in such conditions 
owing, for instance, to attenuation of the signal in rain.   Therefore, the control is 
preflight planning for an unmanned aircraft flight to ensure it will be in conditions 






If you do not know where they are, a MAC is credible. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
If we are not expressly considering weather impacts, in real time, on the DAA 
sensor, then degraded DAA sensor performance could easily happen at this rate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 









weather impacts to 








use of additional 
sensors that do not 




All listed options 




E E E  
Residual Risk 
(Worst Credible) 





Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Terrain-induced detection holes 
Description 
 
Terrain producing areas where DAA sensor is unable to detect. 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor calibration on initial deployment. 







Flying UAS with some buffer above lowest elevation angle of sensor and C2 radio 
line of sight. This buffer allows for the intruder that would be considered to be a 






Identified to be a rare event as it would only result with complete mis-use/mis-
understanding of systems being used.  














Detailed modeling of sensor coverage relative to terrain and structures prior to 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sensor producing false targets 
Description 
 

















False targets are common, especially at low altitudes. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Improper identification of real targets among many false targets 
Description 
 









The user suspects that a real target is a false target and deviates slightly to avoid, 






False targets are common, but it is less common that a real target will be believed 
to be a false target. 














Avoid all targets Use redundant sensors, which will 
reduce the number of false targets 




















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  "Target" is not detected within the well surveilled volume due to temporarily 
reduced S/N ratio (e.g. detection nodes, partial beam blockage) 
Description 
 
Signal is below noise level of sensor. 
Existing  
Controls 
Calibrate sensor according to manufacturer guidelines. 
 






There is an unknown, unidentified target in the well surveilled volume.  The most 






This scenario (i.e. individual detection failures) would not be common, but could 
occur once a week. 


































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Partial target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that partial data (at least horizontal or altitude) 
are transmitted, providing some target information to the flight crew. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 













Experience indicates that prolonged issues with sensor data are commonly 
identified prior to flight and corrected and that prolonged issues during flight that 
are not recognized are rare. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Degraded sensor performance such that no positional target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that all target positional data are missing. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 







Loss of target positional data will put the UAS at risk of an NMAC with the user 






Prolonged loss of information is oftentimes recognized early. 














More detailed health monitoring of sensor data resulting in earlier identification of 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sensor cannot provide accurate enough position information 
Description 
 
Sensor positional uncertainty cannot be refined enough to differentiate multiple 
targets within a given volume that is outside of well clear distances for each target. 
Existing  
Controls 







Target position with large positional uncertainty is generally sufficient for 






The sensor uncertainty is known to some degree and is added to well clear 
distances.  This reduces the chances for violation of the 'true' well clear by adding 
additional buffers.  














Define MOPS for connecting sensor to visualization system such that operating 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sensor experiences partial failure resulting in blind spots or missed detections 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Inadequate effective range 
Description 
 


















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Refraction causing inaccurate target information 
Description 
 
Environmental conditions are such that refraction is not conforming to standard 









The change in location is not sufficient in the horizontal such that it shall become 






Highly dependent on environmental conditions. If weather impacts on the DAA 
sensor Is not expressly considered, then degraded DAA sensor performance could 
easily happen at this rate. 














Real-time EM propagation modeling to 
correct errors in intruder positions 
 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Non-eye-safe lidar 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Light sources (e.g. Sun, etc.) oversaturates the sensor 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Reflections off water 
Description 
 
















































GBDAA Passive Sensor 
Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Brief Power Outage (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Power to sensor is lost for ≤ 5 s resulting in complete loss of situational awareness 
during power loss 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor auto-restarts with resumed power 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO  
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 


























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Extended Power outage 
Description 
 
Sensor loses power for > 5 s and is the sole sensor providing informtion to the 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO CI) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Extended power losses are much less common during operations than short-
duration power losses. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 

























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that the mean time to failure is greater than 1 month. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 










sensor system redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 




IEC/IP equipment ratings (standard 60529) or conformance to a standard like 
RTCA DO-160B or MIL-STD-810G. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that failures are only common when equipment is used 
outside OEM lmitations. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Health monitoring for environmental 
threats 
Sensor diversification AND additional 




1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
E (UAO C1)  C 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Software failure 
Description 
 
Software fails, resulting in loss of situational awareness. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 
of DO 178C. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






DO178 B standard Sensor diversification/ redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Brief loss of target(s) due to interference  (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Temporary noise level increases and prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO  
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 



























Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Sustained loss of target(s) due to Interference (> 5 s) 
Description 
 
Sustained increase in noise level prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 







Monitor natural sources of interference (e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Propagation issues producing detection holes 
Description 
 
Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 




1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Uncertainty in service volume buffers results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based upon approximate knowledge of propagation variation, a buffer is used.  The 
liklihood of that buffer being exceeded is very low. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 






Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using 
observed soundings 




















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing detection holes 
Description Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 
VFR is a possible mitigation in that the DAA system replaces the "Visual" of VFR.  
However, current manned aviation can be VFR in precipitation and the DAA 
system replacing that see-and-avoid function may not work in such conditions 
owing, for instance, to attenuation of the signal in rain.   Therefore, the control is 
preflight planning for an unmanned aircraft flight to ensure it will be in conditions 






If you do not know where they are, a MAC is credible. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
If we are not expressly considering weather impacts, in real time, on the DAA 
sensor, then degraded DAA sensor performance could easily happen at this rate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 









weather impacts to 








use of additional 
sensors that do not 
have the same 
weather 
limitations 
All of the Above 




E E E  
Residual Risk 
(Worst Credible) 





Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Terrain-induced detection holes 
Description 
 
Terrain producing areas where DAA sensor is unable to detect. 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor calibration on initial deployment. 







Flying UAS with some buffer above lowest elevation angle of sensor and C2 radio 
line of sight. This buffer allows for the intrueder that would be considered to be a 






Identified to be a rare event as it would only result with complete mis-use/mis-
understanding of systems being used.  














Detailed modeling of sensor coverage relative to terrain and structures prior to 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Sensor producing false targets 
Description 
 

















False targets are common, especially at low altitudes. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Improper identification of real targets among many false targets 
Description 
 









The user suspects that a real target is a false target and deviates slightly to avoid, 






False targets are common, but it is less common that a real target will be believed 
to be a false target. 














Avoid all targets 
 
Use redundant sensors, which will 
reduce the number of false targets 




















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  "Target" is not detected within the well surveilled volume due to temporarily 
reduced S/N ratio (e.g. detection nodes, partial beam blockage) 
Description 
 
Signal is below noise level of sensor. 
Existing  
Controls 
Calibrate sensor according to manufacturer guidelines. 
 






There is an unknown, unidentified target in the well surveilled volume.  The most 






This scenario (i.e. individual detection failures) would not be common, but could 
occur once a week. 


































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Partial target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that partial data (at least horizontal or altitude) 
are transmitted, providing some target information to the flight crew. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 













Experience indicates that prolonged issues with sensor data are commonly 
identified prior to flight and corrected and that prolonged issues during flight that 
are not recognized are rare. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Degraded sensor performance such that no positional target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that all target positional data are missing. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 







Loss of target positional data will put the UAS at risk of an NMAC with the user 






Prolonged loss of information is oftentimes recognized early. 














More detailed health monitoring of sensor data resulting in earlier identification of 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Sensor cannot provide accurate enough position information 
Description 
 
Sensor positional uncertainty cannot be refined enough to differentiate multiple 
targets within a given volume that is outside of well clear distances for each target. 
Existing  
Controls 







Target position with large positional uncertainty is generally sufficient for 






The sensor uncertainty is known to some degree and is added to well clear 
distances.  This reduces the chances for violation of the 'true' well clear by adding 
additional buffers.  














Define MOPS for connecting sensor to visualization system such that operating 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Refraction causing inaccurate target information 
Description 
 
Environmental conditions are such that refraction is not conforming to standard 









The change in location is not sufficient in the horizontal such that it shall become 






Highly dependent on environmental condistions. If weather impacts on the DAA 
sensor Is not expressly considered, then degraded DAA sensor performance could 
easily happen at this rate. 














Real-time EM propagation modeling to 
correct errors in intruder positions 
 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Signal used for detection ceases 
Description 
 
The signal being used ceases either for more than 3 s or in an intermittent fashion. 
Existing  
Controls 
It is expected that planned outages of the signal would be monitored and that 













It is expected that non-planned, significant outages of signals could occur 1 yr-1, 
although this may be a conservative estimate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Health monitoring of signal AND 





















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Signal used for detection degrades 
Description 
 
The signal used for detection of intruders degrades such that performance (e.g., 
coverage) is affected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 













Experience indicates that prolonged issues with sensor data are commonly 
identified prior to flight and corrected and that prolonged issues during flight that 
are not recognized are rare. 

































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Dirty lens 
Description 
 
The lens used in the sensor becomes dirty with contaminants (e.g., dust). 
Existing  
Controls 












This is a very difficult likelihood to estimate.  Once yr-1 seems to be reasonable, 
but additional data are needed. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Procedural mitigation (e.g., land) 
 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Image Saturation 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Lack of contrast 
Description 
 

















































Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Erroneous signal or position data 
Description 
 
Ownship signal has errors, which could include incorrect positional information.  
















Because software could contribute to this and software is assumed to be designed 
to a level equivalent to DO 178C, C is appropriate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Checks for physical realizability to identify issues with ownship position AND 



















Ground Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor Passive 
Hazard  Loss of signal and position data 
Description 
 
The signal providing ownship information is lost for a significant period of time 
(e.g., > 3 s) or intermittently. 
Existing  
Controls 













This could be either a hardware or a software failure (e.g., avionics or systems used 
to communicate data).  It is expected that software and networking are the most 
likely to fail.  The software is assumed to be developed to the equivalent of DO 
178C. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 
























ABDAA HOTL Human Management Error 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 
Hazard  User takes no action to resolve hardware issues 
Description 
 
An indication of a hardware issue is presented by the system, but the human does 









Significant system failure that could result in not having situational awareness of a 






SME estimates indicate a DTEM hardware failure would occur once a year, and 
the user may take no action once out of 10 times conservatively. SC-228 
standards may push this to an E 














System design should include audio and visual alarms. 
AND Training Emphasis on most common critical failures 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 
Hazard  User takes no action to resolve DTEM software issues 
Description 
 
An indication of a software issue is presented by the system, but the human does 









Significant system failure that could result in not having situational awareness of a 






SME estimates indicate a DTEM software failure would occur once a month, and 
the user may take no action once out of 10 times conservatively. It is credible that 
COTs Windows and Unix Oss that have not been developed for safety critical will 
be utilized in HD used for the management function. Thus software issues 
associated with the management function and OSs will impact the overall 
management systems. Assumed that onboard systems adhere to a DO178 or 
ASTM F38 F3201-16 Standards 














System design should include audio and visual alarms. 
AND Training Emphasis on most common critical failures 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 



















SME estimates indicate a DTEM hardware (most likely) failure would occur once a 
year, and the user may make a decisional error once out of 10 times 
conservatively. 














System design should include audio and visual alarms. 
 AND Training Emphasis on ADM 
AND Command of execution override is available, but message includes reasoning 






Additional time required for user to process the automated challenge maintains 
an NMAC as credible 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
HOTL, Human Management Error 
Hazard  User lacks experience to troubleshoot abnormalities 
Description 
 
Literature indicates that user with less than 100 hour (or equivalent for UAS) 
operate at an elevated risk for incidents and accidents resulting in the User 
improperly taking no action or executing the incorrect procedure 
Existing  
Controls 












Compounded probability of 1) abnormality or failure with 2) User condition (i.e. 
lack of experience). Mark paranoid: Precedence set with HD failure rate above 














Appropriate crew supervision following initial qualification 
 AND Audible warnings and alarms 
OR 


















ABDAA Hardware Supporting Systems On Board 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Power failure 
Description 
 
Supporting systems lose power requiring a reboot (once power is restored). 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Complete loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates mean time to failure is greater than once per year 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan  
AND Supporting system redundancy 







E (UAO C1) E (UAO C1) 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to improper use 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Unknown amount of C2 data are corrupted 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  C2 comms failure 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Data corrupted -for less than 3 seconds- between onboard DAA system and CS 
(CS is presumably onboard) 
Description 
 
DAA determines resolution and provides as input to CS, CS sends command for 
maneuver, supporting systems failure results in data corruption lasts for less than 3 
seconds and an incorrect maneuver 
Existing  
Controls 












Absent TCP or check sum procedures, minor corruptions are known to exist in 
networking applications 


































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems On 
Hazard  Commanded maneuver doesn’t reach CS 
Description 
 
Commanded maneuver never reaches CS 
Existing  
Controls 












SME estimates place this hazard as plausible more than once every century (i.e. 
rare) 
































ABDAA Hardware Supporting Systems Off Board 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Power failure 
Description 
 
Supporting systems lose power requiring a reboot (once power is restored). 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Complete loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational Awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates mean time to failure is greater than once per year 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan  
AND Supporting system redundancy 
Replacement parts (can include PC)  







E (UAO C1) E (UAO C1) 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to improper use 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Unknown amount of C2 data are corrupted 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  C2 comms failure 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 













(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Data corrupted -for less than 3 seconds- between C2 system and MMI 
Description 
 
Corrupt information gets to the MMI, but has a life of less than 3 seconds. Not 
affecting the CS or PIC. 
Existing  
Controls 












Absent TCP or check sum procedures, minor corruptions are known to exist in 
networking applications 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Supporting Systems Off 
Hazard  Total network failure between C2 and MMI (no data) 
Description 
 















SME estimates place this hazard as plausible more than once every century (i.e. 
rare) 














While no mitigation may be necessary, ensuring human management functionality, 


















ABDAA Hardware HOTL MMI 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Power outage 
Description 
 










Loss of management MMI results in the inability to perform management 
functions.  However, the DAA system is still functioning, and thus there is no 
impact upon maintaining well clear. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights. 














UPS, back-up power (e.g. generator)  
OR 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 









Loss of management MMI results in the inability to perform management 
functions.  However, the DAA system is still functioning, and thus there is no 






Experience indicates that mean time to failure is greater than 1 year. 
INITIAL RISK 5D 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood  
(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  
Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 





















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  
Mechanical failure due to improper use 
Description 
 















(Worst Credible)  
Likelihood  
Rationale  
(Worst Credible)  
INITIAL RISK 




















ABDAA Hardware Algorithm 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Hardware, Algorithm 
Hazard  Hardware failure with system on which the algorithm (conflict identification and 
resolution identification) resides. 
Description 
 
















Experience indicates that mean time to failure is greater than 1 year. 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 






Recurring maintenance plan AND fusion 
box system redundancy  
OR Health monitoring (MMI) and 




















ABDAA Software HOTL MMI 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Misleading health/status/mode information 
Description 
 
Information regarding the health/status/mode of the DAA system is misleading. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






If the DAA system is not functioning but it is believed to be functioning, then a 





















Use of alerts within the MMI such that the human is made aware when the aircraft 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 




No IDS is provided in the management MMI.  This is a compound hazard as the 
IDS provides information to the human that enables the human to recognize if 
something is not working properly. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






If something is not working properly AND no IDS is present to help indicate that 
AND the health monitoring system does not properly provide the needed 






Something must not work properly with the DAA system (C likelihood) and health 
monitoring system does not provide needed information (C likelihood), resulting in 
this well within E likelihood. 














Use of alerts within the MMI such that the human is made aware when the aircraft 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Horizontal representation of multiple targets is incorrect (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
The IDS simply displays the incorrect information. Purely a software issue. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






Incorrect intruder locations in the optional IDS could lead the human to maneuver 






DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








Probability is compounded by 0.005.  Even with several targets the probability is 






Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed from sensor(s) on a separate 
display] 
OR Provide health monitoring system that alerts to this issue (e.g. monitor position 
relative to a fixed reference target) 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Horizontal representation of single target is incorrect  (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
If software has an issue, then it will affect multiple targets (see “Horizontal 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed for single aircraft   (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
If software has an issue, then it will affect multiple targets (see “Erroneous aircraft 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed for multiple aircraft   (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
The MMI simply displays the incorrect information. Purely a software issue. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






Incorrect intruder altitudes in the optional IDS could lead the human to maneuver 






DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 














Provide redundant information (e.g., from GCS) 
-OR- 
Apply a procedural mitigation such as checking aircraft altitudes via radio 
communications 
-AND- 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Erroneous aircraft ID/category displayed  (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
The incorrect aircraft category or ID is displayed owing to MMI software failure. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






If an aircraft category is used to infer aircraft flight characteristics, the human 
could take over for the algorithm to ensure separation and in doing so could 






DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 














Check categories of known targets (e.g., ownship). 




















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  False target  (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
A target that is not present is displayed-this is commonly a target that tails another 
target, but does not have to be.  This could result from faulty sensor information or 
software issues. It is assumed that all targets are being avoided. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






The algorithm would avoid all targets if the source is a sensor.  If the source is 
software (e.g., in the MMI), then the human could act to avoid it, which could 






Experience indicates that ghost targets can be quite common (e.g., they have arisen 
with ADS-B data). 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Latency exceeds threshold rendering target data unusable  (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
The target data are latent such that uncertainty in position is very large.  This 















Significant latency resulting from sensor issues are expected to occur roughly 
1/year. 














Because the IDS can provide useful information, it is recommended that operations 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Sustained loss of one target in the midst of other targets (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Sustained loss of multiple targets (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
Intruders are not displayed within the IDS owing to MMI software failure. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 






If the system appears to be maneuvering unnecessarily, the human may take 






DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








Probability is compounded by 0.005.  Even with several targets the probability is 






Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed from sensor(s) on a separate 
display] 
-OR- 
Provide health monitoring that alerts to loss of targets on display (e.g. inclusion of 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Multiple targets never displayed (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Sustained loss of all targets (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  No targets displayed (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Horizontal representation of ownship incorrect (in optional IDS) 
Description 
 
The representation of ownship position is incorrect, which is always true owing to 
uncertainty in sensors used to derive ownship position (generally GPS), but can be 
more severe owing to software issues (e.g., within the MMI), issues associated with 
the data being fed to the MMI, and latency with the data being fed to the MMI). 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent of 
DO 178C.  Use of ADS-B data or direct links to GCS to obtain ownship position 






Having incorrect ownship within the MMI could result in the human taking control 
when the DAA system, in the user's view, allows ownship to get too close to 
another aircraft.  In the resulting maneuvering, a MAC is credible because of the 






DO-178C equivalent software assurance level.  In flight tests, issues with ownship 
position have not been observed. 














Health monitoring system to alert accuracy of ownship position. 
Not sure what this will look like 
















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, System Management Man-Machine Interface 
Hazard  Erroneous service status displayed 
Description 
 
















































ABDAA Software Algorithm 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Software lacks robustness/maturity 
Description 
 
A software algorithm that is improperly tested, configured, installed, etc. that is put 
into operation in a highly safety critical environment. 
Existing  
Controls 












Generally software is tested in laboratory setting to work out more critical issues 
with the system prior to being deployed. Assuming that software developers are 
following best practices, these causes to the hazard are reduced in likelihood.  








Depending on the amount of time to recover the system after a malfunction, a MAC 

























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm will always provide imperfect historical and current position (i.e. track) 
for single target 
Description 
 
Target position and tracks will have inherent measurement error. System is 
operating normally, but the user assumes absolute position 
Existing  
Controls 






Without knowledge of sensor uncertainty, an error in spacial understanding could 






Measurement error from sensors are always present 















Algorithm utilizes measurement error and considers for operation. (with 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Multiple aircraft causes ambiguity resulting in errant track(s) 
Description 
 




Track data are presented to the algorithm. Cooperative aircraft ID information is 







With existing controls and the assumed buffer for pop-ups. The algorithm will still 
be able to maintain well clear as it will remain far enough away from both targets 






multiple crossing targets are relatively uncommon but feasible 























(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides errant track for multiple targets 
Description 
 
Algorithm becomes confused from sensor input being lower quality, resulting in 
errant tracks of multiple targets. 
Existing  
Controls 
Track data are presented to the algorithm. Cooperative aircraft ID information is 







With existing controls and the assumed buffer for pop-ups. The algorithm will still 
be able to maintain well clear as it will remain far enough away from both targets 






Since track data are still available, the algorithm will try to self-separate from 
these tracks.  The distance between the UAS and errant track should still be far 
enough away that a NMAC is not valid, but well-clear violation may be 
reasonable. 






















(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm fails to provide a track 
Description 
 










If algorithm doesn't utilize a target because no track data is available, the could 






With an individual probability of detection of 0.90 the likelihood of missing two 
consecutive targets in the well surveilled volume is 0.01 








0.000005 est, starting with 0.01, .1 outside well clear, .1 probability of NMAC, .05 

























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm fails to provide tracks for multiple targets 
Description 
 
Software is working correctly. Sensor data is intermittent causing track to not be 















A tenth as likely as a single track not being provided 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 




Sensor data provided to tracking system may be inaccurate preventing the 
















This will happen for only at extremely low angles of incidence. 



































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides improper resolution of conflict for single intruder at twice the 
distance of well-clear 
Description 
 
Uncertainty in track provided to the algorithm may temporarily produces 
convergence rather than divergence in a conflict resolution.  Depends on 









Using radar as a model, heading errors would be at worst 2-3 degrees. If the 
intruder turned heading error would be on the order of 15 deg on a radar system 
with a 5 sec update rate. Assume 5 seconds for operator to react and obtain a 
new heading. Given that, you are still 500 ft from well-clear boundary. 






1 out of 100 resolution with a few conflict resolutions being provided every day. 























(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides proper intruder resolution but results in CFIT/obstacle 
Description 
 
Algorithm provides proper intruder resolution but results in CFIT/obstacle 
Existing  
Controls 
Flight Planning, Site visits, operator can input constraints in system for flight area 






If the algorithm doesn't have knowledge of terrain or obstacles, there is a 






If operator performs a proper flight planning and site visit, the likelihood of flying 
in to these objects/terrain would be very unlikely. 














Algorithm utilizes a DTED and Geospatial data regarding obstacles to define no-fly 
locations in conjunction with site survey to determine any changes from what is 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  The resolution confuses the manned aircraft 
Description 
 
UAS was not following right-of-way rules and maneuvers by UAS may cause 
manned aircraft pilot to become confused. 
Existing  
Controls 






Well clear may be violated due to the confusion caused by UAS maneuvering.  
Manned aircraft could then maneuver in a way that was unpredictable to UAS 






Manned aircraft may still be able to see UAS (visually or technologically) but may 
be confused at what the intention of the flight path would be. 























(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 













Algorithms that don't take into account multiple conflicts in a resolution may 







The chance that these scenarios occur in the low density airspace are remote. 























(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 




Algorithm not designed to take into account limitations of airframe. 
Existing  
Controls 






Airframe will not execute maneuver outside its limits, but will result in the 






User generally takes into account the capabilities of its airframe during 
operations. 








Given expectation that maneuvers occur twice the distance to well-clear, it is 















(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Software, Algorithm 
Hazard  Algorithm provides a resolution alien to right of way rules 
Description 
 









Using radar as a model, heading errors would be at worst 2-3 degrees. If the 
intruder turned heading error would be on the order of 15 deg on a radar system 
with a 5 sec update rate. Assume 5 seconds for operator to react and obtain a 
new heading. Given that, you are still 500 ft from well-clear boundary. 






1 out of 100 resolution with a few conflict resolutions being provided every day. 























(Worst Credible)  
Residual Risk 




ABDAA Active Sensor 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Brief Power Outage (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Power to sensor is lost for ≤ 5 s resulting in complete loss of situational awareness 
during power loss 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor auto-restarts with resumed power 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO  
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 


























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Extended Power outage 
Description 
 
Sensor loses power for > 5 s and is the sole sensor providing information to the 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO CI) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Extended power losses are much less common during operations than short-
duration power losses. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 

























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that the mean time to failure is greater than 1 month. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 











Sensor system redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 




IEC/IP equipment ratings (standard 60529) or conformance to a standard like 
RTCA DO-160B or MIL-STD-810G. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that failures are only common when equipment is used 
outside OEM limitations. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 











Sensor diversification AND additional 




1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
E (UAO C1)  C 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to improper use 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Software failure 
Description 
 
Software fails, resulting in loss of situational awareness. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 
of DO 178C. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 












Sensor diversification/ redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
  Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Brief loss of target(s) due to interference  (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Temporary noise level increases and prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 



























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sustained loss of target(s) due to Interference (> 5 s) 
Description 
 
Sustained increase in noise level prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 







Monitor natural sources of interference (e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Propagation issues producing detection holes 
Description 
 
Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 




1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Uncertainty in service volume buffers results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based upon approximate knowledge of propagation variation, a buffer is used.  The 
likelihood of that buffer being exceeded is very low. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 






Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using 
observed soundings 
OR 




















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing detection holes 
Description Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 
VFR is a possible mitigation in that the DAA system replaces the "Visual" of VFR.  
However, current manned aviation can be VFR in precipitation and the DAA 
system replacing that see-and-avoid function may not work in such conditions 
owing, for instance, to attenuation of the signal in rain.   Therefore, the control is 
preflight planning for an unmanned aircraft flight to ensure it will be in conditions 






If you do not know where they are, a MAC is credible. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
If we are not expressly considering weather impacts, in real time, on the DAA 
sensor, then degraded DAA sensor performance could easily happen at this rate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 









weather impacts to 








use of additional 
sensors that do not 
have the same 
weather 
limitations 
All listed options 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 3 3 3 




E E E  
Residual Risk 
(Worst Credible) 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Terrain-induced detection holes 
Description 
 
Terrain producing areas where DAA sensor is unable to detect. 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor calibration on initial deployment. 







Flying UAS with some buffer above lowest elevation angle of sensor and C2 radio 
line of sight. This buffer allows for the intruder that would be considered to be a 






Identified to be a rare event as it would only result with complete mis-use/mis-
understanding of systems being used.  














Detailed modeling of sensor coverage relative to terrain and structures prior to 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sensor producing false targets 
Description 
 

















False targets are common, especially at low altitudes. 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Improper identification of real targets among many false targets 
Description 
 









The user suspects that a real target is a false target and deviates slightly to avoid, 






False targets are common, but it is less common that a real target will be believed 
to be a false target. 














Avoid all targets 
 
Use redundant sensors, which will 
reduce the number of false targets 




















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  "Target" is not detected within the well surveilled volume due to temporarily 
reduced S/N ratio (e.g. detection nodes, partial beam blockage) 
Description 
 
Signal is below noise level of sensor. 
Existing  
Controls 
Calibrate sensor according to manufacturer guidelines. 
 






There is an unknown, unidentified target in the well surveilled volume.  The most 






This scenario (i.e. individual detection failures) would not be common, but could 
occur once a week. 


































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Partial target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that partial data (at least horizontal or altitude) 
are transmitted, providing some target information to the flight crew. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 













Experience indicates that prolonged issues with sensor data are commonly 
identified prior to flight and corrected and that prolonged issues during flight that 
are not recognized are rare. 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Degraded sensor performance such that no positional target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that all target positional data are missing. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 







Loss of target positional data will put the UAS at risk of an NMAC with the user 






Prolonged loss of information is oftentimes recognized early. 














More detailed health monitoring of sensor data resulting in earlier identification of 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sensor cannot provide accurate enough position information 
Description 
 
Sensor positional uncertainty cannot be refined enough to differentiate multiple 
targets within a given volume that is outside of well clear distances for each target. 
Existing  
Controls 







Target position with large positional uncertainty is generally sufficient for 






The sensor uncertainty is known to some degree and is added to well clear 
distances.  This reduces the chances for violation of the 'true' well clear by adding 
additional buffers.  














Define MOPS for connecting sensor to visualization system such that operating 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Sensor experiences partial failure resulting in blind spots or missed detections 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Inadequate effective range 
Description 
 


















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Refraction causing inaccurate target information 
Description 
 
Environmental conditions are such that refraction is not conforming to standard 









The change in location is not sufficient in the horizontal such that it shall become 






Highly dependent on environmental conditions. If weather impacts on the DAA 
sensor Is not expressly considered, then degraded DAA sensor performance could 
easily happen at this rate. 














Real-time EM propagation modeling to 























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Non-eye-safe lidar 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Light sources (e.g. Sun, etc.) oversaturates the sensor 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Active 
Hazard  Reflections of water 
Description 
 
















































ABDAA Passive Sensor 
Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Brief Power Outage (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Power to sensor is lost for ≤ 5 s resulting in complete loss of situational awareness 
during power loss 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor auto-restarts with resumed power 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO  
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based on current operational pace and what has been experienced with flights.  
Short loss of power is not generally observed. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 


























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Extended Power outage 
Description 
 
Sensor loses power for > 5 s and is the sole sensor providing information to the 






1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO CI) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Extended power losses are much less common during operations than short-
duration power losses. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 

























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
Description 
 







1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that the mean time to failure is greater than 1 month. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 













Sensor system redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Mechanical failure due to environmental impacts 
Description 
 




IEC/IP equipment ratings (standard 60529) or conformance to a standard like 
RTCA DO-160B or MIL-STD-810G. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Experience indicates that failures are only common when equipment is used 
outside OEM limitations. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 











Sensor diversification AND additional 




1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
E (UAO C1)  C 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Software failure 
Description 
 
Software fails, resulting in loss of situational awareness. 
Existing  
Controls 
Software validation (underlying assumption) has been performed to an equivalent 
of DO 178C. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
DO-178C equivalent software assurance level. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 












Sensor diversification/ redundancy. 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 (SC & UAS) 4 
Post-Mitigation 
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  C 












Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Brief loss of target(s) due to interference  (≤ 5 s) 
Description 
 
Temporary noise level increases and prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
3 [SC & UAS] & 4 UAO  
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness leads to well clear violation; possible manned aircraft 




C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 



























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Sustained loss of target(s) due to Interference (> 5 s) 
Description 
 
Sustained increase in noise level prevents target(s) from being detected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Initial calibration and configuration, FCC regulations, and the operational 
environment is removed from most sources of noise. 
Pre-Mitigation 
Severity  
1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Loss of situational awareness results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Assumptions preclude majority of credible sources for interference and natural 
mitigations further reduce likelihood. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 







Monitor natural sources of interference (e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Propagation issues producing detection holes 
Description 
 
Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 




1 (SC & UAS) 
Severity  
Rationale 
Uncertainty in service volume buffers results in a MAC being a credible outcome. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
D (UAO C1) 
Likelihood  
Rationale 
Based upon approximate knowledge of propagation variation, a buffer is used.  The 
likelihood of that buffer being exceeded is very low. 








In low airspace density environments, the likelihood of being close enough to an 






Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using 
observed soundings 
OR 




















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing detection holes 
Description 
 
Targets are missed as a result of propagation detection holes. 
Existing  
Controls 
VFR is a possible mitigation in that the DAA system replaces the "Visual" of VFR.  
However, current manned aviation can be VFR in precipitation and the DAA 
system replacing that see-and-avoid function may not work in such conditions 
owing, for instance, to attenuation of the signal in rain.   Therefore, the control is 
preflight planning for an unmanned aircraft flight to ensure it will be in conditions 






If you do not know where they are, a MAC is credible. 
Pre-Mitigation  
Likelihood 
C (UAO C1)  
Likelihood  
Rationale 
If we are not expressly considering weather impacts, in real time, on the DAA 
sensor, then degraded DAA sensor performance could easily happen at this rate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 









weather impacts to 









use of additional 
sensors that do not 




All listed options 
Post-Mitigation 
Severity 
1 3 3 3 




E E E  
Residual Risk 
(Worst Credible) 





Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Terrain-induced detection holes 
Description 
 
Terrain producing areas where DAA sensor is unable to detect. 
Existing  
Controls 
Sensor calibration on initial deployment. 







Flying UAS with some buffer above lowest elevation angle of sensor and C2 radio 
line of sight. This buffer allows for the intruder that would be considered to be a 






Identified to be a rare event as it would only result with complete mis-use/mis-
understanding of systems being used.  














Detailed modeling of sensor coverage relative to terrain and structures prior to 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Sensor producing false targets 
Description 
 

















False targets are common, especially at low altitudes. 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Improper identification of real targets among many false targets 
Description 
 









The user suspects that a real target is a false target and deviates slightly to avoid, 






False targets are common, but it is less common that a real target will be believed 
to be a false target. 














Avoid all targets 
 
Use redundant sensors, which will 
reduce the number of false targets 




















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  "Target" is not detected within the well surveilled volume due to temporarily 
reduced S/N ratio (e.g. detection nodes, partial beam blockage) 
Description 
 
Signal is below noise level of sensor. 
Existing  
Controls 
Calibrate sensor according to manufacturer guidelines. 
 






There is an unknown, unidentified target in the well surveilled volume.  The most 






This scenario (i.e. individual detection failures) would not be common, but could 
occur once a week. 


































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Partial target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that partial data (at least horizontal or altitude) 
are transmitted, providing some target information to the flight crew. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 













Experience indicates that prolonged issues with sensor data are commonly 
identified prior to flight and corrected and that prolonged issues during flight that 
are not recognized are rare. 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Degraded sensor performance such that no positional target data are provided 
Description 
 
Degraded sensor performance such that all target positional data are missing. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 







Loss of target positional data will put the UAS at risk of an NMAC with the user 






Prolonged loss of information is oftentimes recognized early. 














More detailed health monitoring of sensor data resulting in earlier identification of 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Sensor cannot provide accurate enough position information 
Description 
 
Sensor positional uncertainty cannot be refined enough to differentiate multiple 
targets within a given volume that is outside of well clear distances for each target. 
Existing  
Controls 







Target position with large positional uncertainty is generally sufficient for 






The sensor uncertainty is known to some degree and is added to well clear 
distances.  This reduces the chances for violation of the 'true' well clear by adding 
additional buffers.  














Define MOPS for connecting sensor to visualization system such that operating 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Refraction causing inaccurate target information 
Description 
 
Environmental conditions are such that refraction is not conforming to standard 









The change in location is not sufficient in the horizontal such that it shall become 






Highly dependent on environmental conditions. If weather impacts on the DAA 
sensor Is not expressly considered, then degraded DAA sensor performance could 
easily happen at this rate. 














Real-time EM propagation modeling to 























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Signal used for detection ceases 
Description 
 
The signal being used ceases either for more than 3 s or in an intermittent fashion. 
Existing  
Controls 
It is expected that planned outages of the signal would be monitored and that 













It is expected that non-planned, significant outages of signals could occur 1 yr-1, 
although this may be a conservative estimate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Health monitoring of signal AND 























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Signal used for detection degrades 
Description 
 
The signal used for detection of intruders degrades such that performance (e.g., 
coverage) is affected. 
Existing  
Controls 
Data heartbeat monitor. 
Procedural mitigations if prolonged issues are identified; Crew is trained to take 
corrective action (e.g. return to safe state, land, etc.). 













Experience indicates that prolonged issues with sensor data are commonly 
identified prior to flight and corrected and that prolonged issues during flight that 
are not recognized are rare. 

































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Dirty lens 
Description 
 
The lens used in the sensor becomes dirty with contaminants (e.g., dust). 
Existing  
Controls 












This is a very difficult likelihood to estimate.  Once yr-1 seems to be reasonable, 
but additional data are needed. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






























Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Image saturation 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Lack of contrast 
Description 
 

















































Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Erroneous signal or position data 
Description 
 
Ownship signal has errors, which could include incorrect positional information.  
















Because software could contribute to this and software is assumed to be designed 
to a level equivalent to DO 178C, C is appropriate. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 






Checks for physical realizability to identify issues with ownship position AND 



















Airborne Based Detect and Avoid 
Sensor, Passive 
Hazard  Loss of signal and position data 
Description 
 
The signal providing ownship information is lost for a significant period of time 
(e.g., > 3 s) or intermittently. 
Existing  
Controls 













This could be either a hardware or a software failure (e.g., avionics or systems used 
to communicate data).  It is expected that software and networking are the most 
likely to fail.  The software is assumed to be developed to the equivalent of DO 
178C. 








If on the boundary of well clear, the likelihood of a MAC is 0.005 times the 










































System Redundancy Mitigations 
 
System Type and Element: GBDAA, HITL, Human Execution Error    









Automation system that alerts/takes over control 
to avoid MAC 
Task Saturation T 1D 1E 
 
Utilize a second qualified crewmember to help 
operate the system 
User is poorly trained on the MMI T 1D 1E 
 
Practical performance evaluation added to 
training AND visual cues (e.g. trail information of 
intruders) AND Aural and Visual alerts 
Misinterpretation of target data T 2D 2E 
 
Develop and validate UAS DAA centric phraseology 
AND Practical performance evaluation AND Place 
DAA monitor in front of the PIC 
Unclear communication between 
RPIC and individual providing DAA 
guidance 
T 1D 1E 
 
Use of "bubbles" to illustrate well-clear 
boundaries relative to either intruders or ownship 
OR Provision of warnings (either visual or aural) 
regarding potential violation of well clear 
User misinterprets scale of the 
visualization system 
E 2D 4C 
 
Use of alerts that are visual, aural, or both User does not recognize a conflict E 1E 2E 
 
Use of alerts that are visual, aural, or both to 
indicate if a poor maneuver is being applied 
Pilot is given or chooses an 
improper maneuver for avoiding 
conflict 
E 2C 3C 
 
Use of alerts that are visual, aural, or both to 
indicate if a poor maneuver is being applied 
Pilot executes intended maneuver 
incorrectly 
M 2D 3C 
 
Have a backup VO or PIC present OR Provision of 
alerts (visual, aural, or both) 





System Type and Element: GBDAA, HOTL, Human Management Error   
 









System design should include audio and visual 
alarms AND Training Emphasis on most 
common critical failures AND Automatic 
Mitigations 
User takes no action to resolve hardware 
issues 
DTEM 1E 3E  
System design should include audio and visual 
alarms AND Training Emphasis on most 
common critical failures AND Automatic 
Mitigations 
User takes no action to resolve DTEM 
software issues 
DTEM 1E 3E  
System design should include audio and visual 
alarms AND Training Emphasis on ADM AND 
Command of execution override is available, 
but message includes reasoning for why the 
automated system believes another mitigation 
is appropriate 
User executes inappropriate procedure given 
an abnormality or failure 
DTEM 1E 2E  
Appropriate crew supervision following initial 
qualification AND Audible warnings and alarms 
OR Command of execution override is 
available, but message includes reasoning for 
why the automated system believes another 
mitigation is appropriate 
User lacks experience to troubleshoot 
abnormalities 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Active     









Back-up power (e.g. generator) Brief Power Outage (≤ 5 s) D 3E 3E  
Back-up power (e.g. generator) Extended Power outage D 1E 3E  
Sensor system redundancy Mechanical failure due to fatigue D 1E 4E  
Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 
D 1E 4E  
Sensor diversification/ redundancy Software failure D 1E 4E  
Use of additional sensors that do not have the 
same weather limitations 
Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) 
causing detection holes 
D 1E 3E  
Use redundant sensors, which will reduce the 
number of false targets drastically such that all 
targets are avoided 
Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 
D 2B 4D  
Multiple sensors to cross-check/fuse 
Refraction causing inaccurate 
target information 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Passive    
 





















Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 








Use of additional sensors that do not have the 
same weather limitations 
Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) 
causing detection holes 




Use redundant sensors, which will reduce the 
number of false targets drastically such that all 
targets are avoided 
Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 




Multiple sensors to cross-check/fuse. 
Refraction causing inaccurate 
target information 








System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems   
 









UPS, back-up power (e.g. generator) Power outage DTEM 1E 5E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND Supporting 
system redundancy  
Mechanical failure due to fatigue DTEM 1E 5E  
Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure action (e.g. RTB, go to ground, loiter) 
Mechanical failure due to fatigue DTEM 1E 3E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND fusion box 
system redundancy  
Fusion box failures T 1E 5E  
Health monitoring and replacement parts (can 
include PC) AND procedure turn if needed 
Fusion box failures T 1E 3E  
Redundant network 
Data communication failure within DAA 
supporting systems 
T 1E 5E  
Redundant communication 
Unknown amount of data Comms from 
sensor is corrupted for less than, or equal to, 
3 seconds, and is nonrecurring 
T 3D 5C  
Redundant communication AND logical checks 
(e.g. filtering impossible aircraft motion)  
Unknown amount of data Comms from 
sensor is corrupted for longer than 3 seconds 
T 1E 5E  
Redundant communication AND Rigorous data 
integrity checks 
High autonomy, commanded maneuver data 
are corrupted for less than 3 seconds 
M 1D 2E  
Redundant communication 
High autonomy, commanded maneuver 
doesn’t reach CS 





System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HOTL MMI    
 









UPS, back-up power (e.g. generator) Power outage TE 1E 5E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND MMI system 
redundancy  
Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
 
1E 5E  
Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure turn if needed 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HITL MMI    
 









UPS, back-up power (e.g. generator) Power outage TE 1E 5E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND MMI system 
redundancy  
Mechanical failure due to fatigue 
 
1E 5E  
Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure turn if needed 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, MMI    
 








Provide redundant information (e.g., from GCS) OR 
Apply a procedural mitigation such as checking 
aircraft altitudes via radio communications AND 
Apply a mitigation like return-to-base or land 
Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed 
for multiple aircraft 
T 1E 3E  
Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed 
from sensor(s) on a separate display] OR Provide 
health monitoring system that alerts to this issue 
(e.g. monitor position relative to a fixed reference 
target) AND Apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Incorrect horizontal  target positions 
displayed 
T 1E 3E  
Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed 
from sensor(s) on a separate display] OR Provide 
health monitoring that alerts to loss of targets on 
display (e.g. inclusion of reference to a fixed relative 
target) AND Apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Sustained loss of multiple targets T 1E 3E  
Health monitoring system to alert accuracy of 
ownship position (not sure what this will look like) 
OR Crossreference to an independent display 
Horizontal representation of ownship 
incorrect 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, HOTL, Human Management Error   
 









System design should include audio and visual 
alarms AND Training Emphasis on most 
common critical failures AND Automatic 
Mitigations 
User takes no action to resolve hardware 
issues 
DTEM 1E 3E  
System design should include audio and visual 
alarms AND Training Emphasis on most 
common critical failures AND Automatic 
Mitigations 
User takes no action to resolve DTEM 
software issues 
DTEM 1E 3E  
System design should include audio and visual 
alarms AND Training Emphasis on ADM AND 
Command of execution override is available, 
but message includes reasoning for why the 
automated system believes another mitigation 
is appropriate 
User executes inappropriate procedure given 
an abnormality or failure 
DTEM 1E 2E  
Appropriate crew supervision following initial 
qualification AND Audible warnings and alarms 
OR Command of execution override is 
available, but message includes reasoning for 
why the automated system believes another 
mitigation is appropriate 
User lacks experience to troubleshoot 
abnormalities 





System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Active     









Back-up power (e.g. generator)  Brief Power Outage (≤ 5 s) D 3E 3E  
Back-up power (e.g. generator) Extended Power outage D 1E 3E  
Sensor system redundancy Mechanical failure due to fatigue D 1E 4E  
Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 
D 1E 4E  
Sensor diversification/ redundancy Software failure D 1E 4E  
Use of additional sensors that do not have the 
same weather limitations 
 Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) 
causing detection holes 
D 1E 3E  
Use redundant sensors, which will reduce the 
number of false targets drastically such that all 
targets are avoided 
 Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 
D 2B 4D  
Multiple sensors to cross-check/fuse 
Refraction causing inaccurate 
target information 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Passive     





















Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 








Use of additional sensors that do not have the 
same weather limitations 
 Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) 
causing detection holes 




Use redundant sensors, which will reduce the 
number of false targets drastically such that all 
targets are avoided 
 Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 




Multiple sensors to cross-check/fuse 
Refraction causing inaccurate 
target information 









System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Onboard  
 









Redundancy in power supply to supporting DAA 
system hardware onboard 
Power failure  1E 5E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND Supporting 
system redundancy  
Mechanical failure due to fatigue  1E 5E  
Redundant communication AND Rigorous data 
integrity checks 
Data corrupted -for less than 3 seconds-between onboard 
DAA system and CS (CS is presumably onboard) 
 1D 1E  






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Offboard  
 









UPS, back-up power (e.g. generator) Power failure  1E 5E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND Supporting 
system redundancy  
Mechanical failure due to fatigue  1E 5E  
Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure action (e.g. RTB, go to ground, loiter) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, System Management MMI   
 









Use of alerts within the MMI such that the 
human is made aware when the aircraft does 
not maneuver relative to an intruder 
Misleading health/status/mode information T 1E 2D  
Use of alerts within the MMI such that the 
human is made aware when the aircraft does 
not maneuver relative to an intruder. 
Lack of a Intruder Display System (IDS) to aid 
in situational awareness for mitigation 
enactment 
T 1E 2E  
Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed 
from sensor(s) on a separate display] 
Horizontal representation of multiple targets 
is incorrect (in optional IDS) 
T 1E 3E  
Provide redundant information (e.g., from GCS) 
Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed for 
multiple aircraft   (in optional IDS) 
T 1E 3E  
Provide redundant information [e.g., direct feed 
from sensor(s) on a separate display] 
Sustained loss of multiple targets (in optional 
IDS) 
T 1E 5C  
Health monitoring system to alert accuracy of 
ownship position (not sure what this will look 
like) OR Crossreference to an independent 
display 
Horizontal representation of ownship 
incorrect (in optional IDS) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, System Management MMI  
 









UPS, back-up power (e.g. generator) OR 
Procedural action (e.g., land) until management 
MMI is restored 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Algorithm    
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND fusion box 
system redundancy  
Hardware failure with system on 
which the algorithm (conflict 
identification and resolution 
identification) resides 





System Functionality Mitigations 
 
System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Active     









Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 
D 1E 1E  
Real-time propagation modeling during 
operations 
  Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 
D 1E 2E  
Real-time, reliable, accurate monitoring 
of weather conditions that degrade 
sensor performance 
Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 
D 1E 3E  
Tracking intruders AND avoiding 
operations near the edge of your well 
surveilled volume. 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarily reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 
D 2A 2D  
Real-time EM propogation modeling to 
correct errors in intruder positions 
Refraction causing inaccurate target 
information 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Passive     









Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




Real-time propagation modeling during 
operations 
Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 




Real-time, reliable, accurate monitoring 
of weather conditions that degrade 
sensor performance 
Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 




Tracking intruders AND avoiding 
operations near the edge of your well 
surveilled volume 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarily reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 




Real-time EM propagation modeling to 
correct errors in intruder positions 
 Refraction causing inaccurate target 
information 




A means for cleaning the lens in flight Dirty lens (e.g., EO/IR) D 1E 5C  
Checks for physical realizability to 
identify issues with ownship position 
AND enactment of a procedural 
mitigation (e.g., land). 
Erroneous signal or position data 
(ownship) 





System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems   
 









User indication of target latency (e.g. 
timestamp or color status) AND 
procedural action (i.e. RTB and more 
conservative separation minimums) 
Latency exceeds threshold rendering target 
data unusable 
DTEM 1E 4E  
Redundant communication OR logical 
checks (e.g. filtering impossible aircraft 
motion)  
Unknown amount of data Comms from sensor 
is corrupted for less than, or equal to, 3 
seconds, and is nonrecurring 
T 3B 5C  
Redundant communication AND logical 
checks (e.g. filtering impossible aircraft 
motion)  
Unknown amount of data Comms from sensor 
is corrupted for longer than 3 seconds 
T 1E 5E  
Logical checks (e.g. filtering impossible 
aircraft motion)  
Unknown amount of data Comms from sensor 
is corrupted for longer than 3 seconds 
T 1E 3E  
Redundant communication AND 
Rigorous data integrity checks 
High autonomy, commanded maneuver data 
are corrupted for less than 3 seconds 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HITL MMI    
 









User indication of target latency (e.g. 
timestamp or color status) AND 
procedural action (i.e. RTB and more 
conservative seperation minimums) 
Latency exceeds threshold rendering 
target data unusable 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, Algorithm    
 









End user is provided a representation of 
this measurment error and considers 
for operation (with seperation 
standards). 
Algorithm will always provide 
imperfect historical and current 
position (i.e. track) for single target 
T 1C 4A  
Send plot data to display Algorithm fails to provde a track T 1D 3E  
Send plot data to display 
Algorithm fails to provde tracks for 
multiple targets 
T 1D 3E  
System needs to display uncertainties to 
human user 
Algorithm fails to ID conflict with 
intruder(s) (HITL) at twice the 
distance of well-clear 
E 3D 4E  
Algorthim needs to understand and 
utilize sensor uncertainties in target 
positions 
Algorithm fails to ID conflict with 
intruder(s) (HOTL) at twice the 
distance of well-clear 
E 1D 4E  
Algorithm utilizes a DTED and Geospatial 
data regarding obsticles to define no-fly 
locations in conjunction with site survey 
to determine any changes from what is 
currently in database. 
Algorithm provides proper 
resolution resulting in CFIT/obstacle 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, MMI    
 









Uncertainty error is directly 
communicated to User 
Horizontal/Vertical representation of 
multiple targets has additional 
uncertainty beyond sensor 
measurment error  
T 1E 4E  
Check categories of known targets (e.g., 
ownship) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Active     









Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




Real-time propagation modeling during 
operations 
  Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 




Real-time, reliable, accurate monitoring 
of weather conditions that degrade 
sensor performance 
Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 




Tracking intruders AND avoiding 
operations near the edge of your well 
surveilled volume 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarily reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 




Real-time EM propagation modeling to 
correct errors in intruder positions 
Refraction causing inaccurate target 
information 









System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Passive     









Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




Real-time propagation modeling during 
operations 
Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 




Real-time, reliable, accurate monitoring 
of weather conditions that degrade 
sensor performance 
Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 




Tracking intruders AND avoiding 
operations near the edge of your well 
surveilled volume. 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarly reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 




Real-time EM propogation modeling to 
correct errors in intruder positions 
 Refraction causing inaccurate target 
information 




A means for cleaning the lens in flight Dirty lens (e.g., EO/IR) D 1E 5C  
Checks for physical realizability to 
identify issues with ownship position 
AND enactment of a procedural 
mitigation (e.g., land). 
Erronous signal or position data 
(ownship) 





System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Onboard  
 









Redundant communication AND 
Rigorous data integrity checks 
Data corrupted-for less than 3 
seconds- between onboard DAA 
system and CS (CS is presumably 
onboard) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, System Management MMI   
 









Check categories of known targets (e.g., 
ownship) OR Procedurally preclude PIC 
from assuming intruders' performance 
based on category 
Erroneous aircaft ID/category displayed  (in 
optional IDS) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, Algorithm    
 









Algorithm utilizes measurment error and 
considers for operation (with separation 
standards). 
Algorithm will always provide 
imperfect historical and current 
position (i.e. track) for single target 
T 1C 4A  
Utilize plot data in algorithm  to enforce 
separation standards and utilize a track 
prediction algorithm robust enough to 
handle data drop outs 
Algorithm fails to provde a track T 1D 3D  
Utilize plot data in algorithm  to enforce 
separation standards and utilize a track 
prediction algorithm robust enough to 
handle data drop outs 
Algorithm fails to provde tracks for 
multiple targets 
T 1D 3E  
Algorthim understands and utilizes 
sensor uncertainties in calculated target 
positions 
Algorithm fails to ID conflict with 
intruder(s) (HOTL) at twice the 
distance of well-clear 
E 1D 4E  
Algorithm utilizes a DTED and Geospatial 
data regarding obsticles to define no-fly 
locations in conjunction with site survey 
to determine any changes from what is 
currently in database 
Algorithm provides proper intruder 
resolution but results in 
CFIT/obstacle 







System Type and Element: 
GBDAA, HITL, Human Execution 
Error     









Develop and validate UAS DAA centric 
phraseology AND Practical performance 
evaluation AND Place DAA monitor in 
front of the PIC 
Unclear commumication between 
RPIC and individual providing DAA 
guidance 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Active     









Recurring maintenance plan Mechanical failure due to fatigue D 1E 1E  
Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 
D 3E 3E  
Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 
D 1E 1E  
Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using observed 
soundings 
Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 
D 1E 1E  
Preflight planning takes into 
consideration weather impacts to the 
DAA sensors 
  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 
D 1E 1E  
Detailed modeling of sensor coverage 
relative to terrain and structures prior to 
flight to define appropriate operational 
buffers. 
Terrain-induced detection holes D 2D 4E  
Define MOPS for connecting sensor to 
visualization system such that operating 
characteristics are understood for 
sensors being used. 
Sensor cannot provide accurate 
enough position information 





System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Passive    
 













Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 




Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using observed 
soundings 
Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 




Preflight planning takes into 
consideration weather impacts to the 
DAA sensors 
  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 




Detailed modeling of sensor coverage 
relative to terrain and structures prior to 
flight to define appropriate operational 
buffers. 




Define MOPS for connecting sensor to 
visualization system such that operating 
characteristics are understood for 
sensors being used. 
Sensor cannot provide accurate 
enough position information 








System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems   
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND 
Supporting system redundancy  
Mechanical failure due to fatigue DTEM 1E 5E  
Recurring maintenance plan AND fusion 
box system redundancy  






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HOTL MMI    
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND MMI 
system redundancy  






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HITL MMI    
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND MMI 
system redundancy  






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, Algorithm    
 









End user is provided a representation of 
this measurment error and considers for 
operation (with seperation standards). 
Algorithm will always provide 
imperfect historical and current 
position (i.e. track) for single target 
T 1C 4A  
Algorithm utilizes a DTED and Geospatial 
data regarding obsticles to define no-fly 
locations in conjunction with site survey 
to determine any changes from what is 
currently in database. 
Algorithm provides proper 
resolution resulting in CFIT/obstacle 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, MMI    
 









Separation standards (for nominal 
conditions)  plus a buffer is employed 
as a condition of current CONOPs (e.g. 
3-5 NM with ASR-11) AND  Alert from 
health monitoring system regarding 
latency  
Horizontal/Vertical representation of 
multiple targets has additional 
uncertainty beyond sensor 
measurement error  
T 1E 4E  
Procedurally preclude PIC from 
assuming intruders' performance based 
on category AND additional separation 
standards 
Erroneous aircraft category 
displayed 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Active     













Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 




Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using observed 
soundings 
Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 




Preflight planning takes into 
consideration weather impacts to the 
DAA sensors 
  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 




Detailed modeling of sensor coverage 
relative to terrain and structures prior to 
flight to define appropriate operational 
buffers. 




Define MOPS for connecting sensor to 
visualization system such that operating 
characteristics are understood for 
sensors being used. 
Sensor cannot provide accurate 
enough position information 









System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Passive     













Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 




Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-flight 
interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




Better definition of needed buffer based 
on propagation modeling using observed 
soundings 
Propagation issues producing 
detection holes 




Preflight planning takes into 
consideration weather impacts to the 
DAA sensors 
  Weather (rain, clouds, etc.) causing 
detection holes 




Detailed modeling of sensor coverage 
relative to terrain and structures prior to 
flight to define appropriate operational 
buffers. 




Define MOPS for connecting sensor to 
visualization system such that operating 
characteristics are understood for 
sensors being used. 
Sensor cannot provide accurate 
enough position information 









System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Onboard   
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND 
Supporting system redundancy  






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Offboard  
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND 
supporting system redundancy  






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Algorithm    
 









Recurring maintenance plan AND fusion 
box system redundancy  
Hardware failure with system on 
which the algorithm (conflict 
identification and resolution 
identification) resides. 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, Algorithm    
 









Algorithm utilizes measurment error and 
considers for operation (with separation 
standards). 
Algorithm will always provide 
imperfect historical and current 
position (i.e. track) for single target 
T 1C 4A  
Utilize plot data in algorithm  to enforce 
separation standards and utilize a track 
prediction algorithm robust enough to 
handle data drop outs. 
Algorithm fails to provde a track T 1D 3D  
Utilize plot data in algorithm  to enforce 
separation standards and utilize a track 
prediction algorithm robust enough to 
handle data drop outs. 
Algorithm fails to provde tracks for 
multiple targets 
T 1D 3E  
Algorithm utilizes a DTED and Geospatial 
data regarding obsticles to define no-fly 
locations in conjunction with site survey 
to determine any changes from what is 
currently in database. 
Algorithm provides proper intruder 
resolution but results in 
CFIT/obstacle 





Training and Performance Evaluation Mitigations 
 
System Type and Element: 
GBDAA, HITL, Human Execution 
Error     









Practical performance evaluation added 
to training 
User(s) is poorly trained on the man-
machine interface 
T 1D 1E  
Practical performance evaluation added 
to training AND visual cues (e.g. trail 
information of intruders)  
AND Aural and Visual alerts 
Misinterpretation of target data T 2D 2E  
Practical performance evaluation added 
to training AND required reporting of 
colorblindness. 
User is colorblind when the Man-
Machine interface uses color 
T 1E 5E  
Develop and validate UAS DAA centric 
phraseology AND practical performance 
evaluation AND place DAA monitor in 
front of the PIC. 
Unclear communication between 
RPIC and individual providing DAA 
guidance 
T 1D 1E  
Practical performance evaluation added 
to training AND required reporting of 
hearing limitations. 
User is deaf when the Man-Machine 
interface uses aural alerts 
E 2E 5E  
Practical performance evaluation. 
User has low proficiency in 
recognizing conflict 
E 1E 5E  
Practical performance evaluation. 
User has low proficiency in 
identifying conflict resolutions 
E 1E 5E  
PIC is trained to recognize ghost targets 
and to validate with procedure turns 
Pilot becomes fixated during 
maneuvers from a ghost target of 
ownship resulting in diminished 
Situational Awareness 





System Type and Element: GBDAA, HOTL, Human Management Error   
 









System design should include audio and 
visual alarms AND training emphasis on 
most common critical failures AND 
automatic mitigations. 
User takes no action to resolve hardware issues DTEM 1E 3E  
System design should include audio and 
visual alarms AND training emphasis on 
most common critical failures AND 
automatic mitigations. 
User takes no action to resolve DTEM software 
issues 
DTEM 1E 3E  
System design should include audio and 
visual alarms AND training emphasis on 
ADM AND command of execution 
override is available, but message 
includes reasoning for why the 
automated system believes another 
mitigation is appropriate 
User executes inappropriate procedure given 
an abnormality or failure 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, MMI    
 









User is trained on sensor capabilities 
AND alert from health monitoring 
system regarding latency. 
Horizontal/Vertical representation of 
multiple targets has additional 
uncertainty beyond sensor 
measurement error  
T 1E 4E  
Training for PIC to recognize ghost 
targets. 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, HOTL, Human Management Error   
 









System design should include audio and 
visual alarms AND training emphasis on 
most common critical failures AND 
automatic mitigations. 






System design should include audio and 
visual alarms AND training emphasis on 
most common critical failures AND 
automatic mitigations. 
User takes no action to resolve DTEM software 
issues 






System design should include audio and 
visual alarms AND training emphasis on 
ADM AND command of execution 
override is available, but message 
includes reasoning for why the 
automated system believes another 
mitigation is appropriate 
User executes inappropriate procedure given 
an abnormality or failure 











System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, System Management MMI   
 









Training for PIC to recognize ghost 
targets. 





Health Monitoring Mitigations 
 
System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Active     









Health monitoring for environmental 
threats 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 
D 1E 1E  
Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 
D 3E 3E  
Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-
flight interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 
D 1E 1E  
More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data. 
Partial target data are provided D 3C 4C  
More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data resulting in earlier 
identification of the degraded system. 
Degraded sensor performance such 
that no positional target data are 
provided 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Passive    
 









Health monitoring for environmental 
threats 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 




Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 




Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-
flight interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data. 




More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data resulting in earlier 
identification of the degraded system. 
Degraded sensor performance such 
that no positional target data are 
provided 




Health monitoring of signal AND 
procedural mitigation (e.g., land) 
 Signal used for detection ceases D 1E 3E  
More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data. 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems   
 









 Health monitoring and replacement 
parts (can include PC) AND procedure 
turn if needed 
Fusion box failures E 1E 3E  
Ping across LAN components (i.e. health 
monitoring) to identify issues AND 
Procedural action (e.g. RTB, decend and 
loiter, go to ground) 
Data communication failure within DAA 
supporting systems 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, MMI    
 









Separation standards (for nominal 
conditions) plus a buffer is employed as 
a condition of current CONOPs (e.g. 3-5 
NM with ASR-11) AND  alert from health 
monitoring system regarding latency  
Horizontal/Vertical representation of 
multiple targets has additional 
uncertainty beyond sensor 
measurement error  
T 1E 4E  
Provide health monitoring system that 
alerts to this issue (e.g. monitor position 
relative to a fixed reference target) AND 
apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Incorrect horizontal  target positions 
displayed 
T 1E 3E  
Provide health monitoring such that the 
user is alerted that latency has become 
too large.  This mitigation would be 
provided within the MMI. 
Latency exceeds threshold rendering 
target data unusable 
T 1E 3E  
Provide health monitoring that alerts to 
loss of targets on display (e.g. inclusion 
of reference to a fixed relative target) 
apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Sustained loss of multiple targets T 1E 3E  
Health monitoring system to alert 
accuracy of ownship position (not sure 
what this will look like) 
Horizontal representation of 
ownship incorrect 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Active     









Health monitoring for environmental 
threats 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 




Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 




Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-
flight interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data. 




More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data resulting in earlier 
identification of the degraded system. 
Degraded sensor performance such 
that no positional target data are 
provided 









System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Passive     









Health monitoring for environmental 
threats 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 




Health monitoring (e.g. signal to noise 
ratio) AND pre-flight interference 
assessment. 
Brief loss of target(s) due to 
interference  (≤ 5 s) 




Monitor natural sources of interference 
(e.g. solar flares) AND health monitoring 
(e.g. signal-to-noise ratio) AND pre-
flight interference assessment. 
Sustained loss of target(s) due to 
Interference (> 5 s) 




More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data. 




More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data resulting in earlier 
identification of the degraded system. 
Degraded sensor performance such 
that no positional target data are 
provided 




Health monitoring of signal AND 
procedural mitigation (e.g., land) 





More detailed health monitoring of 
sensor data. 










System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, System Management MMI   
 









Provide health monitoring system that 
alerts to this issue (e.g. monitor 
position relative to a fixed reference 
target) AND apply a mitigation like 
return-to-base or land 
Horizontal representation of multiple 
targets is incorrect (in optional IDS) 
T 1E 3E  
Provide health monitoring that alerts to 
loss of targets on display (e.g. inclusion 
of reference to a fixed relative target)  
Sustained loss of multiple targets (in 
optional IDS) 
T 1E 5C  
Health monitoring system to alert 
accuracy of ownship position (not sure 
what this will look like) 
Horizontal representation of ownship 
incorrect (in optional IDS) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Algorithm    
 









Health monitoring (MMI) and 
procedural mitigation (e.g., RTB or land) 
Hardware failure with system on 
which the algorithm (conflict 
identification and resolution 
identification) resides. 







System Type and Element: 
GBDAA, HITL, Human Execution 
Error     










Assume all targets are real and mitigate 
appropriately. 
Pilot becomes complacent failing to 
maneuver from an actual intruder 
believing it is a false target 
M 1D 5E  
PIC is trained to recognize ghost targets and to 
validate with procedure turns. 
Pilot becomes fixated during 
maneuvers from a ghost target of 
ownship resulting in diminished 
Situational Awareness 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Active     










Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions. 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 
D 1E 4E  
Avoid all targets 
  Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 
D 2B 5A  
Tracking intruders AND avoiding operations 
near the edge of your well surveilled volume. 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarly reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Passive    
 










Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions. 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 




Avoid all targets 
  Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 




Tracking intruders AND avoiding operations 
near the edge of your well surveilled volume. 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarly reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 




Health monitoring of signal AND procedural 
mitigation (e.g., land) 
  Signal used for detection ceases D 1E 3E  
Procedural mitigation (e.g., land)    Dirty lens (e.g., EO/IR) D 1E 3E  
Checks for physical realizability to identify 
issues with ownship position AND enactment 
of a procedural mitigation (e.g., land). 
 Erronous signal or position data 
(ownship) 
 1E 3E  
Procedural mitigation such as return to base 
or land. 
   Loss of signal and position data 
(ownship) 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems   
 










User indication of target latency (e.g. 
timestamp or color status) AND procedural 
action (i.e. RTB and more conservative 
separation minimums) 
Latency exceeds threshold rendering 
target data unusable 
 1E 4E  
Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure action (e.g. RTB, go to ground, 
loiter) 
Mechanical failure due to fatigue  1E 3E  
Health monitoring and replacement parts (can 
include PC) AND procedure turn if needed 
Fusion box failures  1E 3E  
Ping across LAN components (i.e. health 
monitoring) to identify issues AND procedural 
action (e.g. RTB, decend and loiter, go to 
ground) 
Data communication failure within 
DAA supporting systems 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HOTL MMI    
 










Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure turn if needed 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Hardware, HITL MMI    
 










Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure turn if needed 
Mechanical failure due to 
fatigue 
TE 1E 3E  
User indication of target latency (e.g. 
timestamp or color status) AND procedural 
action (i.e. RTB and more conservative 
separation minimums) 
Latency exceeds threshold 
rendering target data unusable 






System Type and Element: GBDAA, Software, MMI    
 










Apply a procedural mitigation such as checking 
aircraft altitudes via radio communications 
AND apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Erronous aircraft altitude displayed 
for multiple aircraft 
T 1E 3E  
Check categories of known targets (e.g., 
ownship) AND additional separation standards 
Erronous aircaft category displayed T 3C 5C  
Procedurally preclude PIC from assuming 
intruders' performance based on category 
AND additional separation standards 
Erronous aircaft category displayed T 3C 5C  
Provide redundant information [e.g., direct 
feed from sensor(s) on a separate display] 
AND apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Incorrect horizontal  target positions 
displayed 
T 1E 3E  
Provide health monitoring system that alerts 
to this issue (e.g. monitor position relative to a 
fixed reference target) AND apply a mitigation 
like return-to-base or land 
Incorrect horizontal  target positions 
displayed 
T 1E 3E  
Provide redundant information [e.g., direct 
feed from sensor(s) on a separate display] 
AND apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Sustained loss of multiple targets T 1E 3E  
Provide health monitoring that alerts to loss of 
targets on display (e.g. inclusion of reference 
to a fixed relative target) AND apply a 
mitigation like return-to-base or land 





System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Active     










Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions. 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 




Avoid all targets 
  Improper identification of real 
targets among many false 
targets 
D 2B 5A  
Tracking intruders AND avoiding operations 
near the edge of your well surveilled volume. 
Target is not detected within 
the well surveilled volume due 
to temporarily reduced S/N 
ratio (e.g. detection nodes, 
partial beam blockage) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Passive     










Sensor diversification AND additional 
procedural limitations on environmental 
conditions. 
Mechanical failure due to 
environmental impacts 




Avoid all targets 
  Improper identification of real 
targets among many false targets 




Tracking intruders AND avoiding operations 
near the edge of your well surveilled volume. 
Target is not detected within the 
well surveilled volume due to 
temporarly reduced S/N ratio (e.g. 
detection nodes, partial beam 
blockage) 




Health monitoring of signal AND procedural 
mitigation (e.g., land) 








Checks for physical realizability to identify 
issues with ownship position AND enactment 
of a procedural mitigation (e.g., land). 
 Erronous signal or position data 
(ownship) 




Procedural mitigation such as return to base 
or land. 
   Loss of signal and position data 
(ownship) 









System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Onboard  
 










Procedure action (e.g. RTB, go to ground, 
loiter) 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Supporting Systems Offboard  
 










 Replacement parts (can include PC) AND 
procedure action (e.g. RTB, go to ground, 
loiter) 
Mechanical failure due to 
fatigue 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, System Management MMI   
 










Provide redundant information [e.g., direct 
feed from sensor(s) on a separate display] 
AND apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Horizontal representation of 
multiple targets is incorrect (in 
optional IDS) 
 1E 3E  
Provide health monitoring system that alerts 
to this issue (e.g. monitor position relative to a 
fixed reference target) AND apply a mitigation 
like return-to-base or land 
Horizontal representation of 
multiple targets is incorrect (in 
optional IDS) 
 1E 3E  
Provide redundant information (e.g., from 
GCS) AND apply a mitigation like return-to-
base or land 
Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed 
for multiple aircraft   (in optional 
IDS) 
 1E 3E  
Apply a procedural mitigation such as checking 
aircraft altitudes via radio communications 
AND apply a mitigation like return-to-base or 
land 
Erroneous aircraft altitude displayed 
for multiple aircraft   (in optional 
IDS) 
 1E 3E  
Check categories of known targets (e.g., 
ownship) 
Erroneous aircaft ID/category 
displayed  (in optional IDS) 
 3C 5C  
Procedurally preclude PIC from assuming 
intruders' performance based on category 
Erroneous aircaft ID/category 
displayed  (in optional IDS) 






System Type and Element: 
ABDAA, Hardware, System Management 
MMI   
 










Procedural action (e.g., land) until 
management MMI is restored. 
Power outage  5C 5C  
Procedural action until management MMI is 
restored. 






System Type and Element: ABDAA, Hardware, Algorithm    
 










Health monitoring (MMI) and procedural 
mitigation (e.g., RTB or land) 
Hardware failure with system on 
which the algorithm (conflict 
identification and resolution 
identification) resides. 







System Type and Element: GBDAA, HITL, Human Execution Error    









Practical performance evaluation added to 
training AND required reporting of 
colorblindness. 
User is colorblind when the Man-
Machine interface uses color 
T 1E 5E  
Practical performance evaluation added to 
training AND required reporting of hearing 
limitations. 
User is deaf when the Man-Machine 
interface uses aural alerts 





Software Standards Mitigations 
 
System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Active     















System Type and Element: GBDAA, Sensor, Passive     


















System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Active     


















System Type and Element: ABDAA, Sensor, Passive     


















System Type and Element: ABDAA, Software, Algorithm    
 









Build and test software to an agreed 
level within DO-178C 
Software lacks robustness/maturity E 1D 1E  
 
